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Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures

Public Choice volume 122, pages 333–354 (2005)Cite this article

Abstract

This paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the House of Representatives. I create a measure of reputational trustworthiness, based upon pooled samples of constituency opinion derived from the National Election Studies surveys. I then examine the extent to which such reputational good will among constituents deters lame-duck foreign travel by exiting House incumbents within the context of a quasi-experimental research design. The analysis suggests that legislators may be ‘self-policed’ by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to the point of discouraging unethical activity. urveys. I then examine the extent to which such s derived from the National Election Studies

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, U.S.A.

    Glenn R. Parker

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  1. Glenn R. Parker
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Parker, G.R. Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures. Public Choice 122, 333–354 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-5733-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-5733-0

Keywords

  • Research Design
  • Public Finance
  • Pool Sample
  • Study Survey
  • Opportunistic Behavior