Introduction

Ethics theory has been used as a framework for understanding workplace health and safety (e.g., Douglas & Swartz, 2017; Patankar et al., 2005). Health and safety should be considered as an ethical issue, because health and safety behaviour in an occupational context has implications for the health, safety and wellbeing of employees, and often the wider public and society as well. As one high-profile example, the Atkins and Lerner (2010), which resulted in 11 fatalities following an explosion at the offshore oil platform, was caused by the complex interplay of individual, team and organisational factors that combined to result in substantial failures of health and safety (Reader & O’Connor, 2014). In the longer term, the damage extended to significant ecological, environmental and public health consequences, associated with the explosion and subsequent oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico (Beyer et al., 2016; Osofsky et al., 2011). The significant impact on local businesses by the oil spill also highlights the importance of the issue from the perspective of business ethics practice.

Companies that have a strong health and safety climate (where health and safety is prioritized in relation to other organisational goals; Neal et al., 2000) encourage employees to follow rules and procedures designed to ensure safe work practices (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006). However, workarounds (where alternative work processes are undertaken to “work around” a perceived block in workflow, such as a safety procedure; Halbesleben, 2010) may occur, which allow work to be completed more efficiently, but may compromise health and safety in the longer-term. Rule violations, which involve a deliberate but not malicious deviation from set procedures, may occur for a range of reasons (Hale & Borys, 2013; Jones et al., 2018). This includes ‘personally rewarding’ violations, where personal goals are prioritised over organisational goals (e.g., rules prescribe the use of safety gloves, but these are removed because they are uncomfortable; Reason et al., 1998). Rule violations and workarounds are prevalent across industries, such as aviation and transportation (Alper & Karsh, 2009), and healthcare (Halbesleben et al., 2008; Phipps et al., 2010). Based on ethics theory, research has linked moral disengagement to the performance of unethical health and safety behaviour, such as rule violations (Hystad et al., 2014), accident under-reporting (Petitta et al., 2017) and reduced safety citizenship behaviour (Probst et al., 2020a). Moral disengagement refers to cognitive tactics that allow people to sidestep moral self-regulatory processes that normally prevent unethical behaviour (Bandura, 2002). It may act as a mechanism for employees to temporarily suspend moral standards and behave in an unethical way, such as taking excessive breaks, withholding effort, intentional slow working, or violating organisational rules (Barsky, 2011; Fida et al., 2015). There is substantial empirical evidence to support a large effect of moral disengagement on workplace misconduct based on systematic reviews and meta-analyses (e.g., Newman et al., 2019; Ogunfowora et al., 2022).

We build on existing work examining moral disengagement and workplace health and safety, and extend this to examine the role of moral intensity (Jones, 1991). The moral intensity construct is defined as ‘the extent to which an issue, event, or act has the characteristics that make it subject to moral consideration, moral judgment, or moral action’ (Reynolds, 2006, p. 234). It places ethical decision-making into a wider social context by relating moral intentions to perceptions of the magnitude of consequences, and the probability of potential harm (May & Pauli, 2002; Reynolds, 2006). It is relevant to health and safety decisions in the workplace, where there is often a perceived trade-off between productivity (or efficiency) and, health and safety (Zohar, 2002). Indeed, empirical work has demonstrated the significant effects of moral intensity on moral intentions, using work safety dilemmas (Carpenter & James, 2017). The COVID-19 pandemic provides a real-life context within which to examine the influence of moral intensity on health and safety decision-making, where both organisational rules, and health-protection COVID-19 rules, are relevant. Drawing on ethics theory, we will focus on the role of moral intensity, and moral disengagement, as we seek to understand changes to work behaviours, particularly rule violations and workarounds, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. While we examine our research questions from the specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic, we aim to draw out lessons learnt that can be applied to business ethics practice outside of this context, including other situations in which potential conflicts between organisationally mandated rules can occur (e.g., presenteeism that arises due to conflicts between felt obligation to attend work versus sickness absence rules).

Our study will address understudied research questions around rule following in the workplace from an ethics theory perspective, and make three main contributions to business ethics theory, policy and practice.

First, we consider the moral intensity of the context within which rule violations and workarounds occur to understand why workers morally disengage to break rules. Previous work (e.g., Hystad et al., 2014; Petitta et al., 2017) has focused on the link between moral disengagement and rule-related behaviour, but has paid relatively little attention to the context within which this behaviour occurs. We contribute to the business ethics literature by considering how moral intensity, as a situational factor, influences ethical decision-making about work behaviours, specifically rule violations and workarounds. We focus on how organisational context, such as cultural and social norms, can influence ethical decision-making on work behaviours. Earlier work has shown that cultural norms about the prioritization of safety goals (relative to production / efficiency) can influence the use of moral disengagement tactics to justify unethical work behaviour, such as under-reporting accidents (Petitta et al., 2017). We build on this work to examine how cultural and social norms might influence decisions to break or ‘work around’ rules, even when such rules are in place to protect personal and organisational health and safety, and consider how conflicts between rules designed to protect health, safety and well-being can influence decision making. We draw on the construct of moral intensity to add greater depth to this consideration, given the salience of organisational context as a situational factor.

Second, our study examines work behaviour in the wider situational context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments around the globe applied strict rules to protect public health, by restricting close contacts, mandating work from home, and enforcing mask wearing. During the height of the pandemic, there were several prominent examples of COVID-19 rule violations, such as UK government ministers who received police fines for attending work parties during lockdown (Cabinet Office, 2022), as well as incidents of rule violations by the general public (Power et al., 2022; Williams et al., 2021). Research conducted during the pandemic suggests that moral disengagement was associated with violations of COVID-19 rules, such as social distancing (Alessandri et al., 2020). While many UK industries switched to remote working, or placed workers on furlough, commercial construction work continued onsite throughout periods of lockdown, and other pandemic-related restrictions (BEIS, 2020; Jallow et al., 2021). Thus, focusing on the UK construction industry, we explore ethical decision-making regarding work behaviours, where such behaviours were constrained by COVID-19 rules, mandated by the UK Government to minimize infections and spread of the virus, as well as existing organisational rules. This provides a real-life context in which to consider how moral intensity influences ethical decisions about whether or not to follow organisational rules. While previous work (e.g., Bazzoli & Probst, 2022) has examined the construct of COVID-19 safety climate (as an extension of organisational safety climate), the potential for conflict between COVID-19 rules and organisational rules, and how workers resolve these conflicts as an ethical decision, is yet to be studied.

