Glossary
- Players :
-
The agents who take actions. These actions can be – depending on application – the choice of capital stock, greenhouse emissions, level of savings, level of Research & Development expenditures, price level, quality and quantity of effort, etc.
- Strategies :
-
Full contingent plans for the actions that players take. Each strategy incorporates a choice of action not just once but rather a choice of action for every possible decision node for the player concerned.
- Payoffs :
-
The utility or returns to a player from playing a game. These payoffs typically depend on the strategies chosen – and the consequent actions taken – by the player herself as well as those chosen by the other players in the game.
- Game horizon :
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The length of time over which the game is played, i. e., over which the players take actions. The horizon may be finite – if there are only a finite number of opportunities for decision-making – or infinite – when there are an infinite number of decision-making...
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Dutta, P.K. (2020). Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models. In: Sotomayor, M., Pérez-Castrillo, D., Castiglione, F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems . Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_137
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