Summary.
A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.
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Received: November 1, 1996
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Sorger, G. Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games. Economic Theory 11, 79–100 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050179
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050179