Third, we provide insights for policy and practice related to compliance with organisational rules, taking account of the effects of moral intensity and moral disengagement. Our research provides guidance for businesses based on an ethical perspective, both specifically in the UK construction industry, and more widely across industries. In particular, we focus on the influence of social context (i.e., social group and organisational norms) on encouraging rule compliance and supporting workers in their ethical decision-making. Our work explores the ways in which COVID-19 safety and organisational health and safety were maintained during the pandemic, and identifies practical implications for the management of health and safety within the construction sector and similar industries in future. In particular, we highlight the effects of social subgroups within workforces (e.g., cultural norms and beliefs) and the need to manage these effectively to support rule compliance. We also consider the implications of our research for organisational policies, as well as the wider implications of rule compliance for governments in the context of the societal response to COVID-19 pandemic. While our study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, the findings can be applied in other settings, which might require similar crisis management and persuasion of large social groups to ensure public health (e.g., encouraging childhood vaccinations, acceptance of new technologies, promoting behavioural change to minimise climate change related risk).

Taking a qualitative approach, based on the analysis of semi-structured interviews, we explore the role of moral disengagement tactics and moral intensity relating to COVID-19 and organisational rule violations in construction settings. In particular, we examine the relationships between moral intensity and moral disengagement in this context.

Theoretical Background: Ethical Decision-making, Moral Intensity and Moral Disengagement

Our theoretical approach draws on ethics theories, specifically the theories of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1986) and moral intensity (Jones, 1991), to explore the role of ethical decision-making on workplace rule following in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Bandura (1986) introduced the theory of moral disengagement, which predicts that individuals will morally disengage to perform unethical actions, in order to avoid dissonant feelings of guilt or blame. Individuals may use various moral disengagement tactics related to: behaviour (e.g., cognitive reconstrual, moral justification, advantageous comparison); locus of responsibility (e.g., displacement, or diffusion, of responsibility); harmful consequences (e.g., minimise, distort, or ignore the negative consequences); and, the recipient (e.g., attribution of blame, dehumanisation). Bandura (1986, 1990, 2002) accepts that decision making, whilst an internal process, is directly linked to the external environment. Self-regulation of moral conduct, and the tendency to morally disengage, operate as part of a system in which behaviour, cognition, and environmental influences, are all continuously interacting determinants of each other. This perspective opens up the possibility that context can influence the tendency to morally disengage (Moore, 2015). In line with Bandura’s theory, previous research has proposed that moral disengagement acts as a mechanism, which underpins the link between organisational factors, and rule-related behaviours (Hystad et al., 2014; Petitta et al., 2017; Probst et al., 2020a). Petitta et al. (2017) explored the differential effects of safety culture types on the under-reporting of work accidents, using a diverse sample of US employees. They found that moral disengagement is more likely to occur in technocratic cultures, where safety rules are followed only when these do not impede the workflow, but less likely in bureaucratic cultures, where strict adherence to safety rules is endorsed.

Jones (1991) developed the construct of moral intensity (defined as the’extent of issue-related moral imperative in a situation’ p. 372) to facilitate understanding of ethical reasoning in a wider than individual context. Moral intensity locates ethical decision-making in the social constructivist paradigm and plays a key role in understanding the impact of social factors in ethical decision-making, by highlighting the consequences and impact of decision-making on others (Jones, 1991; Singer, 1996; Singer & Singer, 1997). Research has highlighted that greater moral intensity increases the likelihood of ethical behaviours in a work context, such as whistle-blowing (Valentine & Godkin, 2019). Jones’ model identifies six key dimensions: magnitude of consequences (i.e., the sum of the resultant harms); social consensus (i.e., the degree of social agreement on actions being un/ethical); probability of effect (i.e., likelihood of harm to others); temporal immediacy (i.e., separation of time from action to outcome); proximity (i.e., closeness to those affected); and, concentration of effect (i.e., impact of harm relative to number affected). However, most empirical work has focused on a smaller subset of these dimensions, including only those that most closely tie to research studies in question (Paramita et al., 2022). Therefore, there is limited empirical evidence to support the theoretical prediction that each dimension of moral intensity affects ethical decision-making independently. Empirical research suggests that there are differential relationships between the six moral intensity dimensions, with some dimensions correlated, and others unrelated to each other (Barnett, 2001; Sweeney and Costello, 2009). Quantitative analyses have been conducted on moral intensity measures, which have failed to identify the six-factor orthogonal structure expected based on Jones’ (1991) model. Alternative configurations have favoured a three-factor model (de Graaff et al., 2019; McMahon & Harvey, 2006), comprising seriousness of harm, probability of harm, and social consensus, or a two-factor model focusing on magnitude of consequences and social consensus (Fichtel et al., 2022). Research has highlighted the differential importance of the six dimensions of moral intensity as well, with social consensus and magnitude of consequences being most important, but less so temporal immediacy and proximity, for ethical decision making (Barnett, 2001). Jones’ (1991) model predicts that relative importance of the six dimensions will vary depending on the situation. For example, in a study by Cohen and Martinov-Bennie (2006), using a sample of accounting firm executives, more experienced participants tended to see magnitude of consequences and probability of effect as more important in making ethical decisions. Thus, while the moral intensity construct has gained in popularity among researchers (Craft, 2013; Lehnert et al., 2015), there remains unanswered questions regarding its nature and influence on ethical decision-making.

The literature suggests a growing need to identify the emotional and intuitive factors inherent in ethical decision-making (Watts & Buckley, 2017), particularly against the backdrop of predominantly rational approaches to ethical decision-making processes (e.g., Rest, 1986). In addition, much research has been conducted using hypothetical ethical dilemmas and scenarios, rather than looking at decisions made in situ. Using real-life situations can provide greater insight into ethical sense-making (a process of gathering and interpreting information related to the ethical situation; Mumford et al., 2008) that better reflects the nature of ethical decision-making in situ, which can be complex and often involves multiple (and competing) goals. Our research is conducted in the real-life context of the COVID-19 pandemic, where there have been limited studies of moral intensity to date. Using scenarios, Navajas et al. (2021) explored moral responses to the COVID-19 crisis based on challenging real-life dilemmas, such as the prioritization of younger vs. older patients to life-saving interventions, where limited medical equipment (e.g., ventilators) is available, or the prioritization of public health vs. personal freedoms and liberty. They found that contextual factors, including proximity (e.g., knowing someone who was infected with the virus) and severity (e.g., number of deaths from the virus in the local area), influenced the tendency to prioritize public health. Overall, Navajas et al. (2021) concluded that individuals followed utilitarian principles and tended to prioritize public health over other aspects of wellbeing. However, recent work in an organisational context has suggested that crises can prompt responses characterised by ‘immoral entrenchment’, where the effects expected, based on increased moral intensity, are reversed (Welbourne Eleazar, 2022). Jones’ (1991) model would suggest that a highly intense moral issue would prompt awareness of the moral imperative, and intentions to act ethically. However, in crises, the opposite response (i.e., unethical behaviour) may instead occur due to ‘immoral entrenchment’ in which responses are based on perceived threat (i.e., threat rigidity), leading to moral disengagement tactics being used (e.g., denial of responsibility, blaming the victims).

