Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Confidence to spare: individual differences in cognitive and metacognitive arrogance and competence

  • Published:
Metacognition and Learning Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

While some individuals are able to confidently make competent choices, others make poor decisions but are unjustifiably confident. What are their individual characteristics? This study examined individual differences in cognitive and metacognitive competence and arrogance. In doing so, we determined the role of metacognitive confidence and self-monitoring in competence and arrogance. We also investigated the predictive validity of the resulting model to decision-making competence. Psychology undergraduates (N = 180) completed measures of intelligence, on-task confidence, arrogant-and dogmatic-like traits and thinking dispositions. Confirmatory Factor Analysis revealed that the most parsimonious solution was a hierarchical two-factor model defined by broad Cognitive and Metacognitive Competence and Arrogance factors. The broad Competence was defined by positive loadings from Intelligence and Confidence factors and a negative loading from the Dogmatism factor. The broad Arrogance factor was defined by positive loadings from Confidence, Arrogance, and Dogmatism factors, but no loading from the Intelligence. Therefore, the study determined that the Confidence trait loaded on both factors while a first-order Intelligence factor loaded on Competence only. Thus, while arrogant individuals were as confident as competent individuals, this confidence was not justified by their performance and ability. Moreover, Arrogance positively predicted higher bias, confidence, prediction and evaluation estimates, but not actual performance on a decision task. In contrast, the Competence factor positively predicted the accuracy of performance. Supporting and extending the Koriat’s (1997) cue utilization theory, the current results indicated that test- and (systematic) individual-specific sources of diagnostic cues underlie judgment accuracy, however, they seem to play different roles for individuals based on their relative standing within the Cognitive and Metacognitive Competence and Arrogance taxonomy. Extending Dunning et.al (2003), some “people tend to be blissfully unaware of their incompetence” and are “triply cursed” as they are also dogmatic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. We acknowledge that there are three measures assessing workplace arrogance (Johnson et al., 2010), intellectual arrogance in the context of religious leadership (McElroy et al., 2014), and mental materialism and ideological territoriality (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017). However, the first two measures are outside the scope of the present research, which focuses on cognitive arrogance. The third measure, although does not capture cognitive and metacognitive arrogance directly, may be of some relevance to its nomological network, but it was published after this research was conceived and executed. Future studies should investigate its convergence with the broad Arrogance factor described below.

  2. Some authors refer to this score as overconfidence bias or calibration bias (e.g., Bruine de Bruin & Parker, 2005; Yates, 1990). In this paper, however, we will use the term ‘bias’ score only to reflect the fact that people may exhibit both, over- and under-confidence (see Stankov, 1999 for a review).

  3. The tasks were administered as part of a combined protocol for two separate theses. The second project compared self-report measures of the Confidence trait to on-task confidence assessments. The measures capturing self-assessment of confidence and various self-concepts are outside of the scope of this paper and are not presented here.

  4. Random missing data (one value for the Vocabulary Test due to technical error, and three missing values for age) were imputed using the Expectation Maximisation Method in SPSS v22.

  5. The Pessimism Bias score of the Optimistic Bias measure also had a low reliability estimate (alpha = .50). Given that it was not entirely within the scope of this research, it was omitted from all further analyses.

  6. The graphical depiction of the three models which had relevant bias scores as Dependent Variables were virtually identical; thus, the model based on the confidence bias score only is presented as a Figure 6. The results for each model, however, are shown in Table 6.

  7. Given that correlation between second-order Competence and Arrogance factors did not reach statistical significance (r = −.21, p =. 077), it was omitted and not modelled in Models 2 a-c.

References

  • Ackerman, R. (2014). The diminishing criterion model for metacognitive regulation of time investment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(3), 1349–1368.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ackerman, R., & Zalmanov, H. (2012). The persistence of the fluency–confidence association in problem solving. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(6), 1187–1192.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allwood, C. M., & Granhag, P. A. (1999). Feelings of confidence and the realism of confidence judgments in everyday life. In P. Juslin & H. Montgomery (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: Neo-Brunswikian and process-tracing approaches (pp. 123–146). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ames, D. R., Rose, P., & Anderson, C. P. (2006). The NPI-16 as a short measure of narcissism. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(4), 440–450.

