As is well known, textual reuse is prevalent in many genres of Sanskrit literature. There has been a recent increase in scholarly articles and books focusing on textual reuse in Indian Philosophy and Buddhism. Under the initiative of Elisa Freschi,Footnote 1 the Journal of Indian PhilosophyFootnote 2 and the Buddhist Studies ReviewFootnote 3 dedicated special issues to textual reuse in Indian philosophy and intertextuality in Buddhist texts respectively. A collection of articles on textual reuse in Indian philosophy, grammar, poetry, religions and epics was also published in Freschi and Maas (2017). Recently, a collection of essays on the reuse of fragments, quotations, paraphrases and allusions in Indian philosophical texts was also published (Prets, 2022). Despite the extensive study of textual reuse in Sanskrit literature in the above publications, Indo-Tibetan tantric Buddhism is underrepresented. Among the abovementioned articles, only Hackett (2016) specifically addresses Indo-Tibetan tantric Buddhism. This paper aims to provide more examples of textual reuse in Indo-Tibetan tantric Buddhism and explore their broader implications.

This paper adopts the concepts discussed by Freschi (2015) and Hugon (2015) and divides textual reuse into two main categories: repeat (unacknowledged textual reuse) and quotation (acknowledged textual reuse). Each of the two main categories can be further divided based on the degree of literality in the reused text, i.e. whether the wording and the meaning both are unchanged or the meaning essentially is the same but the wording is different (such as in the case of paraphrase).Footnote 4 The examples discussed in this paper serve as good illustrations of textual reuse, as they encompass both repeat (Śūnyasamādhivajra and Abhayākaragupta reusing Ratnākaraśānti) and quotation (Tsong kha pa reusing Ratnākaraśānti). In the case of repeat by Śūnyasamādhivajra, the form and content are largely unchanged, while in the case of repeat by Abhayākaragupta, the content is modified.

It is sometimes challenging to detect textual reuse without acknowledgement. However, with the advent of digital humanities, an increasing number of reused passages are being detected by computer databases. This paper uses the BuddhaNexus database, developed by the Khyentse Center for Tibetan Buddhist Textual Scholarship at the University of Hamburg, to detect the reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s texts.Footnote 5 This database has allowed us to identify Śūnyasamādhivajra’s reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s works.

Section one of this paper investigates Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the true nature of the maṇḍala and the deities in maṇḍala visualisation in the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā (Tōh. 1871). Ratnākaraśānti also outlines five scenarios of meditation to illustrate the necessity of practising both non-tantric and tantric methods. Section two examines Śūnyasamādhivajra’s reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation in the *Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama (Tōh. 1262). Section three analyses the reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation in the eighteenth chapter of Abhayākaragupta’s Āmanāyamañjarī (Tōh. 1198), and investigates how Abhayākaragupta modified the passage of Ratnākaraśānti to align with his own Madhyamaka doctrine. Section four demonstrates the impact of Abhayākaragupta’s adjusted passage on the Tibetan master Tsong kha pa in his tantric compendium sNgags rim chen mo. Section five offers some observations and concludes by addressing the following questions: What are the reasons for textual reuse? What are the factors which determine whether the reused text is acknowledged or not?

Ratnākaraśānti on maṇḍala Visualisation in the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā

Background

The renowned paṇḍita Ratnākaraśānti was likely the most well-known teacher during the eleventh century CE at Vikramaśīla monastery.Footnote 6 He wrote extensively on major Buddhist topics, covering both non-tantric Mahāyāna doctrine and tantric ritual and meditation. This section examines a passage from Ratnākaraśānti’s *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā, a commentary on the influential tantric ritual manual *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi (Tōh. 1865) written by the ninth-century CE Indian master Dīpaṃkarabhadra.

