Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Studying the Chinese Policy Process in the Era of ‘Top-Level Design’: the Contribution of ‘Political Steering’ Theory

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Journal of Chinese Political Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Making sense of the Chinese policy process has been one of the most challenging endeavors for China scholars since the beginning of ‘reform and opening up’. Although a great deal of empirical knowledge has been gathered over the years on policy-making and implementation in many different fields, theorizing on the Chinese policy process has mostly been concerned with individual policy instruments or various modes of policy-making so far instead of looking at how these are interconnected. In this article, we propose ‘political steering theory’ as an integrative theoretical framework to fill in this gap. Originating from policy research conducted by German social scientists starting in the 1970s, we consider ‘political steering theory’ to be the most appropriate approach to the Chinese case, particularly in the current era of ‘top-level design’ led by Xi Jinping. We demonstrate how China recently recalibrated its political steering approach and propose new directions for research into the Chinese policy process under the current administration.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Graph 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The recent Chinese discourse on the Chinese policy process and the tensions between centralization and de-centralization in central-local relations has been driven by decisions of the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017 concerning the centralization of the institutional apparatus of China’s political system: Further pushing the rationale of ‘top-level design’, party and government organs are systematically integrated and party committees within government institutions strengthened. This development is politically sensitive. Chinese scholars are very careful to reflect on the centralization of the policy process and the institutional apparatus of China’s political system which has been brought on track since the 19th Party Congress. Most articles published in China remain at the descriptive level and often are apologetic, in the sense that they either legitimize the steps taken by the Xi Jinping government to streamline the policy process and institutional apparatus, or ask for careful implementation of additional reforms to secure administrative efficiency and political stability. See e.g. Lee [46]; Ni and Wang [64]; Zhang [90]; Zhu [95].

  2. The concept of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ was originally developed and empirically applied in Lampton [44], Lieberthal and Oksenberg [49], and Lieberthal and Lampton [50]. For recent studies see Brødsgaard [10, 11].

  3. An interesting aspect of the current policy process is our recent observation that, in response to greater central-level demands, negotiation may have increased in intensity on the local level, i.e., bargaining on policy implementation between different administrative tiers (province-city-county/district). Whereas the center has enforced a stricter regime of political control by the line (tiao)-branches, local governments struggle harder than ever with coordinating the implementation process across government jurisdictions to guarantee required effectiveness and unequivocal messages of success reported back to the center. This is the reason why, under ‘top-level design’, the system has arguably become even more ‘pressurized’ than it had been before the Xi Jinping era.

  4. Zhou [93] and Zhou et al. [94] have neatly complemented ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ with a more micro-level perspective focusing on collusion of local government officials and a ‘muddling through’ approach - strategies of intermediate party state bureaucracies in Chinese policy implementation. It is the institutional environment which induces local governments to collude for making the best use of the discretion they have been given to implement upper level policies. Moreover, government officials have to come to terms with different ‘bureaucratic logics’ of the tizhi – meeting targets, coalition-building and incentive provision – which make them reactive, urge them to constantly adjust policies and let them focus on short-term solutions. These institutional logics add to the problem of competing bureaucracies and overlapping competencies by enforcing hard targets which can result in ‘goal-displacement’ or distorted policy implementation. However, collusion (as much as ‘muddling through’) ‘may unwittingly act as a corrective and countervailing force to the centralization of decision-making’ and its negative aspects for local policy adjustment as well ([93]: 36).

  5. Heilmann noted that ‘the entire policy process must be conceptualized as an oscillating multilevel interaction rather than as a dichotomized process of centralization vs. decentralization’ ([33]: 12). He also stressed that ‘societal input is still ad hoc and selective, and civil society organizations do not play a significant or even institutionalized role’ ([33]: 20). For a historical contextualization of the ‘point-to-surface’ approach in the Chinese policy process see [32, 35]. For a negative assessment of policy reform at local level, bespeaking ‘symbolic reforms’ see Zeng [91].

  6. As Chen notes, ‘the strict enforcement of the System of Requesting Instructions and Submitting Reports, as well as Rule by Law, have led to local cadres prioritizing self-protection by exclusively and straightforwardly implementing the tasks and policies assigned by the goals of the central government, rather than adapting broad guidelines to local conditions for improved local governance’ ([13]: 669).

