Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models

  • Reference work entry
Extreme Environmental Events

  • 1373 Accesses

Article Outline

Glossary

Definition of the Subject

Introduction

The Dynamic – or Stochastic – Game Model

The Dynamic – or Stochastic – Game: Results

Global Climate Change – Issues, Models

Global Climate Change – Results

Future Directions

Bibliography

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 599.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Abbreviations

Players :

The agents who take actions. These actions can be – depending on application – the choice of capital stock, greenhouse emissions, level of savings, level of Research & Development expenditures, price level, quality and quantity of effort, etc.

Strategies :

Full contingent plans for the actions that players take. Each strategy incorporates a choice of action not just once but rather a choice of action for every possible decision node for the player concerned.

Payoffs :

The utility or returns to a player from playing a game. These payoffs typically depend on the strategies chosen – and the consequent actions taken – by the player herself as well as those chosen by the other players in the game.

Game horizon :

The length of time over which the game is played, i. e., over which the players take actions. The horizon may be finite – if there are only a finite number of opportunities for decision‐making – or infinite – when there are an infinite number of decision‐making opportunities.

Equilibrium :

A vector of strategies, one for each player in the game, such that no player can unilaterally improve her payoffs by altering her strategy, if the others' strategies are kept fixed.

Climate change :

The consequence to the earth's atmosphere of economic activities such as the production and consumption of energy that result in a build-up of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.

Bibliography

  1. Abreu D (1988) On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 56:383–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Abreu D, Pearce D, Stachetti E (1990) Towards a general theory of discounted repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 58:1041–1065

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Benhabib J, Radner R (1992) The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game‐theoretic approach. Econ Theory 2:155–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Benoit J-P, Krishna V (1987) Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53:905–922

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Dockner E, Long N, Sorger G (1996) Analysis of Nash equilibria in a class of capital accumulation games. J Econ Dyn Control 20:1209–1235

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Dockner E, Nishimura K (1999) Transboundary boundary problems in a dynamic game model. Jpn Econ Rev 50:443–456

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Duffie D, Geanakoplos J, Mas-Colell A, Mclennan A (1994) Stationary Markov equilibria. Econometrica 62-4:745–781

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Dutta P (1991) What do discounted optima converge to? A theory of discount rate asymptotics in economic models. J Econ Theory 55:64–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Dutta P (1995) A folk theorem for stochastic games. JET 66:1–32

    Google Scholar 

  10. Dutta P, Radner R (2004) Self‐enforcing climate change treaties. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 101-14:5174–5179

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Dutta P, Radner R (2006) Population growth and technological change in a global warming model. Econ Theory 29:251–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Dutta P, Radner R (2008) A strategic model of global warming model: Theory and some numbers. J Econ Behav Organ (forthcoming)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Dutta P, Radner R (2008) Choosing cleaner technologies: Global warming and technological change, (in preparation)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Dutta P, Sundaram R (1993) How different can strategic models be? J Econ Theory 60:42–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The Folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or incomplete information. Econometrica 54:533–554

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Harris C, Reny P, Robson A (1995) The existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games with almost perfect information: A case for extensive‐form correlation. Econometrica 63:507–544

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) Climate Change, the Synthesis Report. IPCC, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  18. Levhari D, Mirman L (1980) The great fish war: An example using a dynamic cournot‐Nash solution. Bell J Econ 11:322–334

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Long N, Sorger G (2006) Insecure property rights and growth: The role of appropriation costs, wealth effects and heterogenity. Econ Theory 28:513–529

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Mertens J-F, Parthasarathy T (1987) Equilibria for Discounted Stochastic Games. Research Paper 8750, CORE. University Catholique de Louvain

    Google Scholar 

  21. Mertens, Neyman (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Nowak A (1985) Existence of equilibrium stationary strategies in discounted noncooperative stochastic games with uncountable state space. J Optim Theory Appl 45:591–603

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Parthasarathy T (1973) Discounted, positive and non‐cooperative stochastic games. Int J Game Theory 2–1:

    Google Scholar 

  24. Rieder U (1979) Equilibrium plans for non-zero sum Markov games. In: Moeschlin O, Pallasche D (ed) Game theory and related topics. North-Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  25. Rustichini A (1992) Second‐best equilibria for games of joint exploitation of a productive asset. Econ Theory 2:191–196

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Shapley L (1953) Stochastic Games. In: Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences, Jan 1953

    Google Scholar 

  27. Sobel M (1990) Myopic solutions of affine dynamic models. Oper Res 38:847–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Sorger G (1998) Markov‐perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games. Econ Theory 11:79–100

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Stern N (2006) Review on the economics of climate change. HM Treasury, London. www.sternreview.org.uk

  30. Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, October, (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  31. Sundaram R (1989) Perfect equilibrium in a class of symmetric dynamic games. J Econ Theory 47:153–177

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, USA

    Prajit K. Dutta

Authors
  1. Prajit K. Dutta
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer-Verlag

About this entry

Cite this entry

Dutta, P.K. (2011). Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Extreme Environmental Events. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7695-6_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation