Abstract
The horrendous deeds objection to metaethical divine command theory (MDCT) says that since God can command anything whatsoever, even things that are horrendous, MDCT seems to imply that God can make any action, no matter how repugnant, morally obligatory. Defenders of MDCT frequently claim, by way of response, that since God is essentially omnibenevolent, it is impossible that he commands us to do horrendous things. I have recently argued that it is irrelevant that God cannot issue horrible commands. The argument runs as follows: On MDCT, God has moral grounding power — the power to make an action morally obligatory by commanding that we do it. Given that omnipotence is possession of maximal power, every omnipotent being has this power. In some possible world, there exists a non-benevolent omnipotent being who issues horrible commands. Therefore, on MDCT, there is a possible world in which some horrendous action is morally obligatory. Matthew Flannagan has responded to this argument on behalf of the divine command theorist. Flannagan argues that since, on MDCT, moral obligations are constituted by God’s commands, and no other being can perform God’s actions, no other being can possess moral grounding power. In this paper, I criticize Flannagan’s argument. His argument assumes that when some phenomenon is constituted by the actions of an agent, no other agent’s actions can constitute this phenomenon. I argue that this assumption is false.
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Notes
Flannagan (2022).
Thibodeau (2019).
Flannagan (2022).
For the remainder of this paper, ‘MDCT’ will refer to this view, i.e., the view according to which moral obligations are identical to divine commands.
I have replaced my origninal ‘DCT’ with ‘MDCT’ to conform to the terminology used in Flannagan’s paper.
An anonymous reviewer suggests that the argument would be stronger if instead of a non-omnibenevolent deity, it mentioned a deity who is omnibenevolent but not essentially so. The commands of this deity (call her Mod) would, in some possible worlds, perfectly match those of God, but in other worlds would include horrendous commands. The MDCT-ist would not, presumably, be able to claim that in some worlds Mod has MG-power and in some worlds she does not. I agree that this alteration of the argument is interesting and potentially fruitful, but I suspect that Flannagan’s response to it would be essentially the same. That is, Flannagan would argue that on MDCT it is not possible for any other deity (including Mod) to have MG-power. It is this response that I here want to challenge.
Thibodeau (2019, p. 445).
Flannagan (2022, p. 408).
I would like to thank Peter Lupu for bringing this point to my attention.
Thibodeau (2019, p. 445).
Flannagan (2022, p. 408).
Flannagan (2022, p. 409).
Flannagan (2022, p. 407–408).
An anonymous reviewer comments that if we are to think of MG-power as the power to bring about moral facts, then we must be thinking of MG-power as a causal power, which Flannagan has argued is to misunderstand MDCT. I think the reviewer’s worry is misconceived. That is, I agree with Flannagan that, on MDCT, the relationship between somethings being morally obligatory and something’s being commanded by God is constitutive rather than causal. But this does not imply that, on MDCT, we shouldn’t think of God as having the capacity to bring about moral facts. That a person’s acts are identical to their own actions under a different description, in the right contexts, endows the person with the ability to bring certain facts into existence. Suppose that in a far-off land known as Querconia, the emperor is endowed with the capacity to make law by fiat. Thus, when Emperor Ella issues an edict declaring that no one shall cut down a white oak, she thereby makes it the case that cutting down white oaks is illegal in Querconia. The relationship between an act’s being prohibited by Ella and the act’s being illegal is constitutive; Ella’s issuing the edict against cutting down white oaks is identical to her own action under a different description, namely, Ella’s making it illegal to cut down white oaks. Still, Ella has made it the case that it is illegal to cut down white oaks. Ella has the capacity to make things illegal precisely because certain of her acts (issuing an edict about X) are identical to her acts under the description (making X illegal). Pointing out that a being that has MG-power can bring about certain facts does not contradict Flannagan’s point that, on MDCT, the relationship between being commanded by God and being obligatory is constitutive. Indeed, it is because of this constitutive relationship that, on MDCT, God has the capacity to bring about moral facts.
Suppose that some omnipotent being cannot, for lack of the right motive, issue the same commands that God issues. In that case, this being could not bring about the same moral facts that God can bring about. However, this would not show that this being cannot bring about moral facts. For the purposes of the current argument, what matters is whether an omnipotent being would have the capacity to bring about moral facts.
Flannagan (2022, p. 408–414).
Joyce (2002).
Joyce (2002, p. 68).
Joyce (2002, p. 68).
Flannagan (2022, p. 411).
Joyce abbreviates ‘the property of being commanded by God’ with ‘the DCT-property.’ I will use this abbreviation in what follows.
That is, every instance of GTSA, which will provide a substitution of ‘property P.’
Joyce offers an extended discussion of some platitudes (such as that moral requirements are rationally authoritative) that the DCT-property does not appear to satisfy well. (see Joyce, 2002, pp. 69–73).
See page 6, above.
To be clear, I am not claiming that MDCT includes the claim that Yod has MG-power, it obviously does not. Rather, I am claiming, first, that (2*) is independently plausible and, second, that if (2*) is true, then MDCT implies that Yod has MG-power. So, to repeat, to effectively respond to AMP, the defender of MDCT needs to show that (2*) is false.
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Thibodeau, J. God’s Love and the Horrendous Deeds Objection: a Response to Flannagan. SOPHIA 63, 43–56 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-022-00942-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-022-00942-z