  7. Yu and Huang have presented another typology to grasp recent changes in Chinese policy-making. They distinguish, on a continuum, between ‘autonomous exploration’ (zizhu tansuo), ‘autonomous exploration’ as the focus of ‘design and experimentation’ (sheji shiyan), ‘design and experimentation’, and ‘requesting authorization’ (qingshi shouquan). The last type, qingshi shouquan, is the policy-making mode of the Xi Jinping era, by which ‘local governments, for the purpose of solving local problems which are of a general character, come up with a practical plan that demonstrates their willingness to push for reform, report it formally to higher government levels and ask for approval for an experimentation site; after having gained higher level consent and authorization, implementation begins’ ([87]: 94). For the authors, this mode is the most appropriate way to rebalance the tension between hierarchical control and local discretion to the benefit of policy reforms that are relevant for the whole country.

  8. Despite the tightening up of the political system under Xi, this still seems to be the case. For example, the National People’s Congress petition of several law professors against stipulations in recently amended provincial regulations on population and birth planning proved successful; see “Quanguo renda changweihui shencha difang jisheng tiaoli: Jianyi xiugai ‘chaosheng jiu citui’” [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Reviews Local Birth Planning Regulations: Proposes to Revise “Excess-Birth Means Dismissal”]; Pengpai (The Paper), 27/10/2017.

  9. For a condensed version of the main theoretical advances, see [55, 58, 70, 73]. For an overview in historical perspective, see [79]. As often in the case of continental European theory-building, ‘political steering theory’ was widely ignored by U.S. scholars at the time, most likely because it suggested the possibility of systematic public policy planning.

  10. Whether this conceptual shift has been accompanied by parallel transformations in actual practices of governing is debatable, see [8, 52].

  11. This tension is particularly related to the semantic indeterminacy and conceptual inconsistencies inherent to the term ‘governance’, as Offe [67] has convincingly shown.

  12. Mayntz and her colleagues have also discussed wider definitions of ‘governance’ as generic terms for all kinds of coordinated social interaction (soziale Handlungskoordination), sometimes with explicit normative connotations that accentuate claims for ‘good governance’ in the sense of transparency, participation, accountability and legitimate public policy objectives. Mayntz noted in this context that governance can refer either to a structure that regulates action, or to the process of such regulation ([58]: 46). Clearly, the ‘governance’ concept vacillates between these two understandings of the term to the very day.

  13. The distinction of steering and rowing has also entered the literature on (multi-level) governance, see [4, 47].

  14. This original ‘steering optimism’ was later tempered by experience and theoretical objections, and it was system theory à la Luhmann in particular that challenged ‘political steering’ theory by claiming that the steering of autonomous social systems is impossible (see [51, 59, 71]).

  15. Governance without any state involvement (such as network governance) is, however, highly unlikely in a case such as China where even incipient forms of societal self-regulation fall under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.

  16. A different typology is provided by Levi-Faur [47] who regards steering as one mode of governance and envisions state steering capacities developing in more horizontal ways under contemporary circumstances.

  17. This line of inquiry has to be understood as research on political steering, not research to guide and help political steering, as in the early ‘optimistic’ phase of the steering paradigm, see [79]: 80.

  18. The idea of political steering ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ has been introduced by Scharpf [72] and refers to the state’s looming power to step in and regulate with direct intervention if delegated social self-regulation, cooperation in networks or corporatist arrangements are ineffective. For an analysis specific to the Chinese context see the work of Heilmann [32,33,34].

  19. As Grande [24] remarks, in cases where a steering center still exists, one should not speak of ‘governance’.

  20. With this typology we follow Scharpf who distinguishes between aggregate, collective and corporate political actors in his actor-centered institutionalism [73].

  21. We use ‘meta-steering’ as analogous to ‘metagovernance’ introduced by Jessop [40]. ‘Meta-steering’ refers to the coordination of different structures and practices of steering across all administrative tiers in the Chinese political system. Therefore, ‘meta-steering’ is the mode by which all steering is steered by the political center.

  22. We use ‘governability’ in a strictly analytical sense, i.e., to refer to those actors in specific social fields who are targeted by specific policies and who may either comply with or attempt to shirk them. This is also the term most commonly used in the English-language literature, cf. Jessop [40]; Bevir and Rhodes [8].

  23. Whereas ‘coping’ or ‘shirking’ are typical avoidance strategies set against upper level steering, ‘counter-steering’ is more. We define it as goal-oriented and purposeful action on the part of steering objects (lower-level bureaucracies or non-state actors, even the populace) to bring about social and economic conditions that contradict the original objectives of policies passed down to them. ‘Counter-steering’ has been prominently conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas as strategic action by societal actors to maintain systemic complexity (see [26]), pinpointing the positive significance that counter-steering can have for overall system stability.

