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Moral Obligation as a Conclusive Reason: On Bernard Williams’ Critique of the Morality System

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Abstract

Bernard Williams’ critique of the morality system, as illustrated in his reading of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, is intended to show both that real moral conflicts can arise, and that a moral obligation is merely one reason among others and can be defeated by the thick concepts of a shared ethical life. In response, I want to advance two lines of argument. First, when Williams argues that a moral obligation can be the locus of moral conflict, a further step is required to explain why one should feel regret for not acting on a defeated reason. Second, Williams presupposes that, when a conflict is resolved, the conclusive reason will be a thick ethical concept, but there is no compelling justification for that assumption.

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  1. University of Galway, Galway, Ireland

    Allyn Fives

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Fives, A. Moral Obligation as a Conclusive Reason: On Bernard Williams’ Critique of the Morality System. Topoi 43, 425–434 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09990-7

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