Abstract
In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of Śrīharṣa can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in Śrīharṣa’s masterpiece, the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramāṇa) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting Śrīharṣa’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that Śrīharṣa is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing Śrīharṣa’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of Śrīharṣa’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.
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Timalsina, S. Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification. J Indian Philos 45, 313–329 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-016-9310-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-016-9310-2