  24. According to Fligstein and McAdam, strategic action fields ‘are the fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a constructed meso-level social order in which actors (who can be individual, collective or corporate) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (though not necessarily consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (invoking the question who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field’ ([20]: 9).

  25. Our approach is hence informed by actor-centered institutionalism à la Scharpf as an analytical framework for interaction-oriented policy research (interaktionsorientierte Policy-Forschung) ([73]: 84), which focuses on strategic action by complex actors – state and non-state – to explain the policy process and assess its outcomes. However, we have no intention of formalizing these constellations and interaction patterns through game theoretical analysis, but instead trace them through qualitative research methods (see below). This is more in keeping with the sociological roots of ‘strategic action field’ theory. Compared with most political science literature, the latter places greater emphasis on perceptions and collective identities rather than mere material self-interest as factors underlying political action (but see [7]).

  26. In fact, every policy field is a ‘strategic action field’.

  27. For instance, policy implementation might also be located at the municipal level, and townships and villages may play a significant role for policy implementation as well.

  28. For an abridged version in English see http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736_4.htm. The principal objective of this document, which lists 60 reform measures covering 15 policy fields, as declared by China’s government, is to effect a shift to a new model of growth and development.

  29. As a matter of fact, periods of tightening up (shou), in which the hierarchical control over subordinate state bureaucracies was strengthened, and liberalization/loosening up (fang) could be observed since the early reform days [6, 17, 78].

  30. The other three LSGs-turned-commissions are the ones for cybersecurity and informatization, finance and economy, as well as foreign affairs.

  31. It replaces the State Ministry of Supervision and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention. Also see [81].

  32. This is reminiscent of Sun Yatsen’s constitutional thinking who proposed ‘five branches’ (executive, legislative, judiciary, control and examination) in his ‘Three Principles of the People’. Such a structure was adopted in the 1946 constitution proposed by the Nationalist Party (KMT). The historical inspiration for Sun was the censorate of imperial China.

  33. CPC News [14].

  34. Alpermann and Zhan [3].

  35. For instance, recent studies on increasing autonomy on the part of business associations [86, 88] suggest that the party state’s ‘shadow of hierarchy’ has been forced to retract. We would instead claim that the increased leeway of business associations to negotiate with the state on private sector reform, including more access to investment in SOEs, does actually not bespeak the state’s waning control of business associations. It is instead evidence of a gradually changing mode from direct ‘command and control’ to more horizontal steering, which may be called ‘steering by deliberation in the shadow of hierarchy’ (see also [76]).

  36. Greenhalgh and Winckler [25].

  37. The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ steering must be properly defined. ‘Soft steering’ may include discursive practices of steering which have a long tradition in Chinese governance. For a theoretical foundation of ‘soft steering’ see Göhler et al. [23].

  38. This refers, for instance, to the new campaign mode subjecting every high-ranking cadre to continuous ideological training or intensified supervision of party and government bureaus by the Party’s Discipline and Inspection Commission.

  39. Steering blockades may stem from resistance on the part of collective and individual social actors against local policy implementation or from their dissatisfaction with certain shirking strategies of local governments like bureaucratic inertia or formalism. At the same time, those blockades can be further intensified by collaborative efforts of local party state and societal actors (corporate or collective) to counter upper level demands.

