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Varieties of Metalinguistic Negotiation

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Abstract

In both co-authored and solo-authored work over the past decade, we have developed the idea of “metalinguistic negotiation”. On our view, metalinguistic negotiation is a type of dispute in which speakers appear to use (rather than explicitly mention) a term in conflicting ways to put forward views about how that very term should be used. In this paper, we explore four possible dimensions of variation among metalinguistic negotiations, and the interactions among those dimensions. These types of variation matter for understanding the nature, and the potential range, of the phenomenon of metalinguistic negotiation. As an illustration of the latter, we argue in our concluding section that understanding the full range of forms that metalinguistic negotiations can take has implications for debates about the “implementation” of conceptual engineering proposals.

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Notes

  1. For the relevant co-authored work summarized in this paragraph, see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, b, 2014, 2021a, b). We both develop and expand on the idea of metalinguistic negotiation in solo-authored work, including in Plunkett (2015, 2016), Sundell (2011a, b, 2016, 2017). We also further develop our views in recent co-authored work with Rachel Sterken (2023).

  2. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, b).

  3. For further discussion about the metaethics case, concerning the argument put forward in Horgan and Timmons (1993), see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a), and for further discussion focused on philosophy of law, regarding the argument put forward in Dworkin (1986), see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a).

  4. See Plunkett and Sundell (2021b).

  5. For further discussion, see Plunkett and Sundell (2021b).

  6. Our discussion below draws together ideas presented in the works cited in the first footnote, while closely following the basic line of presentation from Plunkett and Sundell (2013a).

  7. Barker (2002).

  8. Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b).

  9. On the understanding of “conceptual ethics” we are working with, conceptual ethics is sometimes tied to “conceptual engineering”, which (put roughly) connects conceptual ethics to work on the design and implementation of proposed conceptual changes. For further discussion of this connection, see Burgess and Plunkett (2020) and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020). Later in this paper, we turn to some issues about the implementation aspect of conceptual engineering projects.

  10. For connected discussion, see Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b), and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020).

  11. See, for example, our work in Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, 2021a, b).

  12. For more discussion of the points in what follows, see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, b), Sundell (2011a, 2016), and Plunkett (2015).

  13. For connected discussion of this kind of idea, see Burgess and Plunkett (2013b), Plunkett and Sundell (2013a), Sundell (2011b), Plunkett (2015), Haslanger (2000), and Thomasson (2020).

  14. For example, consider the framework that Barker develops in Barker (2013). For further discussion, see Plunkett and Sundell (2021b).

  15. For some different recent takes on this issue (or closely connected ones, about similar kinds of disputes), see Mankowitz (2021), Thomasson (2016), Khoo (2020), Belleri (2017), Kocurek et al. (2020), Bolinger (2022), and Soria-Ruiz (2023). We briefly discuss some of our own ideas on this issue in Plunkett and Sundell (2021b).

  16. For previous work where we emphasize this point, see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, b, 2021a).

  17. For Ludlow’s original discussion of the case, see Ludlow (2008). For some of our previous discussion of this case, see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, b).

  18. In this paper, we use small caps (e.g., cat) to name concepts, italics (e.g., cat) to introduce terminology or for rhetorical stress, single quotes (e.g., ‘cat’) to mention linguistic expressions, and double quotes (e.g., “cat”) for quoting other authors, “scare quoting”, simultaneous use and mention, and other informal uses.

  19. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013a).

  20. Versions of this goal, and the previous one, are arguably at the core of a number of cases we have discussed at length in previous work; including metalinguistic disputes about how best to use philosophical or scientific terms. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013a), Plunkett (2015), and Sundell (2011a).

  21. In much of our previous work we have emphasized the importance of differences between these kinds of aims and the aims of engaging in successful inquiry. See, for example, our discussion in Plunkett and Sundell (2013a).

  22. Consider Crocodile Dundee’s statement, insulting a blade-wielding interlocutor who had attempted to appear threatening: “That’s not a knife. This is a knife.” For recent work that emphasizes the kinds of practical issues about domination and power in metalinguistic negotiation (or connected disputes involving conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering), see Shields (2021) and Podosky (2022). These issues are also prominent in Ludlow’s discussion in (Ludlow 2014).

  23. For connected discussion, see Davies (2021). See also related ideas in Eidelson (2023), drawing on Nunberg (2018).

  24. We discuss this more in Plunkett and Sundell (2021a).

  25. This is a point that we have explored in greater detail in previous work. See Plunkett and Sundell (2014, 2021b). We emphasize in that earlier work that it’s consistent with our account not only that speakers engaged in a given metalinguistic negotiation not be aware of it, but indeed that they might vigorously resist such a characterization. As we have argued, there are theoretical resources available not only to accommodate speakers’ lack of awareness, but also to provide a deflationary account of that resistance. See Plunkett and Sundell (2021b). For recent critical discussion of our views here (which it is beyond the scope of this paper to address), see Abreu (2023) and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2023).