A few sentences of introduction to the background of the passage examined are due here. The passage concerns maṇḍala visualisation in the ritual of tantric Buddhist initiation (abhiṣeka). In the system of Dīpaṃkarabhadra and Ratnākaraśānti, a maṇḍala is a representation of consciousness shining forth, expressed symbolically by architectural elements of the maṇḍala palace and deities in the maṇḍala. In the maṇḍalatattva (true nature of the maṇḍala) and devatātattva (true nature of the deities) section of the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi, Dīpaṃkarabhadra states that each component of a nineteen-deity Mañjuvajra maṇḍala is purified by a category in the Buddhist path (e.g. the four dhyānas, the five faculties, the ten pāramitās etc.). For example, the true nature (tattva) or purity (viśuddhi) of the four arches in the maṇḍala is the four meditative absorptions (dhyāna), and the true nature of the four raised platforms is the four mental concentrations (samādhi). Similarly, the deities in the maṇḍala are also purified by categories of the Buddhist path. For example, the true nature of the ten goddesses (the six offering goddesses Rūpavajrā etc. and the four goddesses Locanā etc.) is the ten perfections (pāramitā). For a detailed correspondence between the architectural elements or deities and the doctrinal categories see Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix.

The Deities are Neither the Same nor Different From the Mind

In *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 348 and the commentary thereon, Dīpaṃkarabhadra and Ratnākaraśānti explain that the mind has wisdom and means as its nature, and therefore has the maṇḍala deities as its nature too.Footnote 7 Dīpaṃkarabhadra further states that:

Because it [i.e. the mind] has qualities which are to be experienced by itself, [it] does not abide in differentiation or nondifferentiation (bhedābheda°, dbye yod dbye med) and so on. When [the mind] has been made proliferated in this way,Footnote 8 the perfections and so on appear as results.Footnote 9

What does it mean to say that the mind “does not abide in differentiation or non-differentiation and so on”? In explaining this, Ratnākaraśānti employs a special use of the neither-identical-nor-different argument (and also the neither-one-nor-many argument). Below is my paraphrase of Ratnākaraśānti’s arguments (the original text and a more literal translation can be found in the respective footnotes after each sentence).

Ratnākaraśānti anticipates an objection from an opponent: if the qualities of the mind are the deities, then are those qualities of mind, such as faith, different from the mind, or not different? If they are not different from the mind, is the mind having the nature of them one, or many?Footnote 10 Ratnākaraśānti then responds that the qualities of the mind such as cognising and feeling are not different from the mind, because both the mind and awareness (yang dag par rig pa, *samyagjñāna) of the qualities of the mind are characterised by the luminosity (gsal ba, *prakāśa) of the sky. But the qualities of the mind are not undifferentiated from the mind at the same time too, because of the undesirable consequence that the mind and the qualities being one.Footnote 11

The opponent further asks: then has the single mind become many? Ratnākaraśānti answers: no, because we are aware of the mind and the qualities of the mind as something not different. If the mind were many, the mind would become individual awarenesses like the minds of many beings.Footnote 12

The opponent replies: then in this way, is the single mind endowed with many representational forms (rnam pa, *ākāra)?Footnote 13 Ratnākaraśānti answers: no, because it is contradictory that representational forms, which are not different from the single mind, are themselves multiple.Footnote 14

The opponent further asks: are they, i.e. the representational forms and the mind, one and many at the same time? Ratnākaraśānti answers: no, because the position of them being different has already been refuted, i.e. both are characterised by luminosity (gsal ba, *prakāśa).Footnote 15

To sum up, Ratnākaraśānti explains:

Therefore, the mind in this way lacks duality in being free from the duality of having differentiations and not having differentiations, or of being one and being many. And because of [this] non-duality, it has no conceptual proliferation.Footnote 16

From the above passages, we can observe that according to Ratnākaraśānti, the representational forms (ākāra) of the deities in the maṇḍala and the qualities of the mind such as faith (śraddhā), energy (vīrya) etc. (representing the true nature of the deities) have a neither-the-same-nor-different (bhedābheda) relationship with the mind. How can the representational forms and the qualities of the mind be neither the same nor different from the mind? Although Ratnākaraśānti does not explain it here, he explains in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (Tōh. 4079) and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa (Tōh. 4085) that although the representational forms (ākāra) are ultimately unreal, they possess a special identity (tādātmya) relation with the real reflexively aware luminosity (prakāśa). The identity between the representational forms and reflexively aware luminosity is a superimposed identity (*āropitaṃ tādātmyam) which, while imposing an identity, still maintains a difference between the two.Footnote 17