  40. Here, we differ from Heilmann [37].

  41. Streeck [79].

References

  1. Ahlers, Anna L., and Gunter Schubert. 2013. Strategic modelling: 'Building a new socialist countryside' in three Chinese counties. China Quarterly 216: 831–849.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Ahlers, Anna L., and Gunter Schubert. 2015. Effective policy implementation in China's local state. Modern China 41 (4): 372–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Alpermann, Björn, and Shaohua Zhan. 2019. Population planning after the one-child policy: Shifting modes of political steering. Journal of Contemporary China 28 (117): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1542218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Bache, Ian. 2012. Multi-level governance in the European Union. In The Oxford handbook of governance, ed. David Levi-Faur, 628–641. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Balla, Stephen J. 2017. Is consultation the “new normal?” Online policymaking and governance reform in China. Journal of Chinese Political Science 22 (3): 375–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Baum, Richard. 1994. Burying Mao: Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  7. Bevir, Mark. 2011. Interpretive theory. In The SAGE handbook of governance, ed. Mark Bevir, 51–64. Los Angeles: SAGE.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Bevir, Mark, and R.A.W. Rhodes. 2011. The stateless state. In The SAGE handbook of governance, ed. Mark Bevir, 203–217. Los Angeles: SAGE.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Börzel, Tanja A. 2012. The European Union – A unique governance mix? In The Oxford handbook of governance, ed. David Levi-Faur, 613–627. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Brødsgaard, Kjeld E., ed. 2017a. Chinese politics as fragmented authoritarianism: Earthquakes, energy and environment. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Brødsgaard, Kjeld E. 2017b. ‘Fragmented authoritarianism’ of ‘integrated fragementation’. In Chinese politics as fragmented authoritarianism: Earthquakes, energy and environment, ed. Kjeld E. Brødsgaard, 38–55. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Chen, Xi. 2009. The power of "troublemaking": Protest tactics and their efficacy in China. Comparative Politics 41 (4): 451–471.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Chen, Xuelian. 2017. A U-turn or just pendulum swing? Tides of bottom-up and top-down reforms in contemporary China. Journal of Chinese Political Science 22 (4): 651–673.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. CPC News. 2012. Xi Jinping: Zengqiang gaige de xitongxing zhengtixing xietongxing. Zuodao gaige bu tingdun kaifang bu zhibu (Xi Jinping: Increase the Systematicness, Comprehensiveness and Coordination of Reforms. Do Not Let Reforms Stop or Opening Up Come to a Standstill). Available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1212/c64094-19867225.html. Accessed 15/06/2018.

  15. Deng, Jinting. 2018. The National Supervision Commission: A new anti-corruption model in China. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 52: 58–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Deng, Yanhua, Kevin J. O’Brien, and Jiajian Chen. 2018. Enthusiastic policy implementation and its aftermath: The sudden expansion and contraction of China’s microfinance for women programme. China Quarterly 234: 506–526.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Donaldson, John A., ed. 2017. Assessing the balance of power in central-local relations in China. New York: Routledge.

  18. Eaton, Sarah, and Genia Kostka. 2014. Authoritarian environmentalism undermined? Local leaders’ time horizons and environmental policy implementation in China. China Quarterly 218: 359–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Fishkin, James S., Baogang He, Robert C. Luskin, and Alice Siu. 2010. Deliberative democracy in an unlikely place: Deliberative polling in China. British Journal of Political Science 40 (2): 435–448.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Fligstein, Neil, and Doug McAdam. 2012. A theory of fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  21. Gao, Jie. 2015. Pernicious manipulation of performance measures in China’s cadre evaluation system. China Quarterly 223: 618–637.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Göbel, Christian. 2011. Uneven policy implementation in rural China. China Journal 65: 53–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Göhler, Gerhard, Ulrike Höppner, and Sybille De La Rosa, eds. 2009. Weiche Steuerung. Studien zur Steuerung durch diskursive Praktiken, Argumente und Symbole (Soft Steering. Studies on Steering by Discursive Practices, Arguments and Symbols). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Grande, Edgar. 2012. Governance-Forschung in der governance-Falle? – Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme (Governance research in the governance trap? – A critical appraisal). Politische Vierteljahresschrift 4: 565–592.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Greenhalgh, Susan, and Edwin A. Winckler. 2005. Governing China’s population. From Leninist to neoliberal biopolitics. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Habermas, Jürgen, and Niklas Luhmann. 1971. Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie - Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Theory of the society or social technology? – What does system theory contribute?). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Hammond, Daniel R. 2013. Policy entrepreneurship in China’s response to urban poverty. Policy Studies Journal 41 (1): 2013.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Haus, Michael. 2010. Governance-Theorien und governance-Probleme: Diesseits und jenseits des Steuerungsparadigmas (Governance theories and governance problems: The here and there of the steering paradigm). Politische Vierteljahresschrift 51: 457–479.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. He, Baogang, and Stig Thogersen. 2010. Giving the people a voice? Experiments with consultative authoritarian institutions in China. Journal of Contemporary China 19 (66): 675–692.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. He, Zengke 何增科., and 陈雪莲. Chen Xuelian. 2014. 政府治理 (Government governance). Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press.

  31. Heberer, Thomas, and René Trappel. 2013. Evaluation processes, local cadres’ behaviour and local development processes. Journal of Contemporary China 22 (84): 1048–1066.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008a. From local experiments to national policy: The origins of China’s distinctive policy process. China Journal 59: 1–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008b. Policy experimentation in China’s economic rise. Studies in Comparative International Development 43 (1): 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Heilmann, Sebastian. 2009. Maximum tinkering under uncertainty. Unorthodox lessons from China. Modern China 35 (4): 450–462.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Heilmann, Sebastian. 2011. Policy-making through experimentation: The formation of a distinctive policy process. In Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry. (Eds.). Mao’s invisible hand. The political foundations of adaptive governance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 62–101.

