Abstract
The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, “it is time for an ‘emotional revolution’ in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom as are cognitive and reflective factors” (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück’s appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel.
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Notes
A skill at the level of expertise requires good practical reasoning. However, saying that emotions are “necessary” for reasoning does not imply that emotions are necessary for “good” reasoning. Ronald de Sousa claims that the “philosophers’ frame problem”—that is, the problem about “how to make use of just what we need from this vast store, and how not to retrieve what we don’t need” (de Sousa 1987: 193)—can be solved by emotions, because “an emotion limits the range of information that the organism will take into account, the inferences actually drawn from a potential infinity, and the set of live options among which it will choose” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Even if emotions are “necessary” for reasoning in the above sense, this does not imply that it is emotions that define the goodness of good reasoning. To some extent, we can view the relation between emotions and reasoning in Antonio Damasio’s perspective; that is, “The emotional signal is not a substitute for proper reasoning. It has an auxiliary role, increasing the efficiency of the reasoning process and making it speedier” (Damasio 2003: 148). Nonetheless, this does not exclude the scenarios in which emotions distort the processes of reasoning.
Similarly, in order to develop the skill analogy of virtue, Julia Annas gives an explanation of the relation between virtue and emotions to “bring out the way in which the skill analogy points us not just to something important about the ‘cognitive’ side of virtue, the way that the virtuous person thinks, but also to something significant about the way the virtuous person feels” (Annas 2011: 82).
In this paper, if the term “skill account” is used, it is always an abbreviation for “skill account of the emotions of the wise”, and if the term “skill model” is used, it is always an abbreviation for the “skill model of wisdom”.
Glück and Weststrate (2022) employ different terms to describe these two models: “personality-focused model” and “cognitive-focused model”.
There seems to be another reason: “At a conceptual level, I have argued … that emotions and emotional competencies are inherent in wisdom, as are certain cognitions and knowledge contents. Why should such a useful part of human nature not be a core element of wisdom? If wisdom is among the highest virtues, and if it is truly integrative and holistic, then it does not exclude one faculty of the mind” (Kunzmann 2022: 168).
The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm does not ignore emotions or emotional competencies as antecedents and consequences of wisdom, for it asserts that its “conception of wisdom includes as antecedents, correlates, and consequences a rich spectrum of specific cognitive, emotional, motivational, and social factors as well as life contexts” (Baltes and Kunzmann 2004: 290; emphasis mine). Kunzmann and Glück know this well, for they claim that in the work of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, “emotional processes and competencies have been considered antecedents and consequences, but not an integral part, of wisdom” (Kunzmann and Glück 2019: 576; see also Kunzmann and Glück 2019: 589). Therefore, the debate of interest in the present paper lies in whether emotions and emotional competence are components or elements of wisdom.
In this paper, I mention several key figures in the philosophy of emotions, including Antonio Damasio, Jesse Prinz, Robert Solomon, Ronald de Sousa, and others. While certain points they made suit the purpose of this paper, it should be noted that this does not imply an endorsement of their overall positions on emotions.
To put the thesis that empathy is not necessary for morality more precisely in Prinz’s own words: “The suggestion that empathy is necessary for morality can be interpreted in at least three different ways. One might hold the view that empathy is necessary for making moral judgment. One might think empathy is necessary for moral development. And one might think empathy is necessary for motivating moral conduct. I think each of these conjectures is false. Empathy is not necessary for any of these things” (Prinz 2011a: 213). Nancy Snow also argues that empathy is not necessary for morality. The case she uses is as follows: “consider that high-functioning autistics are capable of obeying moral rules, though many lack empathic feeling for others. They are able to comply with traditional moral prohibitions, and even to engage in prosocial helping behavior, though they do so in relatively unempathic ways” (Snow 2000: 74).
Cf. “Consider a doctor or nurse whose surplus of empathy with a patient prevents her from providing needed care in an emergency. The caregiver fails to fulfill a professional and moral obligation because of too much empathy” (Snow 2000: 74). The case that torture requires empathy also indicates that empathy is not sufficient for morality.
All versions of the skill model of wisdom agree with this point, although their reasons are not the same.
I use the term “the emotions of the wise” rather than the term “wise emotions” in this paper. The term “the emotions of the wise” refers to the emotions experienced by individuals considered wise. It emphasizes the relationship between wisdom and emotions. “Wise emotions”, on the other hand, focuses more on describing the emotions themselves, possibly in specific contexts where there are emotionally intelligent responses. It does not emphasize that these emotions are experienced by wise individuals. Someone might exhibit emotionally intelligent responses in a moral dilemma, even if they are not considered wise in other aspects.
Cf. “I characterized wisdom as knowledge about what matters, why it matters, and how to achieve it” (Thagard 2010: 214). This characterization, although rudimentary, encapsulates the essence the skill model of wisdom. However, I am not suggesting that Thagard is a proponent of the skill model of wisdom. This depends, in part, on whether one is willing to address and respond to the issues concerning the dissimilarity between wisdom and skill, and to argue against the dissimilarity if it might undermine the model.
To feel no anger does not mean to suppress the anger. Here Solomon’s illustration is instructive for understanding how the wise feels no anger, although Solomon’s aim is to show that emotions contain a cognitive component: “I’m at a new neighborhood shop, in a great rush. The salesman is amiably chatting with the customer before me, and I get extremely irritated. I would be furious, but I think, ‘This is a new shop; this is exactly what this person ought to be doing. I’m the one whose haste is out of place.’ And so I do not get furious, I just remain impatient, which I try to hide. After a moment or two, I start enjoying the conversation, as I think, ‘Isn’t it nice to live in a city where people still treat each other so nicely.’ I’m not suppressing my emotion; I have transformed it through reflection” (Solomon 1995: 222).
Zagzebski’s distinction is related to the theory of direct reference and is used to develop her exemplarist moral theory. I will not delve into these discussions.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the guest editors, Maria Silvia Vaccarezza and Michel Croce, for their kind invitation to contribute to this special issue. I am also thankful to Wan-chuan Fang, Chih-hsing Ho, Jay Jian, Daisy Ku, Yung-djong Shaw, Norman Teng, Chih-ming Wang, Zhu Xu, Zhenhua Yu, and in particular two anonymous referees for Topoi for their valuable criticisms, comments and suggestions. This work is part of the project “The Expertise Theory of Wisdom Deepened, Extended, and Applied” funded by the National Science and Technology Council of Taiwan (NSTC 112-2410-H-001-030-MY3).
Funding
This research was supported by National Science and Technology Council (Grant No. NSTC112-2410-H-001-030-MY3).
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Tsai, Ch. Phronesis and Emotion: The Skill Model of Wisdom Developed. Topoi (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-10003-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-10003-w