    Google Scholar 

  • Azevedo, R. (2009). Theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and instructional issues in research on metacognition and self-regulated learning: A discussion. Metacognition and Learning, 4(1), 87–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barelds, D. P., & Dijkstra, P. (2010). Narcissistic personality inventory: Structure of the adapted dutch version. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51(2), 132–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, J. (2000). Thinking and deciding (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bruin, A.B., Kok, E.M., Lobbestael, J., & Grip, A. (2016). The impact of an online tool for monitoring and regulating learning at university: Overconfidence, learning strategy, and personality. Metacognition and Learning, 1–23.

  • Bruine de Bruin, W., Missier, F. D., & Levin, P. I. (2012). Individual differences in decision-making competence. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25, 329–330.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2007). Individual differences in adult decision-making competence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(5), 938.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns, K. M., Burns, N. R., & Ward, L. (2016). Confidence–more a personality or ability trait? It depends on how it is measured: A comparison of young and older adults. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, W. K., Rudich, E. A., & Sedikides, C. (2002). Narcissism, self-esteem, and the positivity of self-views: Two portraits of self-love. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(3), 358–368.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, W. K., Bush, C. P., Brunell, A. B., & Shelton, J. (2005). Understanding the social costs of narcissism: The case of the tragedy of the commons. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1358–1368.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cattell, R. B. (1963). Theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence: A critical experiment. Journal of Educational Psychology, 54(1), 1–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cleary, M., Walter, G., Sayers, L., Lopez, V., & Hungerford, C. (2015). Arrogance in the workplace: Implications for mental health nurses. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 36(4), 266–271.

    Google Scholar 

  • Costa Jr., P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). The five-factor model of personality and its relevance to personality disorders. Journal of Personality Disorders, 6(4), 343.

    Google Scholar 

  • Costa, P. T., McCrae, R. R., & Dye, D. A. (1991). Facet scales for agreeableness and conscientiousness: A revision of the NEO personality inventory. Personality and Individual Differences, 12(9), 887–898.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2018). Reflections on self-reflection: Contemplating flawed self-judgments in the clinic, classroom, and office cubicle. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(2), 185–189.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunning, D., Johnson, K., Ehrlinger, J., & Kruger, J. (2003). Why people fail to recognize their own incompetence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(3), 83–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Del Missier, F., Mäntylä, T., & Bruin, W. B. (2012). Decision-making competence, executive functioning, and general cognitive abilities. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(4), 331–351.

    Google Scholar 

  • Efklides, A. (2008). Metacognition: Defining its facets and levels of functioning in relation to self-regulation and co-regulation. European Psychologist, 13(4), 277–287.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlinger, J., Johnson, K., Banner, M., Dunning, D., & Kruger, J. (2008). Why the unskilled are unaware: Further explorations of (absent) self-insight among the incompetent. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 105(1), 98–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • El-Anzi, F. O. (2005). Academic achievement and its relationship with anxiety, self-esteem, optimism, and pessimism in Kuwaiti students. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 33(1), 95–104.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elliot, A. J., & Dweck, C. S. (2005). Handbook of competence and motivation. New York, NY: The Guildford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. S. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farwell, L., & Wohlwend-Lloyd, R. (1998). Narcissistic processes: Optimistic expectations, favorable self-evaluations, and self-enhancing attributions. Journal of Personality, 66(1), 65–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, R., & Gough, H. G. (2006). The international personality item pool and the future of public-domain personality measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 84–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gorsuch, R. L. (2003). Factor analysis. Handbook of psychology. John Wiley & Sons, Inc..

  • Gregg, A. P., Mahadevan, N., & Sedikides, C. (2017). Intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility: Correlational evidence for an evolutionaryembodied-epistemological account. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12(1), 59–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hickman, S. E., Watson, P. J., & Morris, R. J. (1996). Optimism, pessimism, and the complexity of narcissism. Personality and Individual Differences, 20(4), 521–525.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hogarth, R. M. (2010). Intuition: A challenge for psychological research on decision-making. Psychological Inquiry, 21(4), 228–353.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horn, J. L., & Noll, J. (1997). Human cognitive capabilities: Gf-Gc theory. In D. P. Flanagan, J. L. Genshaft, & P. L. Harrison (Eds.), Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues (pp. 53–91). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horvath, S., & Morf, C. C. (2010). To be grandiose or not to be worthless: Different routes to self-enhancement for narcissism and self-esteem. Journal of Research in Personality, 44(5), 585–592.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, S. A., Kleitman, S., Howie, P., & Stankov, L. (2016a). ognitive abilities, monitoring, and control explain individual differences in heuristics and biases. Frontiers-Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01559.