  36. Heilmann, Sebastian. 2016. Leninism upgraded: Xi Jinping’s authoritarian innovations. China Economic Quarterly 20 (4): 15–22.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Heilmann, Sebastian. 2018. Red swan: How unorthodox policy making facilitated China’s rise. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  38. Heilmann, Sebastian, and Elizabeth J. Perry. 2011. Mao’s invisible hand. The political foundations of adaptive governance in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Hillman, Ben. 2010. Factions and spoils: Examining political behaviour within the local state in China. China Journal 64: 1–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  40. Jessop, Bob. 2011. Metagovernance In Mark Bevir. In The SAGE handbook of governance, 106–123. Los Angeles: SAGE.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  41. Kennedy, John James, and Dan Chen. 2018. State capacity and cadre mobilization in China: The elasticity of policy implementation. Journal of Contemporary China 27 (111): 393–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. Kostka, Genia, and William Hobbs. 2012. Local energy efficiency policy implementation in China: Bridging the gap between national priorities and local interests. China Quarterly 211: 765–785.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. Lai, Hongyi. 2016. China’s governance model: Flexibility and durability of pragmatic authoritarianism. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Lampton, David M. 1987. Policy-implementation in post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Lee, Kwan Ching, and Yonghong Zhang. 2013. The power of instability: Unraveling the microfoundations of bargained authoritarianism in China. American Journal of Sociology 118 (6): 1475–1508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  46. Lee, Sangkuk. 2017. An institutional analysis of Xi Jinping’s centralization of power. Journal of Contemporary China 26 (105): 325–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. Levi-Faur, David. 2012. From “big government” to “big governance”? In The Oxford handbook of governance, ed. David Levi-Faur, 3–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  48. Li, Ling. 2018. Politics of anticorruption in China: Paradigm change of the party’s disciplinary regime 2012–2017. Journal of Contemporary China: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497911.

  49. Lieberthal, Kenneth G., and Michel Oksenberg, eds. 1988. Policy-making in China: Leaders, structures, and processes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Lieberthal, Kenneth G., and David Lampton, eds. 1992. Bureaucracy, politics, and decision making in post-Mao China. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Luhmann, Niklas. 1989. Politische Steuerung: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag (Political steering: A contribution to the discussion). Politische Vierteljahresschrift 30 (1): 4–9.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. 2011. The persistence of hierarchy. In The SAGE handbook of governance, ed. Mark Bevir, 218–236. Los Angeles: SAGE.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  53. Ma, Jun, and Muhua Lin. 2012. Policymaking in China: A review of Chinese scholarship. The China Review 12 (1): 95–122.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Mayntz, Renate. 1996. Politische Steuerung: Aufstieg, Niedergang und Transformation einer Theorie (Political steering: Rise, demise and transformation of a theory). In PVS-Sonderheft: Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation (PVS special issue: Political theories in the era of transformation), ed. Klaus von Beyme and Claus Offe, 148–168. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  55. Mayntz, Renate. 1997. Soziale Dynamik und politische Steuerung: Theoretische und methodologische Überlegungen (Social dynamic and political steering: Theoretical and methdological reflections). Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Mayntz, Renate. 2003. New challenges to governance theory. In Governance as social and political communication, ed. Henrik Bang, 27–40. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Mayntz, Renate. 2004. Governance Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie? (Governance theory as advanced steering theory?). MPIFG Working Paper 04/1, March (http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp04-1/wp04-1.html). Accessed 29 Dec 2018.