The exploration of complex situational factors, and how they influence individuals’ work behaviours, lends itself to a qualitative approach, especially when reflecting on real-world behaviour in the field. Thus, we adopt a qualitative methodology, using semi-structured interviews, to explore our research questions in a sample of UK construction workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our qualitative approach aims to add richness and insight to a literature that has been dominated by quantitative approaches, including survey data, and experimental ethical dilemma scenarios. This approach allows us to examine situations in which ethical dilemmas arise that are higher in complexity, and require differing perspectives, to a greater extent than possible in experimental scenario studies. We utilise Jones’ (1991) model of moral intensity as a lens through which to explore the influence of situational factors on decisions to follow organisational rules, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The research context for our study is the UK construction industry, which was designated ‘critical work’, and largely continued commercial work onsite during the COVID-19 pandemic (BEIS, 2020; Jallow et al., 2021).

Previous research conducted on compliance with COVID-19 rules suggested that a range of factors influenced the extent to which individuals would adhere to the rules, including job insecurity and economic stressors (Probst et al., 2020b; Sinclair et al., 2021). In addition, Bazzoli and Probst (2022) found that compliance with COVID-19 rules was influenced by organisational factors, including the perceived organisational COVID-19 safety climate (i.e., employee perceptions of COVID-19 related policies, practices, and procedures instituted within the workplace in response to the pandemic). Employees were more likely to adhere to COVID-19 rules in the workplace and demonstrate less moral disengagement in a strong organisational COVID-19 safety climate.

We propose that moral intensity in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic will have an impact on the way people choose to respond to health and safety measures. The COVID-19 context is a ripe field for investigating moral intensity and in particular, the consequences of moral intensity on ethical decision making in the workplace. Our research takes an exploratory (theory generating) methodological approach and so we begin with the overarching objective to explore the role of moral disengagement and moral intensity in ethical decisions concerning health and safety in the workplace. We explore these decisions in the context of compliance with both COVID-19 rules and organisational health and safety rules in the UK construction sector. The study will address the following research questions:

  1. 1)

    What is the role of moral disengagement tactics relating to COVID-19 and organisational rule violations in construction settings?

  2. 2)

    What is the role of moral intensity, as perceived by participants, relating to COVID-19 and organisational rule violations in construction settings?

  3. 3)

    What are the relationships between moral intensity and moral disengagement in this context?

The study aims to use the findings, including self-reported anonymous examples of rule-related work behaviours, to provide useful feedback to organisations, and to governments, about how to implement policies and practices to reduce the potential for rule violations and workarounds. For example, in response to potential future pandemic crises, civil nuclear radiation release, or implementation of climate change policies. Our study has significant implications for practice, by taking learning from the COVID-19 context, and applying this to the management of crises, and where organisations need to understand how situational factors influence rule compliant behaviours.

Methods

The research presented is a subset of data collected for the ‘Keeping the UK Building Safely’ (KUBS) research project. The focus of this strand of work was in the UK construction sector during the COVID-19 pandemic (Bourne et al., 2021, 2022). The research project involved a two-stage mixed-methods study with data collected at the onset of the pandemic (Stage 1, December 2020–February 2021) and towards the end (Stage 2, November 2021–January 2022). For the project timeline during the COVID-19 pandemic, see Table 1. The project was conducted by a multi-disciplinary team of researchers in collaboration with three major UK construction partners. For the current study, we used the dataset that draws on semi-structured interviews collected in the second stage of the research project. Construction industry representatives, from both construction organisations and the UK construction regulatory body, were involved in the design and interpretation of the research and helped inform the interview schedule. Ethical approval was given for the work by the University of Manchester Ethics Committee (UREC Ref: 2021-12906-21232).

Table 1 Timeline of Covid-19 significant dates in the UK and two stages of data collection

Research Context: Construction Work During Covid-19 Pandemic

The UK Government deemed construction as ‘critical work’ during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic (BEIS, 2020). Government advice issued in March 2020 (updated in November 2020) confirmed that ‘Construction sites have not been asked to close, so work can continue if it is done safely’. Furthermore, guidance stated that: ‘Employers should ensure their workers onsite are able to follow the public health guidance, and they should consider responsible arrangements for ensuring their workers can travel in line with this advice, such as through staggering site hours to reduce public transport use during peak periods.’ (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2020). COVID-19 measures were introduced on UK construction sites to restrict close contacts, and enforce strict hygiene measures, such as the use of hand sanitisers, and wearing facemasks (Bourne et al., 2021). These measures were in place to reduce the potential for workplace outbreaks, which were seen in some UK industries, such as meat-packing, where workers operated in confined indoor spaces (Chen et al., 2022; Jain et al., 2021). Alongside the introduction of rules designed to minimise COVID-19 infections, the construction industry continued to enforce organisational health and safety rules designed to prevent work injuries and accidents (Bourne et al., 2021). Research in the construction sector points to the importance of a strong health and safety climate, which encourages rule compliance, to protect workers from accidents and injuries (Alruqi et al., 2018).

Procedure

Qualitative interview data were collected from participants in a range of construction roles. This included representatives from multiple types of organisation and multiple roles from leadership to ‘on the tools’ (i.e., working hands-on in construction roles) employees (N = 22). Of these, 23% (5/22) identified as female and 77% (17/22) as male. Participants represent 11 organisations (3 × Tier 1 and 8 × subcontracting firms). Occupations comprised seven health and safety roles and, five others ranging from ‘on the tools’ roles, such as ganger, through office roles, such as planner and up to associate director.

The qualitative data was collected through November 2021 to January 2022. Semi-structured interviews took place using MS Teams or Zoom. Remote interviews were selected in order to protect the health and wellbeing of both researchers and participants (in line with University ethics guidelines for data collection during the COVID-19 pandemic). The inclusion criteria for participation were people working in any roles in a UK construction company during the COVID-19 pandemic. Invitations to participate were cascaded through three major tier 1 (industry leading, large international) construction companies to their employees at all levels and to subcontracting firms (tier 2 and tier 3 medium and smaller sized organisations). Opportunistic sampling was used with partner organisations for participant recruitment, based on availability and accessibility to willing participants. Thus, although we used non-random sampling, this was considered appropriate for research aimed at gaining rich insights, rather than generalisation.

Interview questions are available in the appendix, and include questions on: perceptions of risk of catching Covid-19; implementation and perceived effectiveness of transmission mitigation measures; and, the role of leadership.

Initial qualitative data analysis was undertaken using a thematic approach using NVivo for coding. An iterative approach was undertaken, and first stage analysis informed the development of the interview schedule and analysis approach for second stage data. Figure 1 outlines the timeline for the data collection and iterative relationship between data time points.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Iterative qualitative approach using framework analysis

The wider project findings for the second stage are reported in Bourne et al. (2022). In our study, we focus on examples of rule violations and workarounds within the dataset. These emerged through the analysis of the qualitative data, highlighting a significant dataset within the wider context of general rule adherence and safe working culture across the construction sector. On this basis, we conducted a secondary thematic analysis with NVivo, using the theory-based framework of moral disengagement and moral intensity.

