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Emergence

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The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible

Definition

Emergence (EM) denotes a wide variety of phenomena – studied by numerous disciplines in natural and human sciences – where new processes, interactions, entities, and properties are claimed to be observed, characteristic for higher levels of complexity of matter and irreducible to their lower-level constituents. Playing central role in systems theory and theories of integrative levels, emergentism aspires to become one of the important categories within scientific explanation as it is understood today. As such, it departs from both strict holism and reductionism. Whereas the former assumes that we cannot infer anything concerning higher-level phenomena from the analysis of their parts, the latter argues there is nothing new about wholes, which would not already be present in their parts. Forging a middle ground between these two extreme positions, the term and the theory of EM designate the all-encompassing range of potentialities (possibilities) and dispositions of matter...

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Correspondence to Mariusz Tabaczek .

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Electronic Supplementary Martials

Self-organization of bacteria – due to steric interactions among them and hydrodynamic flows they generate by swimming – into a steady single-vortex state encircled by a counterrotating cell boundary layer, with spiral cell orientation within the vortex (author: Hugo Wioland, in Lushi et al. 2014) (AVI 10127 kb)

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Tabaczek, M. (2020). Emergence. In: The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_149-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_149-1

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