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Cooperative games and cost allocation problems

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to provide a general view of the literature of applications of transferable utility cooperative games to cost allocation problems. This literature is so large that we concentrate on some relevant contributions in three specific areas: transportation, natural resources and power industry. We stress those applications dealing with costs and with problems arisen outside the academic world.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa, Universidade de Vigo, Vigo, Spain

    M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Manuel A. Mosquera

  2. Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidade da Coruña, A Coruña, Spain

    Ignacio García-Jurado

Authors
  1. M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
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  2. Ignacio García-Jurado
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  3. Manuel A. Mosquera
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Correspondence to M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro.

Additional information

This invited paper is discussed in the comments available at doi:10.1007/s11750-011-0202-z, doi:10.1007/s11750-011-0203-y, doi:10.1007/s11750-011-0204-x and doi:10.1007/s11750-011-0205-9.

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Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., García-Jurado, I. & Mosquera, M.A. Cooperative games and cost allocation problems. TOP 19, 1–22 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0200-1

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