Abstract
Single–valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm–Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the τ value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. The Shapley value is in the core only if the game is a square glove market, and in this case also coincides with the two aforementioned solutions.
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Institutional support from research grants BEC 2002-00642, FEDER and SGR2001-0029 is gratefully acknowledged
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Núñez, M., Rafels, C. The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis. Int J Game Theory 33, 421–430 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0199-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0199-3