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Making sense of the lived body and the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl, Derrida and Noë

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Abstract

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense (Sinn) and more exact linguistic meaning (Bedeutung). Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world.

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Notes

  1. Noë mentions Husserl occasionally in his work, but rarely discusses his ideas directly or at length and does not mention him at all in Varieties of Presence. As shown below, Derrida’s relationship to Husserl is frequently acknowledged and well documented.

  2. See Noë (2015, p. 9).

  3. See Noë (2012, p. 9).

  4. Derrida is included in the list of “existential phenomenologists” in the introduction to Noë’s Varieties of Presence, but is not further discussed in the book (2012, pp. 6–7).

  5. I use “originary,” “co-originary,” and “originarily” throughout in accord with recent English translators of Derrida’s works on Husserl (Hobson and Lawlor), where it generally translates “originaire,” and in place of the terms “primordial” and “equiprimordial” more common in the English-language phenomenological literature and sometimes also used to translate Husserl’s “Ursprung” and “Urquelle.” The term refers to the question at issue between Derrida and Husserl, which concerns the notion of an origin of meaning, and not merely its originality in the everyday sense.

  6. See Husserl (1987, p. 4).

  7. See Husserl (1984, 2001b, Investigation 6, §5–6). While for Husserl the structure of intentionality is shared by a variety of intentional modalities, for the purposes of this essay I focus exclusively on perception, which he generally takes as the paradigm case in his phenomenological descriptions and which plays a central role in his explication of meaning (in the guise of Sinn or Wahrnehmungssinn) at the level of passive synthesis, where it most directly intersects with his account of the body discussed below.

  8. See Husserl (1977, p. 78; 2014, p. 66).

  9. This is related to what Rinofner-Kreidel (2013) calls this the “performance-reflection distinction” in phenomenology. I make use of this distinction (in a way that differs slightly from hers) in the rest of this paper with reference to that which is ‘performed’ or ‘non-reflective’ versus ‘reflected’ or ‘reflective.’ Note that this is not the same as the thematic versus non-thematic distinction, which has to do with attention, not reflection.

  10. See Drummond (2012), Jansen (2014).

  11. The later Husserl distinguishes between “internal” and “external” horizons (Husserl 1964a, 1973, §§8, 22). I am here referring to the internal horizon of the cabinet qua intentional object. For the sake of brevity, in the account that follows I will have to pass over several such intricacies in the Husserlian account.

  12. See Mohanty (1976, p. 139ff); Cf. Aldea (2016).

  13. Following Carr (2014, pp. 33–36), throughout this essay I distinguish between mere anticipation (implicit; protentional) in the flow of lived experience and explicit expectation about the future. Either could be in play in this example.

  14. See Gibson (1986).

  15. See Dreyfus (2005, p. 56).

  16. See Dreyfus (2007, p. 371).

  17. See Noë (2012, pp. 7–8).

  18. See Noë (2012, pp. 149ff).

  19. See Noë (2012, p. 69).

  20. See Gibson (1986, p. 134).

  21. See Gibson (1986, p. 140).

  22. Just as for Kant “the difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not concern their relation to their object” Kant (1998, A56-57/B80-81). For a discussion of this notion in the Derridean context, see Bennington (2000, p. 82).

  23. See Rinofner-Kreidl (2013, p. 49).

  24. See Benoist (2008, p. 84).

  25. See Husserl (1964b, 1969b, passim, 1977, p. 185, 2014, p. 159); Cf. Benoist (2014). As noted above, this retention–protention structure should not be confused with the phenomena of recollection and explicit expectation about the future such as making plans or looking forward to something. The latter phenomena are necessarily thematic whereas the former are not. This is not to say that the latter play no role in meaning constitution for Husserl, but only that the role of the former in the genesis of meaning cannot be simply assimilated to that of the latter.

  26. See Michael Dummett’s preface to Husserl (2001b). This does not mean, of course, that expressed, linguistic meaning plays no role in Husserl’s account. Husserl does maintain that language helps to shape sense through its presentation in a linguistic expression, but it ultimately still “borrows” the sense from the underlying act (Smith 2006: 113–117).

  27. See Husserl (1975, 2001b, Prolegomena §3).

  28. See Husserl (1969a, 1974).

  29. See Husserl (1977, p. 258, 2014, p. 247).

  30. See Husserl (1974, p. 228, 1969a, p. 220).

  31. See Husserl (2002, p. 320).

  32. See the discussion of the “language as calculus” versus “language as universal medium” distinction in Hintikka (1984). Husserl’s work is examined explicitly in terms of this distinction in Kusch (1989, pp. 1–134).

  33. See Husserl (1974, pp. 437–46).

  34. See Husserl (1977, p. 284, 2014, p. 245). Cf. Lee Hardy, Translator’s Introduction to Husserl (1999). The exact nature of the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction in the later Husserl is as yet not extensively treated in the literature, and the interpretation presented here cannot be fully defended in this essay. For the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction in early Husserl, see Hill (1991, pp. 29–42), Vandevelde (2008), Roy (1996). Husserl never adopts the more familiar Fregean use of Sinn and Bedeutung, though he does explicitly acknowledge it in the Logical Investigations (1975, 2001b, §15). There is widespread consensus that Husserl’s use of Bedeutung corresponds more closely to Frege’s use of Sinn, whereas Husserl’s use of Sinn has no clear parallel in Frege, although its functional role is similar to the latter's later conception of Gedanken.

