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Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats

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Abstract

This article tests three hypotheses concerning the influence of international secretariats in world politics. This is a topic that has so far received limited systematic attention by IR theorists, who have tended to regard secretariats as bit players in global affairs. Drawing on institutional design literature, I develop a detailed theoretical explanation for both secretariat leadership and state mastery of international organizations. Because powerful actors anticipate channels for informal influence when designing secretariats, they seek to maximize formal bureaucratic autonomy. I assess the explanatory power of this theory through an analysis of negotiations over the design of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). A detailed archival investigation reveals that powerful countries, led by the United States, sought to maximize the autonomy of the UNEP secretariat. Developing countries, which expected to exert less informal influence on the new secretariat, sought to ensure strong intergovernmental control over UNEP’s secretariat. Since UNEP has been a frequently cited example of secretarial leadership and initiative, finding that the UNEP secretariat’s ability to act autonomously was in significant part determined by past institutional design choices holds relevance for theory development.

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Notes

  1. This article adopts the broad definition of international bureaucracy used by Biermann et al.: “a hierarchically organized group of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedure within the context of a policy area” (Biermann et al. 2009, 37). As with the Biermann and Siebenhüner volume, this allows for the treatment of a wide range of secretariats, including those associated with multilateral agreements and so-called umbrella secretariats, such as the UN Environment Programme.

  2. Most accounts equate secretariats in a structural sense implicitly. Although they distinguish between secretariats and international organizations, (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009, 4) explicitly dismiss variation in secretariats’ structure and mandates as a relevant explanatory factor in secretariat influence. As this paper shows, these differences can have important implications for secretariat agency and are the subject of intense interstate competition.

  3. While the secretary-general of IMCO has had a significant influence on matters of policy substance, the role of the secretary-general of ICAO is restricted largely to administrative matters and is formally subordinate to the president of the intergovernmental ICAO Council.

  4. Informal influencers may employ a range of power resources to gain influence on the target of their efforts, including social and material resources.

  5. Collective principals are a form of principal/agent relationship where the preferences of principals are aggregated through an intermediate collective choice mechanism, such as a legislature or assembly, which can produce a unified delegatory mandate. Multiple principals are a form of principal/agent relationship in which multiple principals delegate to agents without the benefit of a centralized collective choice mechanism. Thus, agents simultaneously receive instructions from more than one principal (Nielson and Tierney 2003).

  6. In the early 1980s, for example, the Ronald Reagan administration sought to cease U.S. contributions to the UNEP Environment Fund (Hopgood 1998, 124–125). The U.S. has also withheld the pro rata share of its assessed and voluntary contributions to United Nations committees on Palestinian rights, or UN activities in support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization or Cuba (Kirkpatrick 1988, 268).

  7. For a discussion of influential cases, see: (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 303–304).

  8. For a detailed account of historic contributions to the fund, see: Ivanova (2007, 2011).

  9. Though the drafting group had agreed on a Governing Council of 48 countries, an Australian amendment in the conference plenary session boosted this to 54. In December 1972, led by developing countries, the UN General Assembly further increased this number to 58.

  10. It would, for example, be folly to refer to “the United Nations” as a unified, harmonious international organization. Instead, we compare the policies of the General Assembly, Security Council, secretariat, and specialized agencies. Variance between the expressed preferences of these bodies is an essential element of UN politics.

References

Archival Documents Cited

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Environmental Science and Public Policy Archives (ESPP), Harvard University, Cambridge, U.S.A., Maurice Strong Papers

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Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Ottawa, Canada

  • LAC 1972a: United States Department of State to Canadian Department of External Affairs, “President Proposes creation of UN voluntary fund on the environment,” 8 February 1972, Library and Archives Canada, 68-4-UN-1972-7-CDA, volume 2.

  • LAC 1972b: “Instruction to the Canadian Delegation to the fourth Preparatory Committee meeting for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,” Library and Archives Canada, 2 March 1972, 68-4-UN-1972-7-CDA, volume 2.

  • LAC 1972c: PERMIN-NY to DEA-ECS, “Env: Post Stkhm Institutions and Fund: Brazilian/Yugoslav Draft Resoln,” 21 April 1972, Library and Archives Canada, 68-4-UN-1972-7-CDA, volume 3.

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  • LAC 1972e: GENEV-DEA to DEA-UNS, 5 May 1972, Library and Archives Canada, 68-4-UN-1972-7-CDA, volume 4. Memorandum from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Prime Minister, 10 May 1972, Library and Archives Canada, 68-4-UN-1972-7-CDA, volume 4.

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  • LAC 1972 g: Geoffrey Bruce, “Notes for a Memorandum to the Prime Minister: the selection of the Proposed UN Environment Administrator—the candidacy of Mr. Maurice Strong,” 8 May 1972, Library and Archives Canada, 68-4-UN-1972-7-CDA, volume 4.

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National Archives of the United Kingdom

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  1. Balsillie School of International Affairs, 67 Erb Street West, Waterloo, ON, N2L 6C2, Canada

    Michael W. Manulak

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Manulak, M.W. Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats. Rev Int Organ 12, 497–522 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9245-0

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