Abstract
Aim of the paper is to revise Boolos’ reinterpretation of second-order monadic logic in terms of plural quantification ([4], [5]) and expand it to full second order logic. Introducing the idealization of plural acts of choice, performed by a suitable team of agents, we will develop a notion of plural reference. Plural quantification will be then explained in terms of plural reference. As an application, we will sketch a structuralist reconstruction of second-order arithmetic based on the axiom of infinite à la Dedekind, as the unique non-logical axiom. We will also sketch a virtual interpretation of the classical continuum involving no other infinite than a countable plurality of individuals.
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Carrara, M., Martino, E. To Be is to Be the Object of a Possible Act of Choice. Stud Logica 96, 289–313 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9282-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9282-2