Abstract
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God.
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Notes
Where ‘p’ is the content of a truth-apt proposition. Two big picture issues to note from the start. First, it should be clear that I, as do most philosophers, favor an approach to modal epistemology where we should presume in favor of metaphysical possibility unless we have reason not to do so, as opposed to a more stingy approach of presuming against metaphysical possibility unless we have reason not to do so. The former approach ties possibilities to conceivability, the latter to something like chance in the actual world. The present reflection will therefore be off to a rough start to those sympathetic to the stingy approach. Thanks to a referee for pointing this out. Second, we might say, following Senor (1996), that a belief is prima facie justified when it bears the appropriate relation to a state or process that will make the belief ultima facie justified if there is no other state or process relevant to the justificatory evaluation of the belief.
Gendler and Hawthorne err in saying it is our ability to conceive of a scenario where p obtains that constitutes a reason to suppose p is possible; it is, rather, our conceiving of a scenario where p obtains constitutes a reason to suppose p is possible.
I should be clear that van Inwagen does not believe that the epistemic status of our modal judgments are on par with perceptual judgments; but I think he would agree that the similarities noted make it “easy to think they enjoy similar epistemic status.” Otherwise, it would be hard to see why he sets out to refute the idea that they are on par.
In fact, nearly all prominent discussions of the conceivability-to-possibility principle make explicit use of these ‘appears’ and ‘seems’ idioms. Berglund and Chalmers rely on them to hedge what seems or appears conceivable; Bealer and Yablo rely on them to hedge what seems or appears possible. Mcleod (2005, p. 240) notes Bealer and Yablo’s use of “seems” locutions. In fact, Bealer replaces ‘conceivability’ with a special case of intuition where by intuition he says “we mean seemings: for you to have an intuition that A is just for it to seem to you that A.” Gregory (2010) is one of the few who have explored this is in some detail, and does well to show the MPC’s reliance on something like PC.
For a defense of this principle, see Huemer (2001), ch. 5.
I replace “condition” with “situation” to avoid confusion when I discuss necessary and sufficient conditions.
Hence below we opt for a more modest construal of the subjunctive condition where if it there were no cat before Sam, he would not likely be appeared to catly.
Here’s a mirror example. I look out the window and imagine a flying pig crossing the sky. Now, I don’t literally see, with my eyeball, a flying pig. But it does appear to me, with my mind’s eye, that there is a flying pig. That being said, I am not prima face justified in believing there is actually a flying pig, since a “broad (and perhaps largely tacit) range of considerations” are brought to the cognized situation, including that I’m merely imagining it. I’ll discuss this example more below.
Wykstra’s principle, as formulated, may be subject to counterexamples like the following. Suppose it appears to me that I exist. If Wykstra’s principle is true, then it must be reasonable for me to believe that if it were not that case that I exist, then my cognitive situation would likely be different than it is in some way discernable by me. But that’s false, since if I didn’t exist, nothing would be discernable by me. In personal communication, Wykstra concedes that that his principle, as originally formulated, needs to be revised to account for such cases. He suggests something along the following lines: “On the basis of cognized situation s in which H is appeared to in certain aspects or ways discernable by H, human H is entitled to claim ‘It appears that p’ only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, it is not likely that the discernible-by-H ‘ways’ or ‘aspects’ of s would be same as they presently are.” The counterexample is now avoided, since if it were not the case that I exist, none of the discernible-by-me ways or aspects of my cognitive situation would obtain at all. But it seems to me that Wykstra may be conceding too much here. Does not the “given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them” clause of the original principle already take care of these types of counterexamples? For if H doesn't exist, H’s cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them are no longer given. Wykstra thinks this reply would not be true to the original intent of that clause, however. Regardless, as is clear below, I opt for a similar, but different, principle that also avoids such counterexamples. Thanks to a referee for raising these counterexamples, and to Stephen Wykstra for extensive discussion of them.
Chisholm, v. To make repeated small alterations in a definition or example. “He started with definition (d.8) and kept chisholming away at it until he ended up with (d.8′''''''').” See the esteemed Philosophical Lexicon (philosophicallexicon.com).
