International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 73–93 | Cite as

The kernel and bargaining set for convex games

  • M. Maschler
  • B. Peleg
  • L. S. Shapley


It is shown that for convex games the bargaining set 1 (i) (for the grand coalition) coincides with the core. Moreover, it is proved that the kernel (for the grand coalition) of convex games consists of a unique point which coincides with the nucleolus of the game.


Economic Theory Game Theory Unique Point Grand Coalition Convex Game 
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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1971

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Maschler
    • 1
  • B. Peleg
    • 1
  • L. S. Shapley
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsThe Hebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.The Rand CorporationSanta Monica

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