Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

Living Edition
| Editors: John Baillieul, Tariq Samad

Auctions

  • Bruce Hajek
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_36-1

Abstract

Auctions are procedures for selling one or more items to one or more bidders. Auctions induce games among the bidders, so notions of equilibrium from game theory can be applied to auctions. Auction theory aims to characterize and compare the equilibrium outcomes for different types of auctions. Combinatorial auctions arise when multiple-related items are sold simultaneously.

Keywords

Auction Combinatorial auction Game theory 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of IllinoisUrbanaUSA