It should be noted that here Ratnākaraśānti employs the same type of neither-one-nor-many or neither-identical-nor-different argument to establish the non-duality of mind as he does in defending his specific *alīkākāravādaFootnote 18 view in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa.Footnote 19 And, as Moriyama has pointed out, this use of argumentation contrasts with Śāntarakṣita’s utilization in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra where he employs the neither-one-nor-many argument to prove that entities are lack of intrinsic nature.Footnote 20 In fact, Ratnākaraśānti’s specific use of the neither-identical-nor-different argument aligns with the prasaṅga argument found in chapter three of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. In this chapter, the Buddha explains that the character that is ultimate reality (paramārthalakṣaṇa) and the character of conditioned factors (saṃskāralakṣaṇa) are neither identical nor different.Footnote 21 Ratnākaraśānti’s specific use of this type of argument is rooted in the core Yogācāra texts such as the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and deserves further study.

Why Tantric Visualisation is Needed (the Five Scenarios)

Now, if in visualisation the representational forms of the deities and the qualities of the mind (i.e. the true nature of the deities) are neither the same nor different from the mind, is it not enough to meditate on the true nature of the deities alone? Why bother to visualise all these deities? In the next passage, Ratnākaraśānti explains why we have to meditate on both the mind as deities and the true nature (tattva) of the deities at the same time. According to Ratnākaraśānti, there are five scenarios:

  1. (1)

    If one meditates on the mind alone, then one would only obtain mundane mental concentration (ting nge ’dzin, *samādhi) like the stage of the infinity of consciousness (rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched, *vijñānānantyāyatana).

  2. (2)

    Yet if one meditates on emptiness above all, that [result] too becomes only complete cessation, because of not perfecting the actions of purifying the Buddha qualities.

  3. (3)

    Or, if one meditates on [the mind] only as having the nature of the deities, in this case, one does not even become awakened at all through that alone because the perfection of actions is incomplete.

  4. (4)

    Or, if one meditates only on the true nature of what the deities stand for and not the deities, then in this case too, one would attain Buddhahood in many countless aeons but not quickly.

  5. (5)

    Therefore, the meditation of both [the mind as deities and the true nature of the deities at the same time], because it is extremely pleasant to the mind and because it is a special kind of empowerment, causes one to obtain the highest perfect awakening very quickly.Footnote 22

The five scenarios describe various tantric and non-tantric practitioners, encompassing both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. The first scenario likely disproves non-tantric and non-Buddhist practitioners of mind-focused meditation. The second scenario likely disproves śrāvaka Buddhists who meditate on a specific quality of emptiness (without the aid of Mahāyāna skillful means). The third scenario likely disproves tantric, non-Buddhist practitioners of meditation. The fourth scenario likely disproves Mahāyāna Buddhists following the perfection method. The fifth scenario likely affirms Mahāyāna Buddhists who practise meditation using both the perfection method and the mantra method.Footnote 23

Below is a summary of Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the five scenarios of meditation (Table 1).

Table 1 Ratnākaraśānti’s Explanation of the Five Scenarios of Meditation

By explaining in this way, Ratnākaraśānti provides a sound philosophical basis for visualising the deities in the maṇḍala and contemplating their true nature (tattva). In doing so, he emphasises the importance of practising according to both types of Mahāyāna practice, i.e. the perfection method (pāramitānaya) and the mantra method (mantranaya) at the same time.Footnote 24

The Reuse in Śūnyasamādhivajra’s *Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama

Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the mind and the true nature of the deities in maṇḍala visualisation is unique and exerts an influence in the explanation of the true nature (tattva) or purity (viśuddhi) of the maṇḍala elements and the deities in the later generations. An explanation similar to Ratnākaraśānti’s is found in the *Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama of Śūnyasamādhivajra (who is said to be identical with Divākaracandra, probably a student of Ratnākaraśānti).Footnote 25

*Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama is a text comprised of twenty ritual procedures (cho ga, *vidhi). Śūnyasamādhivajra reuses (without acknowledgement) passages from Ratnākaraśānti’s *Kusumāñjali (Tōh. 1851), Muktāvalī (Tōh. 1189) and *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā in this text. The twentieth (i.e. the last) ritual procedure in the text is called the ritual procedure of practising the purity [of the maṇḍala] (rnam par dag pa bsgom pa’i cho ga), which is comprised of two passages reused from Ratnākaraśānti’s texts and one small passage written by Śūnyasamādhivajra himself. The first passage (D341a4-b3) is a resue of Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the perfection method as expounded in Muktāvalī ad Hevajratantra I.i.10,Footnote 26 while the second passage (D341b3-7) is about the need for practising both the perfection method and the mantra method together as it was expounded by Ratnākaraśānti in *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā ad *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 349.

