This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Even though the notion of representation admits different interpretations, Maher is clear that for something, x, to count as a representation, it must portray something else, y, as being a certain way so that x can misrepresent y (p. 46, 94).
For a critical analysis of Gagliano et al.’s experiment see Biegler (2018).
References
Adams, F. R. (2018). Cognition wars. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 68, 20–30.
Aizawa, K. (2014). The enactivist revolution. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies, 2, 19–42.
Baluška, F., & Mancuso, S. (2009). Plants and animals: Convergent evolution in action? In F. Baluška (Ed.), Plant-environment interactions (pp. 285–301). Berlin: Springer.
Biegler, R. (2018). Insufficient evidence for habituation in Mimosa pudica. Response to Gagliano et al. (2014). Oecologia, 186(1), 33–35.
Cahill, J. F., McNickle, G. G., Haag, J. J., Lamb, E. G., Nyanumba, S. M., & St. Clair, C. C. (2010). Plants integrate information about nutrients and neighbors. Science, 328(5986), 1657–1657.
Calvo, P. (2016). The philosophy of plant neurobiology: A manifesto. Synthese, 193(5), 1323–1343.
Calvo, P., Gagliano, M., Souza, G. M., & Trewavas, A. (2019). Plants are intelligent, here’s how. Annals of Botany, 125(1,2), 11–28.
Dener, E., Kacelnik, A., & Shemesh, H. (2016). Pea plants show risk sensitivity. Current Biology: CB, 26(13), 1763–1767.
Di Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T., & Barandiaran, X. (2017). Sensorimotor life: An enactive proposal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gagliano, M., Renton, M., Depczynski, M., & Mancuso, S. (2014). Experience teaches plants to learn faster and forget slower in environments where it matters. Oecologia, 175(1), 63–72.
Gagliano, M., Vyazovskiy, V. V., Borbély, A. A., Grimonprez, M., & Depczynski, M. (2016). Learning by association in plants. Scientific Reports, 6(1), 38427.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism : Basic minds without content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Li, X., & Zhang, W. (2008). Salt-avoidance tropism in Arabidopsis thaliana. Plant Signaling & Behavior, 3(5), 351–353.
Ramsey, W. (2017). Must cognition be representational? Synthese, 194(11), 4197–4214.
Segundo-Ortin, M., & Calvo, P. (2019). Are plants cognitive? A reply to Adams. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 73, 64–71.
Sims, M. (2019). Minimal perception: Responding to the challenges of perceptual constancy and veridicality with plants. Philosophical Psychology, 32(7), 1024–1048.
Taiz, L., Alkon, D., Draguhn, A., Murphy, A., Blatt, M., Hawes, C., Thiel, G., & Robinson, D. G. (2019). Plants neither possess nor require consciousness. Trends in Plant Science, 24(8), 677–687.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Trewavas, A. J. (2003). Aspects of plant intelligence. Annals of Botany, 92(1), 1–20.
Trewavas, A. J. (2014). Plant behaviour and intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind : Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Segundo-Ortin, M. A book review of Chauncey Maher, Plant minds: A philosophical defense, New York, Routledge, 2017. Phenom Cogn Sci 19, 605–610 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09663-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09663-5