Abstract
Based on the conception of life and semiosis as co-extensive an attempt is given to classify cognitive and communicative potentials of species according to the plasticity and articulatory sophistication they exhibit. A clear distinction is drawn between semiosis and perception, where perception is seen as a high-level activity, an integrated product of a multitude of semiotic interactions inside or between bodies. Previous attempts at finding progressive trends in evolution that might justify a scaling of species from primitive to advanced levels have not met with much success, but when evolution is considered in the light of semiosis such a scaling immediately catches the eye. The main purpose of this paper is to suggest a scaling of this progression in semiotic freedom into a series of distinct steps. The elleven steps suggested are: 1) molecular recognition, 2) prokaryote-eukaryote transformation (privatization of the genome), 3) division of labor in multicellular organisms (endosemiosis), 4) from irritability to phenotypic plasticity, 5) sense perception, 6) behavioral choice, 7) active information gathering, 8) collaboration, deception, 9) learning and social intelligence, 10) sentience, 11) consciousness. In light of this, the paper finally discusses the conceptual framework for biosemiotic evolution. The evolution of biosemiotic capabilities does not take the form of an ongoing composition of simple signs (icons, indices, signals, etc.) into composite wholes. Rather, it takes the shape of the increasing subdivision and control of a primitive, holophrastic perception-action circuit already committed to “proto-propositions” (dicisigns) reliably guiding action already in the most primitive species.
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Notes
It is often overlooked that central ideas of biological evolution were aired already during the French Enlightenment in mid-18th century, such as Buffon and Diderot (2011), but Lamarck was the first to articulate such ideas in a comprehensive theory.
The ascription of agency to the cell implied here is not meant to question the sufficiency of enzymatic causality. Enzymatic reactions, however, are operating inside a higher-order functionality determined by the cell as a holistic unit.
Prokaryotes are single-cell organisms without cell nuclei or any pronounced internal architecture.
Eukaryotic organisms are composed from large cells with nuclei and a rich internal structure, such as those found in plants, fungi, and animals, as well as in many single-celled organisms such as yeast and amoeba. The diameter of a eukaryotic cell lies in the range of 10–100 μm, whereas prokaryotic cells have diameters in the range of 0,2 to 2,0 μm. The internal space of a eukaryotic cell may easily contain thousands of prokaryotic cells.
Because only in this state reproducible data are easily obtained.
Aspen trees, however, are known to form clones of trees where thousands of shoots (ramets) are linked together to form one individual covering tens of hectars. Not only are these forests probably the largest “individuals” on Earth, they may also be among the oldest, some as old as 1.000 years. The strong emphasis in gene centered evolutionary theory on reproduction seems somewhat misplaced in such cases.
Although they have independent circuits for feeding and movement respectively the latter also serving fast escape behavior.
Whereby we mean something like “any mental state (x) about which it is meaningful to ask the question “how is it like to experience (x)?”
We do not address here the further semiotic step distinguishing human semiotic capabilities from those of other primates. One of us has argued a good candidate for that is “hypostatic abstraction”, that is, the ability of creating new thought objects on the basis of first-order objects - facilitating increasing self-control of thought and ensuing action (Stjernfelt 2014, ch. 6).
Our rejection of a purely iconic phase in evolution does not imply, thus, a rejection of hypotheses like Donald’s of a mimetic phase or Tomasello’s of a gestural phase in human cognition as a prerequisite to language; both mimesis and gestures are able to express proto-propositions.
Or: “Swim in this direction (S), there is sugar (P)”; biosemiotic proto-propositions hardly make the distinction between indicative and imperative and are most often both at the same time; they describe a state-of-affairs which immediately initiates action (Millikan 2006)
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Hoffmeyer, J., Stjernfelt, F. The Great Chain of Semiosis. Investigating the Steps in the Evolution of Semiotic Competence. Biosemiotics 9, 7–29 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-015-9247-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-015-9247-y