To clearly show the resue of Ratnākaraśānti’s *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā in Śūnyasamādhivajra’s text, I put the two texts in parallel columns in the following Table (Table 2).

Table 2 The Five Scenarios in Ratnākaraśānti’s *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā ad Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 349, and its Reuse in Śūnyasamādhivajra’s *Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama

From the first row of Table 2, we can see that Śūnyasamādhivajra frames Ratnākaraśānti’s five scenarios with an objection from the opponent: “If through this [perfection method] one obtains quickly the bliss which is perfect awakening, then what is the purpose of other fallacious signs, i.e. palaces, emblems, seed syllables, crescent-shaped ornaments, sound and so on of Heruka and yoginī [used in tantric meditation]?”Footnote 27 This objection is probably modelled on another sentence in Ratnākaraśānti’s Muktāvalī ad Hevajratantra I.i.10.Footnote 28 The point here is that the meditation mentioned in the reused passage in the Muktāvalī (just before repeating the five scenarios) centres on prajñāpāramitā and is non-tantric in nature, and somebody might raise the objection: if a non-tantric method is enough to reach Buddhahood, why take the trouble to visualise all these emblems and seed syllables of the deities which are unreal mental proliferations and are fallacious in nature? Śūnyasamādhivajra then replies that visualising all these has a purpose. He goes on to repeat Ratnākaraśānti’s five scenarios to emphasise that both the perfection method and the mantra method are necessary because, through them, there is speedy attainment of awakening.

From Table 2, we can see that although the wording of Śūnyasamādhivajra’s may at times differ slightly from Ratnākaraśānti’s, the contents of the two texts are more or less the same. Moreover, there are slight differences in the wording in the Tibetan translations of the two texts probably because the Tibetan translations were independently produced by different translators. These two texts may be even more similar in their Sanskrit originals if they were extant. It especially is notable that Śūnyasamādhivajra retains the Yogācāra elements of Ratnākaraśānti. This is more evident if we compare Śūnyasamādhivajra’s reuse with Abhayākaragupta’s reuse in the next section.

The Reuse in Abhayākaragupta’s Āmnāyamañjarī

Before discussing Abhayākaragupta’s resue of Ratnākaraśānti’s text, I will introduce Abhayākaragupta himself with a few words. He was one of the last great paṇḍitas of Buddhism in India and is said to have served as a teacher of both the renowned monasteries of Vikramaśīla and Nālandā during the reign of Rāmapāla (r. circa 1078/1079 to at least 1131),Footnote 29 Abhayākaragupta exerted a great influence on the development of Tibetan Buddhism through both his influence on Tibetan visitors to Vikramaśīla and Nālandā and his support of his Tibetan students’ translations of Sanskrit treatises into Tibetan.Footnote 30

Previous scholarly research has shown that Abhayākaragupta extensively incorporates passages written by other authors into his own works (often without acknowledgement).Footnote 31 Among those authors, Ratnākaraśānti seems to be a favourite source, since Abhayākaragupta reproduces in his own work many passages from both the non-tantric and tantric works of Ratnākaraśānti.Footnote 32

Scholarly research also has shown that the focus of this paper, Ratnākaraśānti’s *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā, was incorporated without acknowledgement by Abhayākaragupta in his Āmnāyamañjarī. Kano has pointed out that Abhayākaragupta incorporates Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the Buddha-nature in the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā ad Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 94 into chapter one of the Āmnāyamañjarī, where he “Madhyamakanises”Footnote 33 Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation by inserting a Madhyamaka phrase indicating that the mind is absent of any intrinsic nature.Footnote 34 Furthermore, Sakurai has pointed out that Abhayākaragupta reuses Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the true nature of the deities in the maṇḍala (*Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā ad Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 349) “almost verbatim” in the eighteenth chapter of the Āmnāyamañjarī,Footnote 35 and that Abhayākaragupta adjusts the text according to his Madhyamaka philosophical position.Footnote 36 However, Sakurai only mentions the reuse of Abhayākaragupta in passing and does not provide further details. In fact, in Āmnāyamañjarī chapter eighteen, when Abhayākaragupta comments on Saṃpuṭatantra V.2.57 with an explanation of the true nature of the deities, he incorporates not one but multiple passages from Ratnākaraśānti. To highlight the reuse, I have included a table with the two texts in parallel columns (Table 3).

