Notes
The view emerges when we read Phaedo 68c-69d with Republic 485a-487a.
For references and a concise summary, see Gonzalez 2000, 259 − 63.
Jonas talks as if virtue is justice, courage, and the like, and I will follow suit for simplicity. I realize that virtue might be, roughly, just the equipment with which one flourishes (whatever that equipment is—justice, courage, and so forth, or something else instead), in which case, perhaps, everyone always values virtue.
You can do this in addition to protrepticizing them or even just in protrepticizing them. In protrepticizing them, for example, you might do it if they think that virtue is a sham and that attaining power is all that matters, caseclosed, such that all that is necessary to determine how to live well is to calculate the surest means of attaining it. You might argue forcefully to the contrary just so they will hear out the alternative views.
See Zagzebski 2017, 110 ff. for reason to think a person is, at most, only partly virtuous unless they have reliable success in reaching virtuous ends and that this is the case regardless of how hard it is to reach them. ‘Reliable success’ is Zagzebski’s phrase. She implies, incidentally, that Socrates is at least partly virtuous; see especially 10.
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Marshall, M. Response to the Review Symposium on Reading Plato’s Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates’ Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement. Stud Philos Educ 41, 711–717 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-022-09848-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-022-09848-2