  35. See Husserl (1974, p. 374, 2001a, p. 33, translation modified, my emphasis).

  36. Insofar as a particular Sinn can be understood as the possible fulfillment of a meaning intention that has been made thematic through expression, it is not incorrect to say that an intended Sinn of this sort has as a condition of its possibility Bedeutung(en). But, contra Derrida (1972a, pp. 185–192, 1973, pp. 109–113) for Husserl this precondition cannot be generalized to hold for Sinne as such.

  37. Thanks to Dermot Moran for useful clarification on this point.

  38. As Drummond notes, “The assertion of an identity between the meaning of an expression and the noematic sense of an act does not entail that the noematic sense is in and of itself an intensional entity” (1990, p. 189).

  39. Derrida criticizes this notion of a pre-expressive level of sense in several places, perhaps most prominently in the section of 1972a, 1973 cited above. Since this essay appears after the more definitive treatment of Husserl in 1967b, 2011 and is said by Derrida to be ‘dependent upon it at every moment’ (1972a, 1973, note 2), I focus in the following section primarily on the book-length version, which also includes other criticisms central to the theme of this paper not as well developed in Derrida’s later essay.

  40. See Derrida (1972b, p. 378, 1982, p. 318).

  41. See Derrida (1967a, p. 227, 1997, p. 158).

  42. See Derrida (1962, p. 56, 1978, p. 66).For the notion of contamination, see Derrida (1967b, pp. 21f, 2011 pp. 17ff), and the translator’s introduction in Derrida (2011, pp. xxvff).

  43. See Derrida (1967b, pp. 97–98, 2011, pp. 74–75).

  44. See Derrida (1967b, p. 89, 2011, p. 68, first emphasis mine).

  45. See Zahavi (1999, pp. 132–37).

  46. See Derrida (1990 [1954], 2003).

  47. Derrida himself uses this language of “dialectic” in The Problem of Origin (1990, 2003).

  48. See Husserl (1970, p. 51, 1976, p. 51).

  49. Husserl does indeed occasionally use the language of “purity” in later works, especially the Crisis (1970, 1976). For a different critique of the possibility of access to the ‘pure’ lifeworld, see Carr (1974).

  50. See Derrida (1967b, p. 49n, 2011, p. 39n). See also Evans (1991, p. 143).

  51. See Derrida (1967a, p. 411, 1997, p. 290).

  52. See Derrida (1967a, p. 411, 1997, p. 290), Cf. Bennington (2000, pp. 80–92), Hodge (2009, pp. 272f).

  53. See Kant (1998, A31, A34).

  54. Cf. Lawlor, translator’s introduction to Derrida (2011, p. xxii).

  55. See Kates (2005, pp. 62ff, 72).

  56. Cf. Ruin (2010, p. 18).

  57. See Derrida (1990, p. 40, 2003, p. 4).

  58. Kates insists that this entails the need to conceive of language more radically. If the empirical existence of the sign were all that was at issue, “Derrida’s own thought would never have had to finally transgress the confines of philosophy and philosophical argumentation” (2005, p. 74).

  59. For a discussion and overview of some of the prominent positions on the status of quasi-transcendental in Derrida’s work, see Kates (2005, Ch. 1).

  60. On this point Derrida’s critique of Husserl aligns interestingly with Frege’s. See Ruin (2010), Evans (1991, pp. 131–133).

  61. See Derrida (1967b, p. 49, note, 2011, p. 39 note).

  62. See Husserl (1974, pp. 296–298, 1969a, pp. 291–293).

  63. This is at odds with Kant’s account of a priori synthetic judgment, since Kant ultimately founds the ordering of the manifold of intuition on intellectual objectivity, conceived in terms of formal intuition, which, as an intellectual activity, is considered to be dependent upon the rational employment of concepts in the understanding (Ricoeur 1967, p. 194).

  64. See Rump (2014a).

  65. It is a similar suspicion that leads Noë to include Derrida in his critique the “over-intellectualization of the intellect,” as noted above (2012, pp. 6–7).

  66. See Husserl (1970, pp. 115f, 1976, p. 118), Cf. Welton (2000, pp. 298f).

  67. See Husserl (1969a, p. 278, 1974, p. 283), Cf. Welton (1983, pp. 245ff).

  68. See Carr (1974, pp. 225ff).

  69. As Carr notes (1974, pp. 225–231) Husserl’s claim that this “dismantling” is non-reflective is highly problematic, and may even be circular. For my purposes here, what is important is only the notion that what would be revealed by such dismantling would be originary lifeworld structures independent of sedimentation and idealization.