Table 3 A Correspondence Table Between Abhayākaragupta’s Āmnāyamañjarī Chapter Eighteen and Ratnākaraśānti’s *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā

As shown in Table 3, Abhayākaragupta repeats (i.e. reuses without acknowledgement) Ratnākaraśānti’s passages from the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā ad Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 343, 348 and 349 in one continuous passage, adding sentences of his own in between and at the end. Although the wordings between the Tibetan translations of Abhayākaragupta’s text and that of Ratnākaraśānti’s text are quite close, we can sometimes see (for example in the first sentence of row one of Table 3) differences in the use of Tibetan particles between the corresponding sentences in the two texts sometimes lead to divergence in meaning. As mentioned above, these differences in the two texts may be due to the fact that the two translations were independently produced.

In row four of Table 3, the places where Abhayākaragupta modifies Ratnākaraśānti’s text are underlined. The following is the translation of Abhayākaragupta’s text in row four (on the five scenarios):

And in this way, when [the mind] has been made proliferated by means of the deities and by means of the true nature [of the deities], one obtains the qualities of the Buddhas, such as the perfections, which have become the results [of the mind]; they are not [obatined] in any other way.

  1. (1)

    If one meditates only on consciousness, one obtains only mundane mental concentration like the stage of the infinity of consciousness.

  2. (2)

    If one meditates only on emptiness, at that time too, like a śrāvaka (nyan thos bzhin du), one becomes somebody who has the notion of complete cessation only, because of not purifying the Buddha qualities.

  3. (3)

    And if one meditates on [the mind] only [as having] the nature of the deities, then in this case, because of inferior purification, there is no Buddhahood and it is not wholesome.

  4. (4)

    If one meditates on the knowledge of emptiness (stong pa nyid kyi ye shes), but not the deities, then in this case too, one would obtain Buddhahood after a long time and it is not the case that [one would obtain it] quickly.

  5. (5)

    When one meditates on all three (gsum ka) [i.e. emptiness, the mind as the deities and the true nature of the deities], because they are extremely pleasant [to the mind] and because of a special kind of empowerment, one obtains the highest perfect awakening very quickly.

In the second scenario, Abhayākaragupta introduces the qualification of “like a śrāvaka (nyan thos bzhin du)” to clarify that this is a disproval of non-Mahāyāna Buddhists such as the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, who are intent on achieving mere cessation. In the fourth scenario, Abhayākaragupta modifies Ratnākaraśānti’s phrase “if one meditates only on the true nature of what the deities stand for”Footnote 37 to “if one meditates on the knowledge of emptiness (stong pa nyid kyi ye shes), but not the deities.” For both Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta, the fourth scenario describes the seeing of emptiness by the practitioners while engaging in the perfection method. According to Ratnākaraśānti, the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) is defined as the seeing of emptiness (on the fourth of the four stages of yoga). And the true nature of the deities can be described as either “the qualities of the mind” or as “emptiness.” This is because, during the exploration in the four stages of yoga, the second stage involves perceiving the true nature of the deities solely as mind only. And in the third and fourth stages, a practitioner further sees the true nature of the deities as emptiness, initially with characteristics (sanimittā) and then without them (nirnimittā).Footnote 38 Abhayākaragupta would largely agree with Ratnākaraśānti’s interpretation, but there is a crucial difference between the concept of emptiness of Ratnākaraśānti and that of Abhayākaragupta. For Ratnākaraśānti, emptiness is the absence of the duality of the apprehended object (grāhya) and the apprehending subject (grāhaka).Footnote 39 The mind itself is not empty, and what is ultimately real is sheer luminosity (prakāśamātra).Footnote 40 On the other hand, Abhayākaragupta considers the mind itself to be empty i.e. without intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and what is ultimately real is the absence of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāvatā).Footnote 41 In other words, Ratnākaraśānti adopts the Yogācāra understanding of emptiness as an implicative negation (paryudāsapratiṣedha),Footnote 42 while Abhayākaragupta adopts the Mādhyamika understanding of emptiness as a non-implicative negation or absolute negation (prasajyapratiṣedha). Abhayākaragupta feels to need to distinguish emptiness from the mind, therefore he changes Ratnākaraśānti’s description of the fourth scenario to highlight the importance of emptiness. Furthermore, in the fifth scenario, Abhayākaragupta changes Ratnākaraśānti’s “if one meditates on both the mind as deities and the true nature of the deities at the same time”Footnote 43 to “when one meditates on all three (gsum ka) [i.e. the mind as deities, the true nature of the deities, and emptiness].” By including emptiness as a separate item in the final accepted scenario of meditation, Abhayākaragupta “Madhyamakanises” the Yogācāra explanation of Ratnākaraśānti. Here, to help clarify, is a summary table of the explanations of the five scenarios by Abhayākaragupta and Ratnākaraśānti (Table 4).