The original data was coded by one researcher, and checked by two others independently for internal validation through inter-coder reliability (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; O’Connor et al., 2020). The secondary analysis was conducted on data identified in codes related to safety risks and rule violations. This data was analysed taking a framework analysis approach (Furber, 2010; Smith & Firth, 2011), which combines both a priori theories and data-led interpretation, and allows the research team to iteratively discuss the findings as they emerge. The stages of the framework analysis are described in Fig. 1. The categorisation process of the data was based on moral disengagement tactics, and further coded based on categories of moral intensity. In doing so we were able to identify firstly personal decision making (and justifications for violations) against the social contextual factors which influence them, in terms of moral intensity. The secondary framework analysis process was conducted by one researcher and iteratively checked by two others to further enhance reliability (O’Connor et al., 2020).

Findings

Key examples of rule violations and workarounds are presented through the lens of moral disengagement and moral intensity to understand the interplay of ethical dilemmas in the context of changing health and safety demands in the UK construction work environment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 2a,b summarises the data categorisation reported in the findings. We present the findings as we recognise them, a matrix of rule violations and workarounds attributed to (individual) moral disengagement mapped against (socially driven) moral intensity.

Table 2 Analysis of rule violations based on moral disengagement and moral intensity

Cognitive Reconstrual

The first category of data relates to rule violations for which participants give moral, social or economic justifications for their decisions. Three types of violation are reported in this category. The first two types of violation relate to breaking COVID-19 rules, in order to maintain site safety. The final example is the reverse, where site safety rules are violated, in order to follow COVID-19 rules. In these examples, participants give the moral justification of the greater need or drive for the measure taken. These relate specifically to wearing face coverings and the need to work closely together.

The first example of deliberate rule violation relates to where workers chose to remove, or not to wear at all, a face covering. There were several examples of this in the data with two specifically referring to the mask limiting their ability to communicate, which was essential for site safety. An ethical decision had to be made between wearing a mask (and protecting oneself and others against COVID-19), or being able to communicate effectively with co-workers onsite.

I think one of the areas that we were very aware of was the communication side of things, so particularly working down the tunnel, it’s a noisy environment in the first place, you’ve then got facemasks on, and then communicating in that environment was critical. We did try all kinds of things and in certain operations we did use firstly floor masks that had comms systems in them but that’s for, sort of, specific instances. It was almost…in other instances it was a sort of, decision made between wearing a mask and being safe from COVID or taking the mask off and being able to communicate better and that’s been one of the sort of, challenges, particularly in the tunnelling environment. (Interview 7)

There were also two reports of choosing not to wear a face covering due to the need to wear glasses, which would steam up if a face covering was worn, preventing the ability to see properly.

Is it better that somebody’s wearing a mask, or that they’re wearing glasses that don’t steam up? Generally, we’ve sort of taken a sort of, practical, sort of, sensible view on that and nine times out of ten if they’re wearing their glasses, we see that as more priority over wearing a mask and so that’s been one of the sort of, challenging areas with PPE. (Interview 7)

The second example relates to where workers were conflicted between following the COVID-19 two metre social distancing rule (recommended in UK government guidance during 2020) and the need to work closely together. There were many examples of this type of rule violation in the data with varying consequences. Several participants reported violating social distancing because many tasks onsite required workers to be close together to be conducted safely. This was specifically reported in relation to heavy lifting and working with water.

In any heavy lifting scenario, so if you need several operatives to lift something, you have to be close together. (Interview 12)

In the construction industry and specially in the water, we are fairly hands-on, working close by, looking after your mate. (Interview 1)

Examples where safe site working was prioritised over following COVID-19 rules (such as mask wearing or social distancing) can be linked across all categories of moral intensity.

In relation to magnitude of consequences, in each example the participant could evaluate the potential risk and consequence of one action against another. There is social consensus in the actions within the team, and with supervisors. The second quote above suggests a direct relationship to social consensus by stating ‘we’ve taken a practical view’ confirming the violating behaviour is accepted within the context. Considering the probability of effect suggests that participants in these examples, when weighing the magnitude of consequences, surmised that the probability of effect was more likely heightened risk onsite than COVID-19 risk. These examples can be linked to temporal immediacy insofar as the decision is taken to be safe now, mitigating the potential later impact of an infection. This could also be linked to concentration of effect, where it is harder to find a workaround than to act as usual.

There is a final example of deliberate violations of site safety rules to maintain social distancing, which resulted in an incident and injury.

This year we’ve had a good number of them and a good number of lost time incidents, three of which, one was a broken foot, another one was a broken wrist and there was one more, I can’t remember, it was a sprained ankle. And three of those, I always remember, the root cause for that was people trying to lift and move things on their own because they were too nervous to ask for help in case they were coming into distance with people. (Interview 5)

This final example, whilst relating to magnitude of consequences, shows that some people onsite prioritised their risk of COVID-19 infection over their risk of injury onsite and suffered consequences as a result.

This type of violation crosses less categories of moral intensity. As with previous examples, there is a consideration of magnitude of consequences, but these are prioritised in reverse to the above examples. Probability of effect shows that in this example the individual perceives the COVID-19 risk as closer than the risk to site safety. There is no social consensus in the examples given that were individual decisions with impacts on individuals, which were documented by the organisation as rule violations. Similarly, these examples can be linked to immediacy and concentration of effort since finding a safe workaround alternative was not pursued, likely due to the need to complete the job and the prioritisation of practicality and time over safety.

In each of these examples, the moral justification for the rule violation was the need to meet conflicting rules and prioritise safety. In these instances, participants had to morally disengage from one set of safety rules in order to meet the needs of the other, and this was done by prioritisation judgments in their decision-making process. In each example, the moral intensity of the social context contributed to the moral disengagement.

Obscuring Personal Agency

There are four types of rule violation that are justified by participants through displacing or diffusing responsibility.

The first type relates to supervisors absorbing responsibility for reminding workers who are violating rules. In particular, this relates to rule violations, such as not wearing face coverings or observing social distancing. In this example, the responsibility is displaced from the individual to the supervisor.

It might slip their mind, so I remind them. (Interview 19)

This type of ‘forgetful’ violation is reported by multiple supervisors who accept that they have ultimate responsibility for ensuring compliance by workers onsite. Most supervisors report friendly warnings are successful and only a small number reported using enforcement measures. In relation to moral intensity, this example relates closely to the magnitude of consequences since the supervisor assumes greater responsibility for this in the context than the worker. It also relates to concentration of effort since workers are diffusing responsibility as it is less effort for them to violate COVID-19 rules until they are reminded by supervisors who assume the responsibility.

The second example reported only by supervisors is that some site workers will deliberately violate safety rules due to a desire to be seen as making independent choices, regardless of their moral stance.

