Abstract
We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.
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Helpful comments of N. Srinivasan and Ashok K Gupta are acknowledged.
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Tripathi, R.C., Sinha, Y. The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human. Integr. psych. behav. 43, 311–323 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-009-9106-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-009-9106-y