Table 4 The Five Scenarios of Meditation According to Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta

A few passages down from the previously discussed passage, Abhayākaragupta quotes verses 126-128, 125 and 124ab of the Sarvarahasyatantra to explain the true nature of some of the architectural components in the maṇḍala.Footnote 44 In the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā ad Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhi 335, Ratnākaraśānti also quotes the Sarvarahasyatantra in the same sequence (with two verses more; Ratnākaraśānti quotes verses 126–130, 125 and 124ab).Footnote 45 Abhayākaragupta’s source is probably Ratnākaraśānti. It is interesting to note in passing that Śākyarakṣita’s Hevajrābhisamayatilaka (Tōh. 1277) also quotes the Sarvarahasyatantra in the same number of verses and sequence as Abhayākaragupta’s Āmnāyamañjarī,Footnote 46 and just before the Sarvarahasyatantra quotation, there is also a large chunk of parallel passage between the two texts. Given that Śākyarakṣita was a student of Abhayākaragupta,Footnote 47 we probably have here a repeat of Abhayākaragupta’s Āmnāyamañjarī in Śākyarakṣita’s Hevajrābhisamayatilaka.

Tsong Kha Pa’s Reuse

Both the writings of Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta had a significant impact on Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419),Footnote 48 the renowned founder of the dGe lugs school in Tibet. Tsong kha pa frequently quotes Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta in his sNgags rim chen mo.Footnote 49 The passage under discussion, the five scenarios of meditation in Ratnākaraśānti’s *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā, is not only quoted in Tsong kha pa’s sNgags rim chen mo, but also reproduced verbatim in Tsong kha pa’s bZhi brgya lnga bcu pa’i skor gyi zin bris gnang ba.Footnote 50

In the sNgags rim chen mo, Tsong kha pa discusses the necessity of practising both the perfection method and the mantra method. He first cites the Vajrapañjaratantra and Jñānapāda’s Ātmasādhanāvatāra before quoting verbatim from the third to the fifth scenarios of Ratnākaraśānti in the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā:

Ratnākaraśānti says in the Commentary to the Four Hundred and Fifty Verses [i.e. the *Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā], “(3) If one meditates on [the mind] only as having the nature of the deities, in this case, one does not even become awakened at all through that alone, because the perfection of actions is incomplete. (4) Or, if one meditates only on the true nature of what the deities stand for and not the deities, then in this case too one would attain Buddhahood in many countless aeons but not quickly. (5) Therefore, the meditation of both [the mind as deities and the true nature of the deities at the same time], because it is extremely pleasant to the mind and because it is a special kind of empowerment, causes one to obtain the highest perfect awakening very quickly.”Footnote 51

While Tsong kha pa quotes Ratnākaraśānti, his explanation is based on the Madhyamaka explanation of Abhayākaragupta in the Āmnāyamañjarī. Tsong kha pa continues:

[Here Ratnākaraśānti] says that if one meditates only on deity yoga, one is not able to be awakened at all. And if one does not meditate on the deities, through meditating [only] on emptiness together with other means, one would attain awakening after many countless aeons. And if one meditates on both the deities and emptiness, the path [to awakening] is speedy. Therefore, this ācārya [i.e. Ratnākaraśānti] also accepts that because the view of emptiness is common to both [types of] Mahāyāna [i.e. perfection method and mantra method], if there is no deity yoga, then there is a delay in the path like the Perfection Vehicle (phar phyin gyi theg pa, *pāramitāyāna), and by connecting deity yoga with the view of emptiness, the path is speedy. [His view] follows what has been discussed earlier [in the Vajrapañjaratantra and by Jñānapāda in the Ātmasādhanāvatāra].Footnote 52

We can see that, in contrast to Ratnākaraśānti, who expresses the Yogācāra view that the mind and the qualities of the mind are the true nature of the deities in a tantric visualisation, Tsong kha pa, himself a Mādhyamika, interprets the true nature of the deities as the view of emptiness according to Abhayākaragupta’s Madhyamaka modification but without mentioning Abhayākaragupta.Footnote 53 He only mentions Abhayākaragupta and his Āmnāyamañjarī by name after explaining Ratnākaraśānti’s passage:

In chapter eighteen of the Āmnāyamañjarī too, Abhaya, after explaining in accordance with Śāntipa [i.e. Ratnākaraśānti], cites the scriptural source of that from chapter fourteen of the Vajrapañjaratantra: “For the purpose of overcoming ordinary pride, [this] meditation is correctly proclaimed” and “furthermore, in order to purify the impure body, one should meditate on the body of the Buddha.”Footnote 54

Here, Tsong kha pa points out that Abhayākaragupta’s source is Ratnākaraśānti and reproduces Abhayākaragupta’s citation of the Vajrapañjaratantra.Footnote 55

Some Observations

Both Śūnyasamādhivajra and Abhayākaragupta silently incorporate Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation of the five scenarios of meditation, so their reuse fall under the category of “repeat (i.e. unacknowledged textual reuse)” and not under “quotation (i.e. acknowledged textual reuse).” Tsong kha pa’s reuse, on the other hand, is a quotation where he acknowledges Ratnākaraśānti. Specifically, his quotation falls into the category of citation (i.e. acknowledged textual reuse, the same in both form and content). In contrast, Tsong kha pa only says that Abhayākaragupta’s text follows Ratnākaraśānti’s but does not quote Abhayākaragupta.

While Śūnyasamādhivajra follows faithfully Ratnākāraśānti’s Yogācāra explanation, Abhayākaragupta modifies Ratnākāraśānti’s text in accordance with his own Madhyamaka philosophy. Tsong kha pa quotes Ratnākaraśānti’s text verbatim but follows Abhayākaragupta’s modification in his own explanation. As a Mādhyamaka himself, Tsong kha pa regards Abhayākaragupta’s Madhyamaka modification as the correct interpretation of Ratnākaraśānti’s teaching. In fact, he intentionally reinterprets Ratnākaraśānti through the lens of Abhayākaragupta.

What can we glean from these cases of repeat and quotation? According to Hugon, there are two main functions of quotations: (1) to present an opponent’s view, or (2) to support one’s own interpretation or explanation.Footnote 56 Tsong kha pa’s quotation has the second function; he quotes Ratnākaraśānti to support his argument that it is necessary to have both types of Mahāyāna meditation together.

But what are the possible reasons for unacknowledged repeats, as in the cases of Śūnyasamādhivajra and Abhayākaragupta? Scholars already have pointed out that the modern concept of plagiarism does not apply to the intellectual world of medieval India and Tibet.Footnote 57 In the literary culture of medieval India or Tibet, a master operates within a tradition of lineages and regards himself as an agent transmitting traditional knowledge rather than as an innovator composing something entirely new. And in that literary culture, as the previous scholarship has shown, to silently appropriate (i.e. repeating without acknowledgement) a predecessor’s view indicates a master’s endorsement of and respect towards this predecessor.Footnote 58 And lastly, as also has been studied, in India and Tibet to repeat something from another text, even without acknowledgement, would be recognised by the intellectual community in the author’s time, as the source was probably widely known at that time.Footnote 59

However, if the source of a quotation was separated in time and space, by a long time or by great geographic distance, from an author and his audience, the author would be more likely to acknowledge that source by name. Let me use Abhayākaragupta and Tsong kha pa to illustrate. Below is a table of Abhayākaragupta’s reuse of other people’s work which is by no means exhaustive (Table 5).