Some people just don’t want to be told what to do. (Interview 15)

The second example reported is different to the first since responsibility is challenged, and the worker does not want responsibility for decision making to be diffused to the organisation and, as a result, has a greater desire to pursue violating behaviour to assert responsibility. In this situation there seems little to no regard for any level of moral intensity. In this example, the responsibility for ethical decision making is reclaimed by the organisation through enforcement measures to ensure the worker avoids a rule violation.

The third example is a supervisor diffusing organisational responsibility based on individual decisions outside the work context. Multiple participants mentioned this risk and suggested that the actions of people outside work may invalidate any measures undertaken in the workplace. The wider societal context of the COVID-19 restrictions in place nationally and locally may also influence individuals’ actions, given that the restrictions were relaxed over time (see Table 1 timeline).

You don’t know what people have done on the weekend. (Interview 10) / when they get home. (Interview 16)

The moral intensity created through the COVID-19 pandemic tended to ease over time, as people realised that their initial perception of the magnitude of consequences was probably higher than required. The timeline (see Table 1) demonstrates the relaxing and reintroduction of rules throughout 2021. In the UK, the first rules were relaxed in Spring 2021, before this became normalised at work, in particular onsite, which caused some conflict. The probability of effect reduced significantly and faster socially than organisationally, and this increased the effort required to adhere to rules at work, such as face coverings and social distancing, as they stopped being the social norm. As moral intensity increased in these areas, adherence to basic rules reduced and responsibility from supervisors also reduced as they diffused their responsibility to the broader social and political context.

The final example is an interesting example of a widespread rule violation that led to an outbreak and was uncovered as a result of the investigation of that outbreak. This was reported in an interview by a health and safety supervisor, and occurred in the office where they were based and attending in-person part-time during the pandemic. It was uncovered that, after the vending machines were restricted due to the risk of them being touchpoints, one member of staff started a ‘tuck shop’ offering various snacks and drinks for sale from the top drawer of their desk.

But trying to stop people from making team brews was just one of those idiosyncrasies and we found out. We had a cluster in one of our depots and so we were panicking that our measures weren’t working, and because one of the measures that we’d taken is we turned off all vendors machines and things like that so you couldn’t...there weren’t those touch points, only to find out that they’d been replaced by a tuck shop that somebody was running out of their drawer. (Interview 9)

This example of widespread violation by multiple actors links most strongly to social consensus. It also relates to concentration of effect since by sharing the violation in the social culture the effect of risks is absorbed by the group. It could be argued that temporal immediacy meant that urgent hunger needs were prioritised over long-term risks of illness.

In examples of moral disengagement related to obscuring personal agency, the matrix of moral intensity gives us insight into the ways that personal agency is related to social perceptions and group decisions in a range of settings. In some examples, supervisors seek to absorb responsibility for the personal agency of their employees, but in other examples they refuse the responsibility on the basis and understanding that personal agency extends beyond the workplace into the social environment.

This suggests that where there is full moral disengagement, there is little intensity of feeling. However, in the tuck shop example, while there is also little moral intensity displayed in most categories, there is a strong overlap with social consensus, where rule breaking has become normalised through social culture.

Therefore, within moral disengagement through obscuring personal agency, there is on some occasions very limited moral intensity, and sometimes moral intensity is applied through the responsibility of the organisation, although this is difficult when challenged by societal norms. In this theme, magnitude of consequences, social consensus and concentration of effect are the most moral intensive approaches to obscuring personal agency.

Disregarding Consequences

This category of moral disengagement relates to disregarding, distorting or denying harm. There are five types of disregarding consequences. The first four examples relate to specific examples of behaviours by specific sub-cultures, but the final one has a more overarching reach across the broader working culture.

The first example is the conspiracy theorist sub-culture, characterised by a range of views, which include that COVID-19 virus is not a risk and that wearing a mask or being vaccinated are not necessary or, in extreme cases, are part of a wider conspiracy.

You know, a lot of people didn’t believe that they’re going to get it. Some people didn’t believe it... I spoke to a guy yesterday, he arrives in on a pushbike, he’s a Romanian lad and he said to me, why have you got your mask on, because I was walking through an area where there’s a lot of people. I said, because that’s what we do. He says, it’s a waste of time. He said, it’s a load of rubbish. He said, it won’t do you any good. He said, everyone says you don’t need to wear one. Well, that’s their mentality. They just don’t think it affects anyone. We have a lot of people thinking it was purely because... The injections were purely to track them. (Interview 11)

In the example of the conspiracy theorist, consequences are fully refuted and while there is evidence of moral intensity, it is low. This is highlighted in the comment that ‘they just don’t think it affects anyone’. Perceptions of threat from the COVID-19 virus may be displaced by perceived threat from protection measures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. It may even be the case that moral disengagement tactics are not needed, because there is no awareness of following COVID-19 rules being a moral issue (‘it’s a waste of time’, ‘it’s a load of rubbish’). Several participants reported that ‘a small minority’ hold different views to the mainstream view and refuse to adhere to COVID-19 rules, based on their personal views. These form a small sub-culture who oppose mainstream views and develop their own social consensus.

The second and third examples relate to the view that specific demographic groups hold specific anti-mainstream views, and that these sub-cultures comprise a large percentage of the workforce, particularly at the sub-contracting levels. These examples overlap to some extent with conspiracy sub-cultures.

There’s plenty of different people out there as well on construction sites that will tell you this is all a hoax, this is the yada, yada. (Interview 5)

I think there was a difficulty with acceptance in some areas. We’re a very male dominated workforce, certain areas of the business can be quite macho. So yeah, here was a bit of that to start with. (Interview 6)

There’s a high percentage of people who don’t believe in vaccinations, don’t believe in COVID, they’re all from different backgrounds, high Eastern Europeans, high volumes of varying people from the UK. (Interview 11)

Moral intensity, in relation to each of the first three examples of disregarding consequences, is present but low in all categories. This is because some people believe the magnitude of consequences to be low (or non-existent, or even threatening in the case of vaccines) and risks low across categories of probability, temporal immediacy, proximity and concentration of effect. There was a significant problem with misinformation about the virus, and the vaccine, in the UK, particularly on social media (Burki, 2019; Van Der Linden, 2022). While this view is different to the mainstream social consensus, people with these views exist and hold social consensus within their own sub-cultures. Following COVID-19 rules may not be viewed as a moral issue, and therefore behaviour is only ‘unethical’ in the eyes of those with a different world view so there is no cognitive dissonance (feelings of guilt) and therefore no imperative to comply with the rules.

There is significant overlap between moral disengagement categories. The fourth example is a group who obscure their personal agency (and therefore fit the previous section) but do so through the views that COVID-19 is either unavoidable or not serious enough to warrant changes in personal behaviour. This example therefore also shows disregard of consequences and best fits within this category.

