Abstract
Several recent spatial modeling studies incorporate valence issues—e.g., voters’ evaluations of the candidates’ competence, integrity, and charisma—that may give one of the candidates an electoral advantage that is independent of his policy positions. However to date all such models assume that while voters value positive valence characteristics, the candidates themselves do not. We develop a spatial model where the candidates are valence-seeking, i.e.—like the voters—the candidates prefer that the winning candidate possess qualities, such as integrity, diligence, and competence, that will enhance his job performance. We analyze a spatial model where the candidates value both the valence qualities and the policies of the winning candidate, and we show that the candidates’ optimal policy choices typically diverge as the valence differential between them increases, and in particular that the valence-disadvantaged candidate normally has incentives to become more extreme as the valence advantage of her opponent increases.
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Adams, J., Merrill, S. Policy-seeking candidates who value the valence attributes of the winner. Public Choice 155, 139–161 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9845-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9845-4