From Table

Table 5 A By-No-Means-Exhaustive Table of Abhayākaragupta’s Reuse of Other People’s Works

5, it appears that the distance in time between Abhayākaragupta and the source texts might be a factor affecting the identification of source texts. The farther away the authors are from Abhayākaragupta in time, the more likely they are quoted by name as an authority. From the table, we can see that Abhayākaragupta quotes Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu most often. The closer the authors are to Abhayākaragupta in time, the more likely they are incorporated silently. For example, Abhayākaragupta silently repeats Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, Kamalanātha and Bhavabhaṭṭa. It might be argued that Abhayākaragupta also quotes the works of masters who are closer to him in time, such as [tantric] Nāgārjuna’s Pañcakrama, [tantric] Āryadeva’s Sūtaka, [tantric] Āryadeva’s Svādhiṣṭhānaprabheda, and [tantric] Candrakīrti’s Pradīpoddyotana. However, Abhayākaragupta probably equates the later tantric Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti with the earlier Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti, who wrote the famous Madhyamaka treatises such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

There are exceptions to the above observations. Abhayākaragupta sometimes cites and sometimes silently borrows from masters from the same period. He cites Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha by name but silently incorporates Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakāloka. Both Sthiramati and Candrakīrti lived hundreds of years before Abhayākaragupta, but Abhayākaragupta assimilates Sthiramati’s Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā and Candrakīrti’s Pañcaskandhaka instead of quoting them. Sometimes Abhayākaragupta not only borrows from but also quotes the same master. He quotes Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya and Triśaraṇasaptati, citing the text or author by name, but borrows without acknowledging the source from Candrakīrti’s Pañcaskandhaka. And he borrows silently from and also quotes three times by name Ratnākaraśānti’s Sāratamā in the Munimatālaṃkāra.Footnote 60 With these exceptional cases, another possible factor for the silent borrowing of other master’s texts might be at play here. The borrowed master’s explanations on certain matters might have become the standard in Buddhist monastic colleges and were being handed down by tradition.Footnote 61 The fact that Ratnākaraśānti is repeated the most by Abhayākaragupta might indicate that Ratnākaraśānti’s explanations were widely accepted at Abhayākaragupta’s time. Although it is not plausible that Abhayākaragupta was Ratnākarasānti’s student,Footnote 62 he certainly had access to Ratnākaraśānti’s works in the Vikramaśīla monastery.Footnote 63

Distance in space is probably also a factor affecting the identification of source texts. In the sNgags rim chen mo, the Tibetan master Tsong kha pa quotes Indian masters by name, but only refers collectively to the views of “some Tibetan masters” when he does not agree with other Tibetan interpretations.Footnote 64 Tsong kha pa regards Indian masters as authoritative and quotes them to lend weight to his arguments in refuting wrong views from other Tibetan masters.

Conclusion

In this paper, I provide a few examples of textual reuse in tantric texts, primarily focusing on a line of reuse of Ratnākaraśānti by Śūnyasamādhivajra, Abhayākaragupta and Tsong kha pa. I produce comparative tables of the works of these authors to show that, in contrast to Śūnyasamādhivajra, who retains the Yogācāra flavour of Ratnākaraśānti, Abhayākaragupta modifies Ratnākaraśānti’s text to suit his Madhyamaka philosophy. On the other hand, Tsong kha pa accurately quotes Ratnākaraśānti but utilises Abhayākaragupta’s justification to offer Madhyamaka viewpoints in his commentary on Ratnākaraśānti. After applying the insights of earlier studies, I provide some remarks regarding these authors’ compositional processes, employing a variety of sources. In contrast to the accepted customs nowadays, in medieval India and Tibet, a master’s endorsement of and respect for a predecessor is demonstrated when he silently appropriates (i.e., repeat without acknowledgement) that predecessor’s viewpoint. A master would be more likely to give credit to the source of a quotation if there was a significant period of time or distance between that source and his audience. I hope future research on tantric Buddhist commentaries will further improve our understanding of the nature of textual reuse in late medieval Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.