If I’m going to get it I’m going to. Just got to get on with it. (Interview 16)

It will run its course. (Interview 21)

This example links to low levels of moral intensity in relation to perception of low consequences and impacts further on low intensity based on probability of effect and concentration of effect. Interestingly there is little social consensus association despite this view growing in popularity across the broad workplace culture. This is linked to the final example of obscuring personal agency.

The final example of disregarding consequences relates significantly to the context of data collection, which was undertaken towards the end of the pandemic when measures were generally being relaxed in public, but less so in workplaces. At this point, many participants expressed that their perception of consequences of COVID-19 reduced as the evidence had suggested that COVID-19 was not as deleterious, as in many cases people had worried that it might be.

When it first came out, people always laugh, I always tell the story, but we didn’t know if it was gonna turn us into zombies or whatever the case may be. None of us knew what was going to happen to us. There was people dying left, right and centre and it was really really scary. (Interview 1)

The social consensus changed over time, which was reflected in individuals’ attitudes and behavioural changes. Within this category, the evidence suggests that moral intensity reduced as moral disengagement increased over time.

Vilification of Targets

This category relates to displacement of blame to the victim. There are four examples that relate to this. Some have significant overlap with previous examples, and all relate to working cultures.

The first example relates to scenarios where violation of social distancing COVID-19 rules were justified as violating behaviours because they opposed the normal working culture.

We are fairly hands-on, working close by, looking after your mate—that’s been drilled into us for like, since I first started. (Interview 1)

Yes, because what they used to do was, because we’re quite close-knit. (Interview 11)

Obliged to work in close contact, can’t do it alone. (Interview 8)

Moral intensity was displaced to the victim in a justified way, linked to high social consensus. There are low levels of moral intensity in relation to COVID-19. This is closely linked to examples where judgements were made between COVID-19 and organisational rules.

The second and third examples specifically relate to behaviour at work and changes over time.

The second examples are conflicts between work and social behaviours, which increased as social COVID-19 rules relaxed (see Table 1 Timeline).

We still have deep rooted construction industry habits which means people like to go to the pub on a Friday afternoon and do those sorts of things, or Friday evening these days, and they’re social animals. (Interview 9)

So, there’s always that chance, and you don’t know what people do on a weekend. (Interview 10)

There was that contact outside of work as well. So, when they left work, they would generally walk down the road together, chit-chatting and stuff like that. (Interview 11)

Being on a construction site what you can’t manage is yes, we’ve got all the signage up, they enter the threshold and then they, you know, you see them doing their hands, you see them abiding by the site rules. But what you can’t manage is what happens when they leave home, that’s the shame of it, I think. (Interview 16)

The third examples are those specifically where workers became fatigued with rule following.

A lack of commitment because of they’re all fed up with it, and a bit of…and there is a bit of complacency coming in as well. And there is also a lot of, I can go in a pub, I haven’t got to wear a mask, but I come here and you’re telling me I’ve got to do this and I’ve got to do that. So, it’s not clear, is it? (Interview 4)

In these examples, moral intensity is high based on social consensus, whilst being low based on consequences or outcomes.

The final example is a demonstration of rule violations blamed on the COVID-19 situation creating an opportunity for violation that had not existed previously. One participant reported a scenario where they got COVID-19 at work by being in close contact with a team (crane drivers) with whom they did not need to interact. An opportunistic move for a personally rewarding safety violation (Reason et al., 1998) was created by a scenario where fewer people than normal were working onsite during the pandemic. The worker had never been in a crane, but had always wanted to, so took the opportunity on a quiet day when offered the chance. As a result, he was infected with COVID-19 and he, and the crane driving team, were all absent from work for a prolonged period. He admits that his close contact was avoidable and not required for work and facilitated by the different working scenario enabled through the pandemic.

I didn’t need to be up the crane at all. It was more of a…we were having a conversation saying, I really want to go up the crane one day, and the guys were like, well Saturday, it’s quiet, there’s no better time to do it, if you’re going to do it, come up now. So, had I not done that, it would probably have been quite a different story. (Interview 17)

This demonstrated the target vilifying themselves through rule violation with total moral disengagement across all levels of moral intensity. The victim accepted responsibility for the outcome in this scenario and demonstrated why rules exist for preventing COVID-19 transmission through close working.

Discussion

We examined the role of moral intensity and moral disengagement tactics for justifying rule violations in the context of construction work during the COVID-19 pandemic, using a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews from across the UK construction sector. We found that moral disengagement tactics were used frequently to justify breaking both COVID-19 rules, such as social distancing, as well as organisational health and safety rules, such as wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) onsite. The moral intensity of the situation, particularly the effects of social consensus and magnitude of consequences / concentration of effect, affected ethical decisions about work behaviour. Situational factors, including organisational and group social norms, influenced rule violations, but also wider societal beliefs and norms, regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. An overview of these contextual influences is presented in Fig. 2, which reflects an illustration of our findings.

Fig. 2
figure 2

Conceptual model based on interview findings

The model demonstrates our findings of overlapping concentric circles of social influence on ethical decisions concerning rule-related work behaviour. The innermost circle of influence concerns social norms amongst work groups. Here, we found that close social bonds at work (e.g., ‘looking after your mate) was difficult to reconcile with COVID-19 rules requiring social distancing and limited social mixing, where this was perceived as part of the fabric of the construction industry (‘that’s been drilled into us…., since I first started’). For example, workers would follow COVID-19 rules onsite, but this rule adherence would begin and end at the site entrance, to allow for socialising in non-work time. At the organisational level (i.e., the middle circle), supervisors played an active role, not just in enforcing rules, but also in resolving ethical dilemmas that arose around rule implementation, such that these resolutions became normative. For example, supporting workers to maintain site safety, even when this meant violating COVID-19 rules (e.g., wearing glasses to see properly was prioritised over mask-wearing). Here, the interface between circles of influence relating to the social group and the organisation played an important role in ethical decision-making.

The outermost circle of influence concerns the societal level, including government restrictions relating to COVID-19 (i.e., to protect public health), and societal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, we found several examples of rule violations that prioritised following COVID-19 rules over site safety rules (e.g., maintaining social distancing even when this meant that workers struggled to lift equipment by themselves, leading to personal injuries). However, individuals’ ethical decision-making was also influenced by the perceived legitimacy of COVID-19 rules, and misinformation about the COVID-19 virus. For example, sub-cultures developed where workers’ beliefs about the COVID-19 virus underpinned their rule-violating behaviour (e.g., facemasks were ineffective against the virus, or vaccinations were a way of tracking people). These behaviours reflected not so much a threat rigidity response (Welbourne Eleazar, 2022), as a failure to recognise the moral intensity of the COVID-19 pandemic, such that the response was based on a nullification of COVID-19 as a moral issue. This aligns with earlier work (e.g., Peeters et al., 2019) which has suggested that the complexity of morally intense societal issues (such as climate change) can lead to reductions in perceived moral intensity. Relatedly, we also identified instances where individuals used a fatalistic attitude as a way of coping with COVID-19 as a highly intense moral issue (e.g., ‘If I’m going to get it I’m going to. Just got to get on with it’), which allowed them to carry on as normal, ignoring the potential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. These examples illustrate how changing the frame of reference for moral intensity allows greater scope for moral disengagement tactics, such as within sub-cultures (Su et al., 2011). Based on their adherence to sub-culture beliefs, individuals are able to disconnect their ‘unethical’ behaviour from wider social norms.