  26. For connected discussion, see Plunkett and Sundell (2021a).

  27. For previous discussion, see Plunkett and Sundell (2013a) and Plunkett (2015).

  28. This point connects to the phenomenon of “code words” (sometimes also discussed as “dog whistles”), and suggests ways in which metalinguistic negotiation might connect to some instances of the use of such words. For some of the recent discussion here on “code words”, and how their use ties into propaganda and other important socially important types of speech, see Khoo (2017), Saul (2018), Stanley (2015), and Quaranto (2022).

  29. We emphasize this point in Plunkett and Sundell (2013a).

  30. For discussion, see Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b), and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020).

  31. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, 2021a), and Plunkett (2015).

  32. See Ludlow (2014).

  33. Thanks to Valerie Friedmann for discussion. This illustration obviously oversimplifies the realities of city planning and development review.

  34. Our points above draw from Plunkett (2015).

  35. Our inclusion of these issues is tied to the broad uses of “normative” and “evaluative” that we favor for characterizing conceptual ethics. For connected discussion, see McPherson and Plunkett (2017).

  36. We note this issue in Plunkett and Sundell (2021a). For a view that analyzes “should” judgments in terms of “what to do” judgments, see Gibbard (2003). For views on which these are importantly distinct kinds of judgment, see Hieronymi (2009) and Southwood (2013).

  37. For connected discussion, see Hansen (2019), Khoo and Knobe (2016), and Kocurek et al. (2020).

  38. Shields (2021).

  39. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013a, b).

  40. This point matters not just for potential critiques of our views, such as Shields’s, but also just for understanding how our framework relates to other discussion of cases of metalinguistic disputes that differ from the cases we have focused on. For example, we think that in light of the discussion in this essay, our framework can incorporate key cases discussed by Podosky (2022) and Davies (2021).

  41. For further discussion of this understanding of conceptual engineering and its connections to conceptual ethics, see Burgess and Plunkett (2020) and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020). Note that there are subtle differences between these accounts. However, those differences won’t matter to us here. For a range of other accounts of what “conceptual engineering” is, see the papers collected in Burgess et al. (2020).

  42. For a view that emphasizes these larger kind of ambitions for key projects in conceptual engineering within philosophy (including his reading of certain paradigmatic examples of such projects), see Cappelen (2018). For arguments that push back against the idea that important conceptual engineering projects (including ones that are often taken to be paradigmatic examples of conceptual engineering within philosophy, such as Haslanger (2000)) really have this ambition, see Pinder (2021) and Riggs (2019).

  43. Koslow (2022) discusses Kevin Scharp’s proposals regarding truth (in Scharp (2013)) as a limiting case with respect to the small size of the linguistic population targeted, despite Scharp’s proposal still being directed at a group. (Namely, logicians, or those facing “liar-shaped predicaments”.) If Scharp’s proposal—directed at a small group, but a group nonetheless—is a limiting case, then changes directed at individual speakers or specific conversations—like the changes advocated in classic cases of metalinguistic negotiation—are unlikely to even register as cases of conceptual engineering.

  44. For further discussion of these (and other) kinds of variation here, see Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b), and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020).

  45. See Scharp (2013) and Carnap (1947/1956).

  46. Sterken (2020).

  47. Sterken (2020, p. 420, emphasis Sterken’s).

  48. Sterken (2020, p. 420).

  49. Sterken (2020, p. 418).

  50. Jorem (2021, p. 190).

  51. Queloz and Bieber (2021).

  52. Koslow (2022).

  53. This might not be so, however, for Cappelen (2018)’s discussion of metalinguistic negotiation and conceptual engineering. Even there, however, we can take his comments to reflect a broader skepticism about metalinguistic negotiation, and a broader pessimism about intentional semantic revision, rather than being focused on the view that metalinguistic negotiations are too limited in scope to bear on projects in conceptual engineering.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Pedro Abreu, Chris Barker, Alexis Burgess, Elisabeth Camp, Herman Cappelen, Andy Egan, Jesse Ferraioli, Valerie Friedmann, Sean Kim, Devontae Lacasse, Zachary Lang, Peter Ludlow, Tristram McPherson, Mark Richard, Adrian Russian, Rachel Sterken, Giulia Terzian, Zoe Thierfelder, Amie Thomasson, Fangzhou Yu, anonymous referees, and audiences at the Nova University of Lisbon and the University of Warsaw for helpful discussion about ideas in this paper or for feedback on previous drafts of this paper.

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  1. Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

    David Plunkett

  2. Philosophy, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA

    Timothy Sundell

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Plunkett, D., Sundell, T. Varieties of Metalinguistic Negotiation. Topoi 42, 983–999 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09941-2

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