  • Jackson, S. A., Kleitman, S., Stankov, L., & Howie, P. (2017). Individual differences in decision making depend on cognitive abilities, monitoring and control. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making., 30(2), 209–223. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1939.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, S. A., Kleitman, S., Stankov, L., & Howie, P. (2016b). Decision pattern analysis as a general framework for studying individual differences in decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 29(4), 392–408. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1887.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, S. A., & Kleitman, S. (2014). Individual differences in decision-making and confidence: Capturing decision tendencies in a fictitious medical test. Metacognition and Learning, 9(1), 25–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jonsson, A. C., & Allwood, C. M. (2003). Stability and variability in the realism of confidence judgments over time, content domain, and gender. Personality and Individual Differences, 34(4), 559–574.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, R. E., Silverman, S. B., Shyamsunder, A., Swee, H. Y., Rodopman, O. B., Cho, E., & Bauer, J. (2010). Acting superior but actually inferior?: Correlates and consequences of workplace arrogance. Human Performance, 23, 403–427.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. The American Psychologist, 58(9), 697–720.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleitman, S. (2008). Metacognition in the rationality debate: Self-confidence and its calibration. Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleitman, S., & Stankov, L. (2001). Ecological and person-oriented aspects of metacognitive processes in test-taking. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15(3), 321–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kleitman, S., & Stankov, L. (2007). Self-confidence and metacognitive processes. Learning and Individual Differences, 17(2), 161–173.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koriat, A. (1997). Monitoring one's own knowledge during study: A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126(4), 349–370.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koriat, A., Nussinson, R., Bless, H., & Shaked, N. (2008). Information-based and experiencebased metacognitive judgments: Evidence from subjective confidence. In I. J. Dunlosky & R. A. Bjork (Eds.), Handbook of memory and metamemory (pp. 117–135). New York: Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1977). Do those who know more also know more about how much they know? Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 20(2), 159–183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marsh, H. W. (1987). The hierarchical structure of self-concept and the application of hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis. Journal of Educational Measurement, 24(1), 17–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Davis, D. E., Hook, J., N., Hill, P. C., …, Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical elaborations in the context of religious leadership. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 42(1), 19–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meagher, B. R., Leman, J. C., Bias, J. P., Latendresse, S. J., & Rowatt, W. C. (2015). Contrasting self-report and consensus ratings of intellectual humility and arrogance. Journal of Research in Personality, 58, 35–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008). The trouble with overconfidence. Psychological Review, 115(2), 502–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, S. C., von Hippel, W., Dubbs, S. L., Angilletta, M. J., Wilson, R. S., Trivers, R., & Barlow, F. K. (2015). The role of overconfidence in romantic desirability and competition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(8), 1036–1052.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pallier, G., Wilkinson, R., Danthiir, V., Kleitman, S., Knezevic, G., Stankov, L., & Roberts, R. D. (2002). The role of individual differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments. The Journal of General Psychology, 129(3), 257–299.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2005). Decision-making competence: External validation through an individual-differences approach. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18(1), 1–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parker, A. M., & Stone, E. R. (2014). Indentifying the Effects of Unjustified Confidence versus Overconfidence: Lessons Learned from Two Analytic Methods. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 27, 134–145.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parker, A. M., Bruine de Bruin, W., Yoong, J., & Willis, R. (2012). Inappropriate Confidence and Retirement Planning: Four Studies with a National Sample. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(4), 382–389.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Item selection and validation of a brief, 15-item version of the Need for Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(1), 90–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowatt, W. C., Powers, C., Targhetta, V., Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & Labouff, J. (2006). Development and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to arrogance. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1(4), 198–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudolph, J., Niepel, C., Greiff, S., Goldhammer, F., & Kröner, S. (2017). Metacognitive confidence judgments and their link to complex problem solving. Intelligence, 63, 1–8.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuel, D. B., & Widiger, T. A. (2008). Convergence of narcissism measures from the perspective of general personality functioning. Assessment, 15, 364–374.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson, P. L., Jarvinen, M. J., Paulus, T. B., Church, I. M., Hardy, S. A., & Barrett, J. L. (2015). Implicit theories of intellectual virtues and vices: A focus on intellectual humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 10(5), 389–406.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schunk, D. H., & Pajares, F. (2005). Competence perceptions and academic functioning. In A. J. Elliot & C. S. Dweck (Eds.), Handbook of competence and motivation (pp. 85–104). New York, NY: The Guildford Press.

  • Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy?: Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(3), 400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stankov, L. (1997). The Gf/Gc Quickie Test Battery: Unpublished test battery available from the School of Psychology, University of Sydney.

  • Stankov, L. (1999). Mining on the “no man’s land” between intelligence and personality. In P. L. Ackerman, P. C. Kyllonen, & R. D. Roberts (Eds.), Learning and individual differences: Process, trait, and content determinants (pp. 315–337). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stankov, L., & Crawford, J. (1997). Self-confidence and performance on cognitive tests. Intelligence, 25, 93–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stankov, L., Kleitman, S., & Jackson, S. A. (2014). Measures of the Trait of Confidence. In G. J. Boyle, D. H. Salofske, & G. Matthews (Eds.), Measures of personality and social psychological constructs (pp. 158–189). Burlington: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89(2), 342.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127(2), 161–188.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2016). Real-World Correlates of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks in a Community Sample. Journal of Behavioural Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.

  • Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (Fifth ed.). New York: Pearson International Edition.

  • Thompson, C., Aitken, L., Doran, D., & Dowding, D. (2013). An agenda for clinical decision making and judgement in nursing research and education. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 50(12), 1720–1726.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thόrisdόttir, H., & Jost, J. T. (2011). Motivated closed-mindedness mediates the effect of threat on political conservatism. Political Psychology, 32, 785–811.

  • Trumpeter, N., Watson, P. J., & O’Leary, B. J. (2006). Factors within multidimensional perfectionism scales: Complexity of relationships with self-esteem, narcissism, self-control, and self-criticism. Personality and Individual Differences, 41(5), 849–860.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. The Journal of Business, 59(4), 251–278.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90(4), 293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049–1062.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiner, B. (2005). Motivation from an attribution perspective and the social psychology of perceived competence In Andrew J. Elliot & Carol S. Dweck (eds.), Handbook of Competence and Motivation. (pp. 73–78). The Guilford Press.

  • Wenglert, L., & Rosen, A. S. (2000). Measuring optimism–pessimism from beliefs about future events. Personality and Individual Differences, 28(4), 717–728.

    Google Scholar 

  • West, R. F., Meserve, R. J., & Stanovich, K. E. (2012). Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(3), 506–519.

    Google Scholar 

  • West, R. F., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2008). Heuristics and biases as measures of critical thinking: Associations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Journal of Educational Psychology, 100(4), 930–941.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilhelm, O., Schroeders, U., & Schipolowski, S. (2009). BEFKI. Berliner Test zur Erfassung fluider und kristalliner Intelligenz [Berlin test of fluid and crystallized intelligence]. Unpublished Manuscript.

  • Wilhelm, O., Schroeders, U., & Schipolowski, S. (2014). BEFKI – Berlin Test for the measurement of fluid and crystallized intelligence (middle school form). Göttingen: Hogrefe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yates, J. F. (1990). Judgment and decision-making. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Funding

This project was not funded.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia

    Sabina Kleitman, Jessica Sik-Wai Hui & Yixin Jiang

Authors
  1. Sabina Kleitman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jessica Sik-Wai Hui
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Yixin Jiang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sabina Kleitman.

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval was obtained from the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee (ID#2015/208).

Conflict of interest

The first author of this manuscript is acting as the Associate Editor of the Metacognition and Learning journal and the Guest Editor of the SI titled Applied Metacognition. The manuscript, however, will be handled by the second Guest Editor of this SI, Prof Susanne Narciss. Thus, the authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher’s note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Electronic supplementary material

ESM 1

(DOCX 16 kb)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kleitman, S., Hui, J.SW. & Jiang, Y. Confidence to spare: individual differences in cognitive and metacognitive arrogance and competence. Metacognition Learning 14, 479–508 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11409-019-09210-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11409-019-09210-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation