Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions Leonid Hurwicz OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 14
On the relationship between economic development and political democracy John E. Roemer OriginalPaper Pages: 15 - 39
Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching Ebbe HendonBirgitte SlothTorben Tranæs OriginalPaper Pages: 55 - 77
Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms Lu HongScott E. Page OriginalPaper Pages: 103 - 117
Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism Tatsuyoshi SaijoYoshikatsu Tatamitani OriginalPaper Pages: 119 - 140
A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods Jose AizpuruaAntonio Manresa OriginalPaper Pages: 141 - 158
Robust implementation under alternative information structures Luis C. CorchonIgnacio Ortuño-Ortin OriginalPaper Pages: 159 - 171
Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments Bhaskar DuttaArunava SenRajiv Vohra OriginalPaper Pages: 173 - 203
Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems John P. ConleySimon Wilkie OriginalPaper Pages: 205 - 216
A principal-agent model of altruistic redistribution, with some implications for fiscal federalism Mark Shroder OriginalPaper Pages: 217 - 224
A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal Shasikanta Nandeibam OriginalPaper Pages: 227 - 250
Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets José Alcalde OriginalPaper Pages: 275 - 287
Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences Dominique Lepelley OriginalPaper Pages: 289 - 299