If S is to be propositionally justified in believing p, we will have to add as a further necessary condition that S believes p (cf. Chisholm’s analysis above), so that PC′ reads: If, on the basis of cognized situation c, it appears to S that p, then S is pf-justified in believing p if and only if S believes p and it is reasonable for S to believe that if it were not the case that p, c would likely not suggest that p. I omit this for simplicity.
It also applies to necessity claims of the sort “It appears necessary that p,” given that what is necessary is possible.
Swinburne (2004, 304) makes a similar observation with respect to perceptual appearances. He writes, “how things seem positively to be is evidence of how they are, but how things seem not to be is not such evidence….[I]f it seems to me that there is no table in the room, then there is only reason for supposing that there is not, if there are good grounds for supposing that I have looked everywhere in the room, and…would have seen one if there was one there.” Swinburne thinks, then, that additional, good grounds are needed to justify negative appearances; grounds for thinking one’s present sensory experience would have been different were it not the case that not-p.
Putting the matter in set language is only meant to be a useful way to capture the idea. Strictly identifying possible worlds as (maximal) sets of propositions runs into Cantorian-like paradoxes. See Chihara (1998, 120–141). We could instead think of possible worlds in terms of certain configurations of objects and properties.
At least according to the Stalnaker/Lewis analysis of counterfactuals. Thus, it is widely recognized that the Lewis/Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals cannot make sense of counterpossibles. See Goodman (2004).
Unless, of course, the apparent possibility is also actual.
Chalmers (2002, 153): “A situation is coherently imagined when it is possible to fill in arbitrary details in the imagined situation such that no contradiction reveals itself…it must be possible in principle to flesh out any missing details of an imagined situation that verifies S, such that the details are imagined clearly and distinctly, such that no contradiction is revealed.” Cf. also Williamson (2008, 145). Williamson correctly likens modal knowledge to perceptual knowledge in important respects, but oddly thinks modal knowledge is gained in cerebral acts of mental deductions. I agree with Jenkins (2008) that this is an implausible description of how we come to know modal truths, though I do think it is how we come to be uf-justified in believing modal propositions.
It is customary to speak of defeaters in these contexts. The variety and nature of defeaters is interesting and important subject, but speaking instead of ‘overriders’ is a convenient way of avoiding unnecessary forrays into that literature.
If there is in (8) an implicit reference to a negative existential in “unembodied,” perhaps we can replace it with (8*) Possibly, I am a spiritual substance; or (8**) Possibly, I am fundamentally mental. Thanks to [Joshua Rasmussen] for discussion here.
The inference is valid in S5 and B. The characteristic modal axiom of S5, ◇p ⊃ ☐◇p, is logically equivalent to the ◇☐p ⊃ ☐p. In fact, ◇☐p ⊃ p is also a provable in B, so technically theists don’t need to appeal to S5 to license the relevant inference. That said, S5 is the favored system among modal logicians and metaphysicians as regards to the question of what best captures our intuitions about metaphysics of modality. For defenses of S5 as the correct system of absolute or metaphysical modality, see Pruss (2011), Hale (2013), Williamson (2016), and Pruss and Rasmussen (2018).
Cf. Plantinga: “if we carefully ponder [the proposition ‘Maximal greatness is possible exemplified’] and the alleged objections, if we consider its connections with other propositions we accept or reject and still find it compelling, we are within our rights in accepting it” (1979, 221). What Plantinga describes is, in effect, discerning no overriders within his c-range.
Van Inwagen (2001, 244–245) voices the same concern: “Whatever merit the crucial modal premise of your argument may have, you can’t expect the philosophical world to accept it unless you can show why it is somehow better or more reasonable than the crucial modal premise of the argument for the opposite conclusion…And I don’t see how you can do that.”.
This paper was first conceived at Calvin College back in 2010, and was kindly nurtured there with much help from Kevin Corcoran, Tim Perrine, Cameron Gibbs, Stephen Wykstra, and Alvin Plantinga. It fell stillborn shortly thereafter. Thanks to Benjamin Arbour for encouraging me to revive it from the swollen grave of abandoned papers. It is raised here to new life, though not, I suspect, to glory. Please direct all counterexamples to benarbour03@yahoo.com.
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McIntosh, C.A. A defense of modal appearances. Int J Philos Relig 89, 243–261 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3