  70. See Husserl (1964a, p. 49, 1973, p. 50).

  71. See Husserl (1964a, p. 49, 1973, p. 50, translation modified, my emphasis).

  72. See Dreyfus (2007).

  73. As Crowell puts this point, arguing for the normative character of phenomenological inquiry, “Even if practical coping and embodied engagement is not a matter of explicit thematization or rule-following, it is not opaque either, not zombie-like or robotic. Nevertheless, if we are to understand the transcendental subject of phenomenological immanence, we shall have to go beyond consciousness. Husserl understood this point clearly, since his mature work emphasized the ‘ego of habitualities,’ the constitutive contribution of the lived body, transcendental intersubjectivity, and the life-world” (2013, p. 123).

  74. See Husserl (1964a, pp. 89–90, 1973, pp. 83–84).

  75. See Husserl (1964a, p. 90, 1973, pp. 83–84).

  76. See Derrida (1967a, p. 411, 1997, pp. 290–291).

  77. See Derrida (1967a, p. 411, 1997, p. 290).

  78. See Derrida (1967a, p 411, 1997, p. 290).

  79. See Derrida (1967b, p. 89, 2011, p. 68).

  80. Thanks to an anonymous referee for a helpful discussion of this issue.

  81. See Husserl (1964a, pp. 31–32, 1973, p. 36).

  82. On the role of the notion of the “type” in Husserl’s later theory of pre-predicative experience, see Lohmar (1998).

  83. Such a case would, in a certain sense, amount to the situation that Derrida takes to be revealed by his critique.

  84. See Husserl (1964a, pp. 177f, 1973, pp. 154f).

  85. See Husserl (2000, pp. 8f, 2001a, pp. 280ff). Bower (2014) takes such observations as reasons to reject Husserl’s conception of perceptual sense (Wahrnehmungssinn). My own view is that Husserl’s conception of sense, in the case of perception, can be taken to include feeling and affect (see the example of the feeling of nostalgia at the end of Sect. 5 of this paper).

  86. The sense of objectivity at play here is thus, in an important sense, normative. This idea is explored at length in Crowell (2013). While I cannot discuss it further here, my framing of intentional objects as “unities of possible meaning” and of the “shared objectivity” of kinestheses accords with Crowell, though in my view his account does not give enough weight to ideas of the later Husserl of the sort described here [see Rump (2014b)].

  87. See Husserl (1969a, p. 279, 1974, p. 285).

  88. It is of course no coincidence that this account of kinesthesis and passive synthesis develops in the same later period in which, as noted above, Husserl moved away from a static conception of phenomenological ‘essence’ to a ‘genetic’ and more open-ended account of meaning (Cf. Costa 1998: 16ff).

  89. Cf. Crowell (2013, Ch. 5).

  90. Campbell (2008, p. 667) makes a related criticism against Noë’s earlier (2004) account. Tellingly, in his response to Campbell, Noë (2008) asserts at one point (p. 702) that sensorimotor knowledge is merely a “necessary enabling condition” for the perception of objects, but on the next page seems to equate perceptual knowledge with sensorimotor knowledge. In subsequent works (2009, 2012, 2015) Noë further addresses such objections by appeal to a broader notion of the understanding, but this notion is itself cashed out in terms of conceptuality, and thus still seems to assimilate intentional noematic content to a kind of intensional content [see Drummond (1990, p. 189; cited above), and note 94 below].

  91. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this useful formulation.

  92. See Husserl (1969a, p. 209, 1974, p. 216).

  93. See Husserl (1977, p. 203, 2014, p. 175).

  94. Noë acknowledges this Gibsonian point (2012, p. 121), but assimilates such meaning under a broadened notion of the “conceptual.” But borrowing a label typically associated with linguistic capacities to refer to something not at that level is not the same as giving an adequate phenomenological description of it on its own terms. It has not been possible in this essay to address the important difference between Noë and Husserl concerning the question of the conceptuality of non-representational meaning in embodied structures of experience—the topic of work currently in preparation. Briefly sketched: Noë continues to conceive of meaning—even at the level of embodied structures—through an extremely broad version of conceptualism. While he is clear that his notion of the concept is non-representational and not directly tied to language, his account, like the Derridean account discussed here, still relies upon a reflective notion (the concept) in accounting for a non-reflective aspect of immanent, lived experience. This view is not only suspect from the standpoint of recent work on non-conceptualism (where Husserl is again an important forebear and resource); it also ignores the problem of meaning constitution—of how we get from non-representational, embodied aspects of meaning to full-blown propositional knowledge. For a critique of John McDowell’s conceptualism along these lines, see Rump (2014a).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Walter Hopp and Lisa Chinn for helpful conversations concerning the ideas in this paper, David Carr and Dermot Moran for comments on earlier drafts of some of the material, and an anonymous referee for extremely helpful insights and suggestions on a previous draft.

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  1. Kilachand Honors College, Boston University, 91 Bay State Road, Suite 115 Room 115P, Boston, MA, 02215, USA

    Jacob Martin Rump

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  1. Jacob Martin Rump
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Correspondence to Jacob Martin Rump.

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Rump, J.M. Making sense of the lived body and the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl, Derrida and Noë. Cont Philos Rev 51, 141–167 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-017-9415-7

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