Abstract
The terms ‘modal’ and ‘modality’ admit of two kinds of qualification. On the one hand, the terms can be qualified by being restricted to the alethic range or to the non-alethic range, such as in the cases of deontic modality and epistemic modality. On the other hand, within the range of alethic uses, the terms can be restricted to the logical, metaphysical, or physical domains. Where the restriction is on alethic metaphysical modality, the two central questions in the epistemology of modality are:The first question admits of four potential answers. It might be the case that we can and do possess knowledge of: (a) the possible, which is also actual; (b) the possible, which is non-actual; (c) the necessary and the impossible; and (d) the essential. A global skeptic argues that we don’t have modal knowledge of any of (a)–(d). A local skeptic only argues that we don’t have knowledge in some of (a)–(d). The second question, both historically and in the contemporary literature, admits of many different responses.
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Notes
- 1.
A genuine restriction of ‘modality’ to either the logical, metaphysical, or physical domains depends on whether there is a real distinction between logical, metaphysical, and physical modality. The standard model holds that: (i) physical modality is a proper subset of metaphysical modality, because some physical laws, such as Plank’s constant, are metaphysically contingent; and (ii) metaphysical modality is a proper subset of logical modality, since some metaphysically necessary truths, such as that water = H2O, are logically contingent. Against the standard model, modal deflationists argue that metaphysical modality deflates into logical modality; while modal inflationists argue that physical modality inflates and exhausts the space of metaphysical modality. Both accounts are anti-realist about genuine metaphysical modality.
- 2.
Historically, within the epistemology of modality, the core question has always surrounded the issue of metaphysical modality, as opposed to either logical modality or physical modality. Of course this means that if there is no distinct space of metaphysical modality, there is no genuine question about the epistemology of metaphysical modality.
- 3.
Hale (1996) offers another set of distinctions that are quite important for understanding some kinds of answers to the central questions. The core distinction he draws is between possibility-based approaches and necessity-based approaches. The distinctions I offer here are intended to go beyond Hale’s very important distinctions for the purposes of capturing new theories that have entered the epistemology of modality. See Fischer (2016b) for a critical discussion of Hale’s distinction between necessity-based and possibility-based approaches.
On my view the primary distinction in the epistemology of modality is the distinction between reductive and non-reductive theories. A reductive account holds that metaphysical modality reduces to some other kind of modality, such as logical or physical modality in the case of the alethic range, or deontic modality in the case of the non-alethic range. The core idea of reductive approaches is that our knowledge of metaphysical modality can be explained through an unproblematic access to a distinct kind of modality. A non-reductive account holds that metaphysical modality is a real feature of reality that cannot be reductively explained either within the alethic range or outside of the alethic range. More importantly, non-reductive views hold that there is a genuine question about how metaphysical modality is known, which cannot be given by an account of our knowledge of some other phenomenon. The secondary distinction in the epistemology of modality is between rationalist and empiricist theories of modal knowledge for a given kind of modality, Mk. A rationalist theory holds that instances of Mk are known a priori. An empiricist theory holds that instances of Mk are known a posteriori.
Underneath the primary and secondary distinctions there are two additionally useful distinctions. A uniform theory holds that all instances of all Mk are either fundamentally rational or fundamentally empirical. A non-uniform theory holds that for some Mk, instances of it are known a priori, and that for some other Mk, instances of it are known a posteriori. A pure theory holds that modal knowledge can be cleanly demarcated into being either a priori or a posteriori for all cases. An impure theory holds that modal knowledge in some cases cannot be cleanly demarcated into being either a priori or a posteriori.
- 4.
A great example in the contemporary literature for engaging Descartes is Gendler and Hawthorne’s (2002) introduction to Conceivability and Possibility.
- 5.
Note that the term ‘reductive’ is not being used here in the classical sense in which to reduce something is to allow for the elimination of it. Rather, the term ‘reductive’ is being used more liberally to mean roughly that talk of x is really talk about y.
- 6.
See Thomasson (2013: 145).
- 7.
See Holden (2014: 6–7). Holden clarifies his rendering of Hume on absolute necessity in two important passages. First, he notes: “we can more plausibly interpret Hume as advancing an expressivist account of absolute necessity – an account, that is, that regards our talk about absolute necessity as giving voice to certain non-representational attitudes that we take toward certain propositions, its superficially representational appearance notwithstanding. When we call a given proposition ‘absolutely necessary’ it is not that we are describing it; nor are we describing the limits of our own imaginations. Rather, we are expressing a certain non-representational attitude…” (pg. 7). Second, he clarifies what he means by expressivism as follows: [According to the expressivist treatment of absolute modality] when we pronounce that a certain proposition is absolutely necessary we are giving voice to a non-representational attitude – most likely, the *prescriptive* attitude of insisting that the proposition in question […] be treated as a non-negotiable element in our systems of belief, as a mandatory commitment that we must stick with no matter what empirical data comes in. In labeling a proposition ‘absolutely necessary’ we are *insisting* upon it, legislating that we are *obliged* to accept it come what may. This prescriptive attitude might be prompted by a sense of the ineradicable imaginative blocks that are a part of human nature, but it does not constitute a report or description of those blocks.” (pg. 27).
- 8.
I would like to thank Sonia Roca-Royes for explaining to me why existentialism and essentialism need to be articulated with modal force. That is, with the use of necessity.
- 9.
I have reconstructed this argument from section 1: pg. 24–34, based on Lowe’s discussion of the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus.
- 10.
I would like to thank Sonia Roca-Royes for discussion of this point.
- 11.
The entanglement thesis was generated off of an objection that Timothy Williamson made at a presentation of my research. His objection was based on the fact that the disjunction between existentialism and essentialism may itself be problematic. His comment was: Why can’t both existentialism and essentialism be false?
- 12.
I would like to thank T. Tahko for bringing to my attention that in Lowe (2014) he articulates a cyclical relationship between certain a posteriori facts and certain a priori exercises of reasoning. Unfortunately, I cannot work out the exact relation between the entanglement view and the cyclical view. But it appears as if there is a common theme.
- 13.
- 14.
Thus the account of understanding used here is not similar to that of Bealer (2002). Bealer articulates a theory of determinate understanding.
- 15.
I would like to thank Bob Hale for bringing to my attention the importance of distinguishing between an essence-based approach to modal knowledge as opposed to an essential-property based approach to modal knowledge. The core advantage of the later over the former is that if the essence of an object contains multiple essential properties it maybe the case, at least with respect to natural kinds, that we can arrive at knowledge of some of the essential properties of an object, and thus make provisional modal judgments based on them, but we cannot make absolute modal judgments, when, for example, we may be ignorant of what additional essential properties an object may have.
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Vaidya, A.J. (2017). Modal Knowledge: Beyond Rationalism and Empiricism. In: Fischer, B., Leon, F. (eds) Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library, vol 378. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_6
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