Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry Tomaso Duso OriginalPaper Pages: 251 - 276
Keeping the other candidate guessing: Electoral competition when preferences are private information Adam Meirowitz OriginalPaper Pages: 299 - 318
Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences Olof Johansson-StenmanPeter Martinsson OriginalPaper Pages: 319 - 331
Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures Glenn R. Parker OriginalPaper Pages: 333 - 354
A logistic growth theory of public expenditures: A study of five countries over 100 years Massimo FlorioSara Colautti OriginalPaper Pages: 355 - 393
Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities? Robert DurHein Roelfsema OriginalPaper Pages: 395 - 416
The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy Lars P. Feld OriginalPaper Pages: 417 - 448
Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis Marko Köthenbürger OriginalPaper Pages: 449 - 465
Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates Amihai GlazerMark Gradstein OriginalPaper Pages: 467 - 482
Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen Brian Goff OriginalPaper Pages: 483 - 499
Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The economics of budget deficits. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 153, ed. by Mark Blaug. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA, U.S.A.: Edward Elgar, 2002. 2 vols.; 1, 112 pages. USD 370.00/GBP 245.00 (cloth). Daniel J. Mitchell Review article Pages: 501 - 512