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Why the Horrendous Deeds Objection Is Still a Bad Argument

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Abstract

A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

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Notes

  1. (King 2008, 26)

  2. See (Rachels 1986) (Brink 2006) (Tooley 1994) (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008)

  3. See (Adams 1979) (Alston 1990) (W. L. Craig 2003) (Evans 2013) and (P. L. Quinn 2006)

  4. The term “essential goodness” response is somewhat misleading because on some versions of divine command meta-ethics, what is stressed is that God has certain character traits such as being impartial, benevolent, whether these character traits are “morally good” is strictly speaking a separate issue. Because the term “essential goodness” is used in the literature, however, I will stick with it.

  5. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008)

  6. (Antony 2008)

  7. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, 106)

  8. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011, 104)

  9. (Antony 2008, 22)

  10. (Pruss 2009)

  11. See (Morriston 2009, 251–252)

  12. X refers to a horrendous deed such as “the gruesome and painful sacrifice of randomly selected ten-year-old

    children” (Morriston 2009, 251)

  13. (Morriston 2009, 251)

  14. (Flint 1983.)

  15. (Morris 1989)

  16. (Wielenberg 2000)

  17. (Morriston 2001)

  18. (Morriston 2001, 158)

  19. (Carrier 2012, 204)

  20. (Hooker 2001)

  21. I have altered Hooker’s style of enumeration to make it consistent with the rest of this article.

  22. (Hooker 2001, 334)

  23. (Hooker 2001, 335)

  24. (Hooker 2001, 334)

  25. (Mackie 1977)

  26. (Mackie 1977, 26–7)

  27. (Mackie 1977, 27)

  28. (Hooker 2001, 334)

  29. (Thibodeau 2019)

  30. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  31. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  32. (Thibodeau 2019, 447)

  33. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.

  34. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  35. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  36. (Thibodeau 2019, 444)

  37. (Thibodeau 2019, 438–439)

  38. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  39. (Joyce 2002, 68–69)

  40. (Joyce 2002, 68)

  41. (Joyce 2002, 68)

  42. (Murphy 2019)

  43. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  44. I am thankful to an anonymous referee for bringing this objection to my attention.

  45. (Thibodeau 2019, 446)

  46. (Thibodeau 2019, 445)

  47. (Joyce 2002, 68)

  48. See (Adam’s 1993, 315–316) and (Adams 1999, 5–6) see also (Craig 2008, 169) and (Flannagan 2012, 29,31)

  49. That commands stand in something like supervenience relationship to natural facts is pointed out by (Enoch 2011, 143–146) and by expressivists like Hare who understand moral judgements to be imperatives or commands issued from an impartial perspective. (Hare 1952, 128–136) and Constructivists like Meyers (Meyers 2012, 27–29) who identify moral wrongness with what is prohibited by principles regulating interpersonal conduct that would be freely agreed to by ideal agents who were impartial, informed and rational.

  50. See (Nowell-Smith 1966) (Antony 2008) (Lehrer and Cornman 1979) (Evans 2013) (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011) and (Kurtz 2008). I thank an anonymous reviewer for forcing me to address this issue.

  51. (Nowell-Smith 1966, 97)

  52. (Antony 2008, 71)

  53. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011, 105)

  54. (Joyce 2002, 71)

  55. (Hill 2010, 190–191)

  56. I am influenced in this point (Jordan 2010, 47–48)

  57. Compare the similarity between Jewish and Christian ideas where our moral duties are part of a covenant between God and human beings and the contractualist idea that morality consists of the kind of contract we would agree to under conditions of impartiality, flawless rationality, and full information.

  58. (Jordan 2012, 48)

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jason Thibodeau for useful dialogue regarding these issues. I also want to thank two anonymous reviewers who made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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    Matthew Flannagan

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Flannagan, M. Why the Horrendous Deeds Objection Is Still a Bad Argument. SOPHIA 61, 399–418 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00803-7

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