Abstract
This paper identifies a class of mechanisms, called elementary mechanisms, which are (in a precisely defined sense) the “simplest” mechanisms that can implement efficient outcomes in economic environments. The class of social choice correspondences that can be implemented by elementary mechanisms is completely characterized in a variety of different economic contexts.
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Dutta, B., Sen, A. & Vohra, R. Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments. Economic Design 1, 173–203 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02716620
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02716620