Our study was conducted during a period in which the COVID-19 pandemic evolved, UK Government guidance on COVID-19 restrictions changed, and the vaccine programme was successfully rolled out (see Table 1). In particular, as COVID-19 restrictions were relaxed in social settings, stricter COVID-19 rules remained in force on construction sites. Perceptions of moral intensity were influenced by these wider societal factors, and the moral imperative to follow COVID-19 rules onsite tended to wane. Here, the interface between societal and organisational influences was especially influential on ethical decision-making, given discrepancies in guidance depending on location. This was reflected in increasing difficulty experienced by supervisors in managing COVID-19 safety onsite (e.g., ‘I can go in a pub, I haven’t got to wear a mask, but I come here and you’re telling me I’ve got to do this and I’ve got to do that’). We found that a growing sense of complacency and compliance fatigue affected perceptions of moral intensity and the associated moral imperative to follow COVID-19 rules at work (e.g., ‘they’re all fed up with it…and there is a bit of complacency coming in as well’).

Our conceptual model (see Fig. 2) illustrates the multi-layered effects of situational factors in our findings, adding greater nuance to the understanding of contextual influence in the business ethics field. We hope that future researchers will be encouraged to explore the potential effects of social consensus through this extended lens of situational context on ethical decision-making in the workplace.

Theoretical Implications

We have grouped the theoretical contributions into three main areas: (1) implications for Jones’ (1991) model of moral intensity; (2) implications for moral disengagement theory, and how this relates to moral intensity, in ethical decision making; (3) implications for better integration of processes, such as ethical sensemaking, into decision making models.

Jones’ (1991) model of moral intensity identifies six dimensions, which are theorised to operate independently to influence ethical decision-making. However, previous research has suggested that these dimensions might be collapsed into two or three overarching factors based on social consensus and magnitude of the harm (e.g., Fichtel et al., 2022; McMahon & Harvey, 2006). While we found that social consensus and magnitude of consequences / concentration of effects were most influential, some dimensions were difficult to distinguish (such as the magnitude of consequences and the concentration of effects, which reflected the scale of harm). Our analysis reflected the complexity of ethical decision-making in situ (e.g., uncertainty and lack of information), which involved most of the moral intensity dimensions, especially during engagement with real-world moral dilemmas. For example, in one instance, the use of facemasks was making communication difficult in a noisy work environment. Wearing facemasks was required under COVID-19 rules, but this affected the ability to converse with coworkers in a situation in which effective communication was critical to getting the work done safely. We found evidence that workers considered the relative probability of effect (i.e., heightened risk onsite compared to COVID-19 risk), temporal immediacy (i.e., being safe now, but risking later impact of an infection), and proximity (i.e., protecting the safety of immediate coworkers, compared to more distant others) in order to make sense of a morally complex situation. Our findings would therefore support maintaining the granularity of Jones’ (1991) model, while acknowledging the overlap between dimensions in practice.

Ethical dilemmas were often resolved through adherence to one set of rules over another, rather than trying to devise a workaround that might act as a compromise. In the above example, workers experimented with different types of mask to identify a workaround, but ultimately the decision was to work without facemasks. This would have increased the likelihood of virus transmission, especially in an enclosed workspace (such as tunnelling), but enabled safe working onsite. The resolution of these real-world dilemmas depended on a complex process of ethical sensemaking to make decisions based on moral and social justifications (i.e., cognitive reconstrual). In contrast, the use of other moral disengagement tactics, such as obscuring personal agency (i.e., diffusing or displacing responsibility) and disregarding the consequences (i.e., denying or distorting the harm), drew on fewer dimensions of moral intensity (often social consensus or magnitude of consequences / concentration of effect). The influence of contextual factors on moral disengagement at different levels (i.e., work group, organisation, and society) is illustrated in Fig. 2. This shows how the displacement of responsibility for harm or ignoring the harmful consequences was based on social norms at group, organisational or societal levels to enable moral disengagement from actions taken. Thus, our findings highlight nuances in the relationship between moral intensity and moral disengagement tactics, and we encourage researchers to explore these relationships further.

Previous work has suggested that high complexity coupled with high moral intensity encourages greater use of ethical sensemaking (i.e., a process of gathering and interpreting information related to the ethical situation; Mumford et al., 2008), such as in military contexts (de Graaff et al., 2019). We found evidence of ethical sensemaking particularly in relation to the most complex scenarios, where workers developed moral and social justifications for their actions, especially in cases of high moral intensity. Thus we would encourage researchers to further explore the role of ethical sensemaking, especially in qualitative analysis of real-world scenarios.

Practice and Policy Implications

The findings demonstrate practical implications when designing and implementing rules in response to crises for organisations and managers, and also for policymakers: (1) we highlight the importance of leadership in organisations, noting the critical role played by organisations in the interpretation of government guidance and how to encourage compliance in their workforce (as the ‘middle layer’ in Fig. 2); (2) we emphasize the role of government guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially the consistency and clarity of information, noting how this influenced work behaviour directly and through social consensus.

Our findings illustrate the importance of identifying potential conflicts in rules and supporting the safest choices. If an organisation understands the potential for conflict leading to moral disengagement, they can consider efforts to increase the moral intensity, in particular around magnitude of consequences / concentration of effect, within training and support mechanisms. Through our analysis, we found that some organisations did in fact utilise this method by asking members of staff who had experienced COVID-19 to create resources to share with colleagues to generate and support development of high moral intensity. This approach is supported by work on crises and crisis management (Bundy et al., 2017), which emphasises the need for the individual to understand and have the opportunity to follow rules and to be supported to apply them, even in a crisis situation.

It is suggested that moral intensity can be low in sub-cultures leading to high levels of moral disengagement though obscuring personal agency within these groups. There is evidence that some supervisors and organisation representatives absorb the responsibility where it is obscured by the individual, based on the workplace or wider cultural / social consensus. However, there is also conflicting evidence that some supervisors refuse to take that responsibility and blame the individual choices or social consensus in sub-cultures for violations. This emphasises the importance of strong leadership and personal agency in leadership roles, concurring with the findings of Lazim et al. (2020) who reviewed the literature related to low morality among employees due to COVID-19 and found leadership in this context was challenging, but played a significant role. The findings point to the importance of good quality cultural understanding by managers translated into strong communication and followed up with strong enforcement. Organisations with clear procedures still suffered violations, and there is evidence that these could have been mitigated by further communication, incentives and rewards (Shafer & Simmons, 2011; Warren et al., 2014). There was some evidence related to risk outside work transferring into the workplace and reducing personal agency at leadership level. To minimise this moral disengagement within leadership in the organisation, it is important to examine the risk of behaviours outside work, and for their impact on work to be recognised and controlled. Indeed, this would align with previous research (e.g., Petitta et al., 2017) that organisations with strong procedures and enforcement have employees who are less likely to be disengaged. Although examined in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, our findings can therefore be applied more widely in business ethics practice in different work settings.

