Skip to main content

The Personal Self in the Phenomenological Tradition

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Identity and Difference

Abstract

The interrelated concepts of ‘self’ and ‘person’ have long traditions within Western philosophy, and both have re-emerged, after a period of neglect, as central topics in contemporary cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind and action. The concepts of ‘self’ and ‘person’ are intimately related, overlap on several levels and are often used interchangeably. While some philosophers (in the past and at present) seek to separate them quite sharply, here I will treat being a self (with some degree of self-awareness) as at least a necessary element of being a person in the full sense. The phenomenological tradition tends to treat the person as the full, concrete, embodied and historically and socially embedded subject, engaged in social relations with other subjects, and does not treat the person as a primarily ‘forensic’ conception (as a legal or moral appellation), as in the tradition of John Locke.In this chapter, I will explore the essential elements of the concept of the self in the phenomenological tradition, concentrating primarily on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. I shall also discuss briefly the contributions of Max Scheler and Edith Stein. The person is not just a free, rational agent, but primarily an embodied intentional meaning-maker with stratified senstive and emotional layers, whose identity is in part constituted by its history.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Earlier versions of this chapter were given as an invited lecture in Huazhong University of Science and Technology (HUST), Wuhan, People’s Republic of China (12 December 2015); as an Invited Lecture to the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of the Sciences, Moscow (21 November 2014) and as the Plenary Address to the Irish Philosophical Society ‘Futures of Phenomenology’ Annual Conference, University College Galway (7 March 2010).

  2. 2.

    Eric Olson, in the entry on ‘Personal Identity’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, claims he will speak only of personal identity as self ‘often means something different: some sort of immaterial subject of consciousness, for instance’.

Bibliography

  • Annas, Julia (1985). ‘Self-Knowledge in Early Plato’ in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Platonic Investigations. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 111–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ayer, Alfred J. (1952). Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. New York: Dover Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, Lynne Rudder (2013). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, Lynne Rudder (2000). Persons and Bodies. A Constitution View. Cambridge: CUP.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Boethius (1918). Theological Tractates. Trans. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. Loeb Classical Library New York: Putnam’s Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, R. (2013). The Stoic Sage. The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, M., S. Collins, and L. Steven (eds) (1985). The Category of the Person. Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, Patricia (2011). Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality. Princeton, NY: Princeton UP.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, Patricia (2002). Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, Andy (1998). Being There. Putting Brain, Body, and World Together. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, Andy and David Chalmers (1998). ‘The Extended Mind’, Analysis 58, 10–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Damasio, A. R. (1999). The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. Houghton: Mifflin Harcourt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins, Richard (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow. London: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, Daniel C. (1992). ‘The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity’, in F. Kessel, P. Cole, and D. Johnson (eds), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, Daniel C. (1990). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, Daniel C. (1981). ‘Conditions of Personhood’, Brainstrorms. Brighton: Harvester Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Descartes, René (1985). ‘The Passions of the Soul’, in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (eds), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Volume One. New York: Cambridge University Press, 325–404.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dupré, Louis (1993). Passage to Modernity. An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture. New Haven: Yale.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farah, M. J., and A. S. Heberlein (2007). ‘Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?’ American Journal of Bioethics (AJOB-Neuroscience) 7 (1), 37–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, Harry G (1988). ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, in Frankfurt Harry G (ed.), The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P. pp. 11–25.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, Shaun (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford U. P.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, Shaun (2000). ‘Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science,’ Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol. 4:1, pp. 14–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, Shaun (1997). ‘Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science,’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3), 195–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gill, Christopher (2006). The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goldie, P. (2000). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haardt, Alexander and Nikolaj Plotnikov (eds) (2008). Diskurse der Personalität. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haugeland, John (1998). ‘Mind Embodied and Embedded’, in Haugeland John (ed.), Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. P. pp. 207–237.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, Martin (1982). The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, Martin (1962). Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper and Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, David (1978). A Treatise on Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd Ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, Edmund (2001). Logical Investigations, 2 Vols. Trans. J.N. Findlay. Ed. with a New Introduction by Dermot Moran and New Preface by Michael Dummett. London & New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, Edmund (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. Trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Husserl Collected Works III. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, Edmund (1989a). Aufsätze und Vorträge 1922–1937. Hrsg. Thomas Nenon and H.R. Sepp. Husserliana Volume XXVII: Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, Edmund (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, Edmund (1967). Cartesian Meditations. Trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, Edmund (1965). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Hrsg. R. Boehm. Husserliana Volume VIII. The Hague: Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ikäheimo, Heikki and Arto Laitinen (eds) (2007). ‘Dimensions of Personhood’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5/6).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (2006). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Ed. Robert Louden. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (2002). Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy After 1781. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (2002a). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. and Trans. Allen E. Wood. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (1997). Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. and Trans. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kobusch, Theo (1997). Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koterski J (2004). ‘Boethius and the Theological Origins of the Concept of Person’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2), 203–224.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Locke, John (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. With an Introduction by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marion, Jean-Luc (2012). In the Self’s Place. The Approach of Saint Augustine. Trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981). After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menary, Richard (ed.) (2010). The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty. Maurice (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, Thomas (2009). The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and Myth of the Self. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moran, Dermot (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. New York & London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Perrett, Roy W (2016). An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peucker, Hennig (2008). ‘From Logic to the Person: An Introduction to Husserlian Ethics’. Review of Metaphysics 62(December), 307–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2003). ‘Emotions Embodied’. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking about Feeling. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricoeur, Paul (1990). Soi-même comme un autre. Paris: Seuil. Trans. Oneself as Another.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1956). ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’ (1918), in R.C. Marsh (ed.) Logic and Knowledge. London: Allen & Unwin, 177–281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, Gilbert (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheler, Max (1987). Person and Value. Three Essays. Ed. and trans. Manfred Frings. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheler, Max (1973). Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt Toward a Foundation of An Ethical Personalism. Trans Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapiro, Larry (2004). The Mind Incarnate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, B. F (1974). About Behaviorism. New York: Knopf Doubleday.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sokolowski, Robert (2008). Phenomenology of the Human Person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sorabji, Richard (2006). Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death. Oxford: Oxford U, Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sperber, Dan (ed.) (2000). Metarepresentation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, Edith (2000). Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities. Washington, DC: ICS Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, Edith (1989). On the Concept of Empathy. Trans. Waltraut Stein. Washington, DC: ICS Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, Edith (1986). Life in a Jewish Family: Her Unfinished Autobiographical Account. The Collected Works of Edith Stein, Volume One, Trans. Josephine Koeppel. Washington: ICS Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, Galen (2011). Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, Galen (2009). Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, Galen (2004). ‘Against Narrativity,’ Ratio (New Series) XVII 4 December 2004.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturma, Dieter (1997). Philosophie der Person. Die Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektiviät und Moralität. Paderborn: Schöningh.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Charles (1989). Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, Evan and Francisco Varela (2000). Lived Body: Why the Mind is Not in the Head. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Vogel, Cornelia J (1963). ‘The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought’, in J. K. Ryan (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Volume. 2. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiggins, David (2001). Sameness and Substance Renewed. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkes, Kathleen (1988). Real People. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, Bernard (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wojtyla, Karol (1979). The Acting Person. Trans. Andrzej Potocki, Ed Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, Dan (2007). ‘Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding,’ in D. Hutto (ed.), Narrative and Understanding Persons. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179–201.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, Dan (2005) Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Moran, D. (2016). The Personal Self in the Phenomenological Tradition. In: Winkler, R. (eds) Identity and Difference. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40427-1_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics