Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice Christopher P. Chambers OriginalPaper Pages: 315 - 334
A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity Biung-Ghi Ju OriginalPaper Pages: 335 - 354
An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value Sergiu Hart OriginalPaper Pages: 355 - 366
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences Bezalel PelegHans PetersTon Storcken OriginalPaper Pages: 381 - 396
Values for strategic games in which players cooperate Luisa CarpenteBalbina Casas-MéndezAnne van den Nouwel OriginalPaper Pages: 397 - 419
The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis Marina NúñezCarles Rafels OriginalPaper Pages: 421 - 430
Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma Akihiro SuzukiShigeo Muto OriginalPaper Pages: 431 - 445
Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games Rodica BrânzeiTamás SolymosiStef Tijs OriginalPaper Pages: 447 - 460