The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides Jean-Francois MertensShmuel Zamir Papers Pages: 39 - 64
On the foundations of game theory: The case of non-Archimedean utilities Peter C. Fishburn Papers Pages: 65 - 71
The kernel and bargaining set for convex games M. MaschlerB. PelegL. S. Shapley Papers Pages: 73 - 93
Possible conflict structure of the european security conference Utz-Peter Reich Papers Pages: 131 - 145
On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information Shmuel Zamir Papers Pages: 179 - 198
The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games the extensive case J. F. Mertens Papers Pages: 217 - 227
A theory of money and financial institutions: Fiat money and noncooperative equilibrium in a closed economy Martin Shubik Papers Pages: 243 - 268