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Toward a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology: Why the Evolutionary Approach does not Imply Reductionism or Determinism

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Abstract

Does evolutionary psychology (EP) properly account for the sociocultural context? Does it underestimate both the developmental and the relational aspects of the human psyche? Is it instantiated in a mechanistic epistemology? Does it imply determinism or reductionism? The commentaries on our previous target article raised similar questions and we try to tackle them in the current response. Our “epistemological assessment” of Psychology and our consequent unification claim under the banner of the evolutionary approach (Zagaria et al., Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 54(3), 521–562, 2020 ) was deeply examined and discussed. The objections to our target article can be grouped into four main categories. We sum them up and argue why: 1) the pre-paradigmatic status of psychology is a problem rather than a richness of perspectives; 2) EP's criticisms stem from common misconceptions—furthermore, developmental and relational aspects of human psyche might find their natural explanation in EP; 3) EP does not wipe out the emergence of the sociocultural context as something qualitatively different; 4) evolutionary meta-theory is not incompatible with subjectivity. Evolutionary psychology might be approached with caution and curiosity, rather than with prejudicial concepts. Incorporating some legitimate cultural criticisms, it may aspire to become a “cultural evolutionary psychology”, hence an integrative psychological meta-theory that tries to connect the biological “plane of existence” (Henriques, Review of General Psychology, 7(2), 150–182, 2003) to the cultural “plane of existence”. However, a basic philosophical concern has yet to be answered, i.e. what ultimately constitutes mind and thus the “psycho-logical” science. We argue that when trying to find the answer we know where to look at.

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Notes

  1. Newton’s mechanics, though largely implemented in engineering, is better conceptualized as a good approximation rather than an accurate theory. From a theoretical standpoint, it has been superseded.

  2. Trying to summarize them would be unprofitable; though it is worth noting that the variety of explanations probably would be mutually excluding in psychoanalytic thought alone.

  3. The analysis of introductory books has been criticized by Baucal and Krstić (2020, p. 582) as well. The authors argue that Natural Language Processing (NLP) on research papers could be a more profitable methodology. We do not rule out replicating our results with this method in the future, however, we believe that our epistemological assessment remains solid.

  4. A similar instance of the importance of everyday-intersubjective-folk psychology is shared by the commentary by Uher (2021). Though labelling her account postmodernist would be misleading; “subjectivist” would do better.

  5. The commentary by Di Nuovo (2020) explores the Evo-Devo approach.

  6. Uexkül has been cited in the commentary by De Luca Picione (2020) and Morioka (2020).

  7. Including Merleau Ponty, who has been extensively cited by Brinkmann (2020) to undermine the epistemology of EP.

  8. A similar critique of the epistemology of evolutionary psychology is made by Tateo (2020 p.673-675), who stresses that the epistemology of psychology should by “eco-systemic”, thus considering the relationships between the phenomena, “which is more than the mere sum of parts” (Tateo, 2020,p.673).

  9. According to Dobzhansky (1968) the concept of adaptation can be clarified as follows: a) adaptation is “the process of becoming adapted” (p.7) b) an adaptive trait is a phenotypical “structural or functional characteristic (...) of the organism” (p.7) c) adaptedness “is a state of being adapted” (p.7) and d) "adaptability “means that the organism or population concerned can remain or can become physiologically or genetically adapted in a certain range of environments” (p.7) .

  10. However, “psyche”/“mind” are far from being consistently defined (Zagaria et al., 2020). What is the meaning of the adjective “psychological” applied to “adaptation” then? We will tentatively argue that psychological adaptations are neural networks associated with consciousness. If a basic form of sentience were not included in an account of the mind, all evolved neural networks would be considered as psychological. However, a neural network responsible for neural reflexes could be hardly defined as “ mental” (think about the ventilation reflexes occurring during sleep). The structure and the implications of the association between consciousness and neural networks might be debated elsewhere. For now, note that “minimal consciousness” is probably shared by a large part of non-human animals (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019), and that with “association” we do not mean the “substrate” of consciousness as a specific process. We are aware that consciousness is one of the trickiest concepts in science, but when it comes to psychology it seems to be necessary nonetheless.

  11. The term “module” has been used until now without dwelling on it. Due to space limitation, we cannot address the long-standing debate about the nature of modularity. What we want to stress though is that the terms “module” and “modularity” are here used as mere synonyms respectively of “domain-specific” and “domain-specificity”. With regards to this issue, we do not side with any theory of “massive modularity” or “soft modularity”, claiming that Homo Sapiens has for sure “some degree of modular structure” (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007, p.5) and that is enough for a coherent evolutionary theory.

  12. We then directly address Gozli's argument, who states we did not account properly for Henriques' theory (Gozli, 2020, p.575).

  13. Many non-human animals seem to show cultural traits, linguistic abilities and a minimal consciousness as well (e.g. Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019; Tomasello, 1999). However, the kind of language, culture and consciousness exhibited in non-human animals seems to be significantly different from the kind exhibited in humans.

  14. The ultimate “function” of the “Life” plane of existence (Henriques, 2003, 2011, ch.6) seems to be the replication of genes. What is the ultimate “function” of the “Mind” plane of existence, on the contrary, is not clear. Additionally, its functioning is often conflated with a biological one. We tentatively argue that the “function” of the “Mind” plane of existence could be that of “making decisions'' (i.e. “selecting among alternatives”) and that that function could be emergent while autonomous from the biological functioning. Space room does not allow further analysis. For now, note that in order to be defined as “mental” the process of “decision-making” as such should be defined thanks to its association with consciousness (see footnote 10, this article).

  15. Misra et al. (2021, p. 175) questioned the utility of EP in professional psychology (e.g. psychotherapy). Space limit does not allow further analysis, however, evolutionary insights do inform therapeutic practice (e.g. Liotti, 2005; Siegel, 2020)

  16. As Smedlund (2021) argued: “our actions and reactions are explicable in terms of reasons, which we balance against the norms, customs and conventions of a culture” (p.184)

  17. The “Person-Culture” plane of existence does not include only human psychology; for the most part it includes other social sciences (i.e. anthropology, sociology, economics, political science) (Henriques, 2021a).

  18. What exactly constitutes a justification is not entirely clear in Henriques’ writings (Henriques, 2011, ch. 1). Our idea is that justification can be defined as “an argument aimed at explaining why”. Indeed, we narrow Henriques’ hypothesis (i.e. emergence of propositional language equating emergence of justifications) and speculate that the emerge of justifications, more specifically, equate the emergence of causal connectives in human language (i.e. the emergence of why-because question–answer dynamics). In other words, justifications, as well as the Person-Culture plane of existence, might have emerged with the appearance of “why” in our evolution (Zagaria, 2021).

  19. Gozli (2020) and Mascolo (2021, p. 201) argue that we highlighted a problem (the absence of core-constructs) without explaining how EP can overcome such impasse.

  20. Note that psychological adaptations are always associated with by-products and noise (see "Reframing Evolutionary Psychology).

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Zagaria, A., Ando’, A. & Zennaro, A. Toward a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology: Why the Evolutionary Approach does not Imply Reductionism or Determinism. Integr. psych. behav. 55, 225–249 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-021-09613-z

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