Abstract
If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question “Is what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?” with Neither.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For the sake of brevity I will henceforth talk only in terms of moral right and wrong (as opposed to good and bad, or obligatory and permissible).
The label moral ‘anti-realism’ is used in the literature as applying not only to the views that construe rightness and wrongness as ultimately a function of our judgments about them, but also to the views that deny the existence of rightness and wrongness altogether. In this essay I am interested only in the question of whether moral rightness and wrongness, assuming that they exist, are ultimately dependent on, or independent of, our actual judgments. Hence, I will set aside views, such as error theory, that deny the very existence of moral rightness and wrongness. My claims regarding moral anti-realism, therefore, are not meant to apply to all views in the literature that identify as “anti-realist”.
These are the actual examples that the critics of anti-realism frequently employ (Dworkin 1996, 2011; Shafer-Landau 2003). They are put forward as actions that virtually everyone will agree are reprehensible. Hence the severity of the cases – not even torturing babies, for instance, but torturing babies for fun.
Blackburn 1988, too, essentially makes the same point, although he uses the terms “antirealism” and “realism” differently in that article.
Kramer 2009 makes a similar point about how abstract theses about morality can be substantive moral.
What makes such an account of the permissibility of the action in question “realist” is, of course, only the last part – namely, the appeal to an independent reality. Otherwise, a “realist” may or may not be a Kantian or a utilitarian, may or may not point to self-defense at all as a morally relevant factor, and may or may not consider the action permissible in the first place. In all these examples in which I offer moral analyses of specific actions, I intend to provide only helpful illustrations – I do not mean to claim that these analyses are accurate or comprehensive.
The real target of this essay is realism, so I will not say much in support of the above objection against anti-realism. I will essentially take it for granted. But the nature of the objection, and thus the nature of the mistake in anti-realism are important. For objections against anti-realism along these lines, see Dworkin 2011 and Shafer-Landau 2003, for instance.
According to Enoch, for instance, that is in fact the main advantage of his “robust realism” over a mere denial of anti-realism. Discussing the importance of normatively distinguishing between a mere preference case (where standing your ground in a difference of opinion would be unreasonable) and a case of moral disagreement (where standing your ground would, or could be morally appropriate), Enoch claims that, although anyone can acknowledge this normative difference, only a robust realist (who postulates an independently existing moral realm) has an explanation for it. He says: “[the realist] can cite the metaphysical difference between the two as further explanation…[he has] more to offer by way of explanation of the moral distinction between different kinds of disagreement and conflict. And this difference in explanatory power counts in favor of the [realist].” (Enoch 2011, p. 33) Leaving aside whether or not Enoch is right about this explanatory advantage, I think it is clear that he intends his realism to go beyond the mere rejection of anti-realism – he is positing something (a metaphysically robust independent realm) which not only entails the negation of anti-realism (in the substantive moral sense), but also, allegedly, provides a rationale for it.
I am especially grateful to David Velleman and Bart Streumer for pushing me on this fundamental point.
This idea actually goes back to Blackburn 1988 where Blackburn claims that the question as to whether rightness or wrongness depends on our actual judgments can only be understood as a first-order moral one. This is in fact precisely his argument for why he, as an expressivist, can affirm the mind-independence of moral truths (he was using the label “anti-realism” in a different sense then. As Blackburn acknowledges in that article, however, to many other philosophers this seems to be simply being “willfully deaf” to the second, morally neutral, metaphysical understanding of the realist assertion of mind-independence.
Dworkin explicitly appeals to “Hume’s principle” in this context on Dworkin 2011, p. 99.
References
Blackburn S (1988) How to be an ethical antirealist. Midwest Stud Philos 12:361–375
Boyd R (1988) How to be a moral realist. In: Sayre-McCord G (ed) Essays on moral realism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 181–228
Brink D (2001) Realism, naturalism, and moral semantics. Soc Philos Policy 18:154–176
Dworkin R (1996) Objectivity and truth: you’d better believe it. Philos Public Aff 25(2):87–139
Dworkin R (2011) Justice for hedgehogs. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Enoch D (2011) Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, 1st edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Foot P (2001) Natural goodness. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Harman G ((1977) The nature of morality: An introduction to ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Harman G (1986) Moral explanations of natural facts: Can moral claims be tested against moral reality?” In N. Gillespie (ed.) Spindel Conference: Moral Realism. South J Philos 24:57–68
Kant, I (2012) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, New York, Cambridge University Press; 2nd edition
Kramer M (2009) Moral realism as a moral doctrine. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford
Mackie JL (1977) Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Penguin, Harmondsworth
Mill, JS (2002) Utilitarianism. Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2nd edition
Nagel T (2001) The last word. Oxford University Press, New York
Railton P (1989) Naturalism and prescriptivity. Soc Philos and Policy 95:51–174
Scanlon T (2014) Being Realistic About Reasons, 1st edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Shafer-Landau R (2003) Moral realism: A defence. Oxford University Press, New York
Street S (2010) What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics. Philos Compass 5(5):363–384
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to David Velleman, Sharon Street, Hartry Field, and David Enoch, for extensive comments on earlier versions of this paper. I have also greatly benefited from conversations with Ayca Boylu, and from the feedback I received at presentations at the philosophy departments of Johns Hopkins University, New York University, University of Illinois at Chicago, Colgate University, Bogazici University, Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, as well as at the 2015 British Society for Ethics Conference at the University of Southampton.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Erdur, M. A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 591–602 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9676-3
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9676-3