Abstract
Although Jürgen Habermas has a strong argument to link reason and philosophy, he also thinks that religion has a legitimate place in the (rational) public sphere. The question, though, is: what does this legitimate place entail? Is the power of religious language due to the fact that modern culture is not sufficiently secularized, that is, not yet sufficiently philosophic? Or is the power of religious language due to the fact that it successfully articulates certain widely shared moral (and substantive) intuitions? In addressing these questions, this contribution has four parts. In the first section the issue of Critical Theory and religion will be briefly examined. The point here is that where religion (like aesthetics) plays a more central role amongst the thinkers of the first movement of Critical Theory (theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Benjamin), this is not the case with Habermas (the leading exponent of the second movement). In the second section, this aspect is further explored by reconstructing Habermas’s intellectual project (with its religious implications) in six steps. Finally (in the third and fourth sections) some critical remarks (inter-paradigmatic and extra-paradigmatic) will be made on Habermas’s view of religion.
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Notes
This article was originally presented as a paper at the Grandeur of Reason-Conference in Rome, 4 September 2008.
This fourth argumentative move is found in sections IV–VII of Habermas (2008: 114–147).
The concept of movement (rather than generation) is used here not politically but rather aesthetically in the sense that although two or more movements in music can’t be reducible to one another, they still do inform one another. On the issue of aesthetics in Habermas, see P. Duvenage (2003).
Finlayson (2005:3–4) is quiet about the ontological-metaphysical side of Critical Theory, but then gives a good standard definition. (1) Critical Theory is theoretically interdisciplinary; (2) it is reflective (self-aware) about the social context that gave rise to it—counter to traditional theory; (3) it is a dialectical (Hegelian) conception of knowledge—facts and our theories are part of an ongoing dynamic historical process; (4) it is critical and normative—it diagnoses the wrongs of contemporary society and identifies progressive aspects to remedy or transform society.
Horkheimer as quoted by J. Habermas et al. (1993: 60).
I agree with Dallmayr’s critique (2004) of Mendieta on this point.
According to Anderson (2000) Habermas was helped by researchers such as Rainer Döbert and Gertrud Nunner-Winkler (development psychologists); Klaus Eder (social evolutionist); Helmut Dubiel and Ulrich Rödel (sociologists); and Ernst Tugendhat (Heidegger-influenced analytical philosopher).
See Habermas (1979).
See here Honneth (1995: 88).
This is a succinct reconstruction of the arguments of the essay ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’ in Habermas (2008).
On the issue of an intra- and extra-paradigmatic critique of Habermas’s critical theory, see Fraser (2007).
Dallmayr ends his critique of Habermas with the following question: Is neo-liberal capitalism and the burning issue of a just global for Habermas just a political (tactical or strategic) problem and not a question for moral theory or discourse ethics?
Yates (2007) compares Habermas’s political liberalism to Rawls. Accordingly laws and public policies are justified only in neutral terms, i.e., in terms of reasons that people holding conflicting world views could accept. Habermas also distinguishes between reasonable religious citizens (whose views should be included in public discourse) from unreasonable citizens in his expectation that religious citizens self-modernize. In this process (as Rawls) two objections can be made against Habermas: (1) that religious citizens are unfairly expected to split their identities in public discourse, and (2) that the burdens of citizenship are asymmetrically distributed. She concludes that while Habermas may be able to overcome the second, the first remains a problem for him.
This quote of the Regensburg address (September 2006) comes from the The Grandeur of Reason conference proceedings, Rome, September 2008.
I owe these questions to the The Grandeur of Reason conference program, Rome, September 2008.
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Duvenage, P. Communicative Reason and Religion: The Case of Habermas. SOPHIA 49, 343–357 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0202-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0202-8