The findings of this study can apply to studies beyond the workplace and into social ethical decision making. We have demonstrated the importance of social consensus on moral intensity and that often strong moral intensity can lower moral disengagement and rule breaking. We also demonstrate the impact of cultural or sub-culture beliefs on moral intensity. Cultural beliefs are shown to influence denial or disregard of harm, in particular in conspiracy theorists, in our findings these occurred most often within males, and Eastern Europeans or transient workers, many of which groups comprise the construction workforce, especially in smaller subcontractors. In these examples, moral intensity in relation to harm is present, but low in all categories, since some people believe the magnitude of consequences to be low (or non-existent, or even threatening in the case of vaccines) and risks low across categories of probability, temporal immediacy, proximity and concentration of effect. Whilst their view is outlined as different to the overall social consensus, they exist and hold social consensus within their own sub-cultures. High levels of social consensus, either in the broadest sense, or within smaller sub-cultures has an impact on other categories of moral intensity. This highlights the need for organisations to engage with these subgroups within their workforce, perhaps through specific messaging and communications, recognising their differing perspectives. While we focused on the construction industry, our findings can be applied across other similar industries, such as manufacturing, mining and agriculture.

There is evidence that as the COVID-19 pandemic progressed personal agency was obscured due to decreasing moral intensity related to the magnitude of consequences, probability of effect and concentration of effect based on observed outcomes. The social consensus changed over time which was reflected in individuals’ attitudes and behavioural changes. Within this category, there is significant evidence that as moral intensity reduced, inversely moral disengagement increased over time. This has implications for governments and policymakers, given that their approach to communicating COVID-19 rules, and changes to those rules based on the changing risk that the COVID-19 virus posed to society, were both critical influences on the extent of moral disengagement and rule compliance in the workplace. Inconsistency in COVID-19 rules between work and non-work locations, and the uncertainty created by misinformation, tended to change perceptions of moral intensity, and allow greater opportunity for moral disengagement. Based on our findings, we would recommend that policymakers focus on consistency and straightforward messaging that clarify the moral imperative of situations (e.g., based on the potential for harm).

If we take our findings in the context of larger world problems, we can consider how to utilise these relationships in relation to social decision making. For example, Peeters et al. (2019) suggest that the motivational gap in climate change is related to the complexity which reduces moral intensity. They suggest increasing informational strategies at a basic social level to reduce moral disengagement culturally. Furthermore, Mäkiniemi and Vainio (2013) suggest this can extend to simple behaviours, such as changes in food choices, which can have positive impacts on both individual health, but also climate change. This meets the suggestion of Bandura (2002) that we need actions built into social systems that uphold compassionate behaviour. Overall, if we can consider measures to increase moral intensity at a cultural level, in particular emphasising and underpinning the magnitude and proximity of consequences, we can affect change at a social level that can impact higher levels of moral engagement in daily decision making which could have global impacts.

Recommendations for Practice

Based on our key findings, we make the following recommendations for practice aimed at businesses, governments and policymakers:

  1. 1.

    We found that perceptions of high moral intensity decrease the likelihood of moral disengagement tactics, and compliance with rules. For companies, we would recommend that they implement training and support mechanisms that increase the salience of moral intensity. They should also be aware of the potential conflicts between rules, and support workers through resolving these.

  2. 2.

    Our findings suggested that subcultures exist within the construction sector, which supported beliefs that didn’t align with organisational policy and practices. This is likely to also be the case in other workplaces and sectors (e.g., manufacturing). One recommendation would be to target communications, and tailor specific messages to these groups to counter and challenge beliefs that undermine rule compliance.

  3. 3.

    At a government level, communication about COVID-19 rules, and changes to those rules based on the changing risk that the COVID-19 virus posed to society, were both critical influences on the extent of moral disengagement and rule compliance in the workplace. Based on our findings, we would recommend that policymakers focus on consistency and straightforward messaging that clarify the moral imperative of situations (e.g., based on the potential for harm). These recommendations would apply in other crisis situations (especially those with implications for public health) in future.

  4. 4.

    Our study was conducted in the field, which highlighted the complexity of ethical decision-making in situ. We found that high complexity coupled with high moral imperative can create circumstances in which individuals fail to perceive the moral intensity of the situation. This can result in moral disengagement, nullification as a moral issue, or fatalistic attitudes. We would suggest one practical means of gaining commitment to ethical actions might be achieved through highlighting simple ways in which individuals can change their behaviour on a daily basis. Such advice could be implemented both by managers in organisations and by policymakers to improve ethical practice in businesses.

Limitations & Future Directions

The strengths of our research relate to its exploratory approach generating interview data from individuals in the field. Our research data draw on individuals’ lived experiences of working practices during the COVID-19 pandemic, which allowed us to examine ethical decision-making in situ.

Based on our methodological approach, our findings relate to a specific research context. We would encourage researchers to adopt a similar approach to examine the role of moral disengagement and moral intensity in additional contexts to triangulate our findings across settings. The approach of qualitative interviews and limitation of the sampling strategy means that we cannot claim generalisability, however we can represent interesting insights which may be recognised by others who would benefit from transferability of learning.

Our research has shown the importance of considering the complexity of the relationship between moral disengagement and moral intensity, especially where a reverse relationship occasionally occurs, depending on social context. We recommend further studies utilising this approach that might usefully inform future ethical decision making on a socio-cultural as well as organisational level. Finally, we recommend further studies into rule violations that can usefully give insight into why these behaviours take place in order to prevent them in future.

Conclusion

Using models of moral disengagement and moral intensity allows consideration of ethical decision-making in a socio-cultural context, enabling the rich description of the impact of social as well as personal feelings on ethical decision making in the workplace. By using both models of moral disengagement and moral intensity, we identified how tensions occur in the ethical decision-making process and the significance of social context and consensus on the actions of individuals. Through the analysis of rule violations and workarounds, we showed that moral intensity played a significant role in making ethical decisions about violating rules, but not always in expected ways. Organisational norms and support from supervisors was influential in workers’ ethical decisions, but wider societal attitudes towards the COVID-19 pandemic, also played a significant role.

The implications of this work show that the importance of social action and organisation and government responsibility for impacting individual decision making related to social safety. The inverse relationship of moral disengagement and moral intensity should be exploited to identify opportunities to influence large scale social ethical decision-making. For example, consensus between large organisations and the government could impact personal decision making in relation to concepts such as climate change or self-care in health.