  58. Mayntz, Renate. 2009. Governance theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie (Governance theory as refined steering theory). In Über Governance: Institutionen und Prozesse politischer Regelung (On governance: Institutions and processes of political regulation), ed. Renate Mayntz, 41–52. Campus Verlag: Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Mayntz, Renate, and Fritz Scharpf. 2005. Politische Steuerung – Heute? (Political steering – Today?). Zeitschrift für Soziologie 34 (3): 236–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  60. Mertha, Andrew. 2009. “Fragmented authoritarianism 2.0”: Political pluralization in the Chinese policy process. China Quarterly 200: 995–1012.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  61. Mertha, Andrew, and Kjeld E. Brødsgaard. 2017. Introduction. In Chinese politics as fragmented authoritarianism: Earthquakes, energy and environment, ed. Kjeld E. Brødsgaard, 1–14. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. Federalism, Chinese style: The political basis for economic success. World Politics 41 (1): 50–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  63. Naughton, Barry. 2015. Reform retreat and renewal: How economic policy fits into the political system. Issues & Studies 51 (1): 23–54.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Ni, Xing, and Rui Wang. 2018. Quanze fenli yu jiceng bize: Yizhong lilun jieshi (the division of rights and responsibilities and local avoidance of responsibility: A theoretical explanation). Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China) 5: 116–135.

    Google Scholar 

  65. O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 1999. Selective policy implementation in rural China. Comparative Politics 31 (2): 167–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 2006. Rightful resistance in rural China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  67. Offe, Claus. 2009. Governance: An “empty signifier”? Constellations 16 (4): 550–562.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  68. Pei, Minxin. 2016. China's crony capitalism. The dynamics of regime decay. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  69. Peters, B. Guy. 2012. Governance as political theory. In The Oxford handbook of governance, ed. David Levi-Faur, 19–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  70. Renate, Mayntz. 2009. Über Governance: Institutionen und Prozesse politischer Regelung (On governance: Institutions and processes of political regulation). Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Scharpf, Fritz. 1989. Politische Steuerung und Politische Institutionen (Political steering and political institutions). Politische Vierteljahresschrift 30 (1): 10–21.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Scharpf, Fritz. 1991. Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts (The state’s acting capacity at the end of the 20th century). Politische Vierteljahresschrift 32(4): 621–634.

    Google Scholar 

  73. Scharpf, Fritz. 2000. Interaktionsformen: Akteurszentrierter Institutionalismus in der Politikforschung (Forms of interaction: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research). Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

    Google Scholar 

  74. Schubert, Gunter. 2016. Die Volksrepublik China – ein föderaler Einheitsstaat? (The People’s Republic of China – A federal unitary state?). In Föderalismus – Das Problem oder die Lösung? (Federalism: Problem or solution?), Schriftenreihe des Europäischen Zentrums für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen, ed. Rudolph Hrbek and Martin Große Hüttmann, 172–188. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  75. Schubert, Gunter, and Anna L. Ahlers. 2012. Participation and empowerment at the grassroots. Chinese village elections in perspective. Lanham: Lexington.

    Google Scholar 

  76. Schubert, Gunter, and Thomas Heberer. 2015. Continuity and change in China’s ‘local state developmentalism’. Issues & Studies 51 (2): 1–38.

    Google Scholar 

  77. Shan, Wei, and Lijun Yang. 2016. Governing society in contemporary China. Singapore: World Scientific.

    Google Scholar 

  78. Shih, Victor. 2008. Factions and finance in China: Elite conflict and inflation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Streeck, Wolfgang. 2015. Von der Gesellschaftssteuerung zur sozialen Kontrolle: Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert Soziologie in Theorie und praxis (From societal steering to social control: Retrospection of sociology in theory and practice over half a century). Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1: 63–80.

    Google Scholar 

  80. Teets, Jessica C. 2015. The politics of innovation in China: Local officials as policy entrepreneurs. Issues & Studies 51 (2): 79–109.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Teets, Jessica C., and William Hurst, eds. 2017. Local governance innovation in China: Experimentation, diffusion, and defiance. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  82. Tsai, Lili. 2016. Bringing in China: Insights for building comparative political theory. Comparative Political Studies 50 (3): 295–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  83. Walker, Richard M., and Wu. Jiannan. 2010. Future prospects for performance management in Chinese city governments. Administration and Society 42 (1S): 34–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  84. Wang, Shaoguang. 2008. Changing models of China’s policy agenda setting. Modern China 34 (1): 56–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  85. Yang, Xuedong, and Jian Yan. 2018. Top-level design, reform pressures, and local adaptations: An interpretation of the trajectory of reform since the 18th CPC party congress. Journal of Chinese Governance 3 (1): 25–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  86. Yu, Jianxing, and Jun Zhou. 2013. Local governance and business associations in Wenzhou: A model for the road to civil society in China? Journal of Contemporary China 22 (81): 394–408.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  87. Yu, Jianxing, and Biao Huang. 2017. Dangdai zhongguo difang zhengfu chuangxin de xin jinzhan (New progress of local policy innovation in contemporary China). Zhengzhixue yanjiu (CASS Journal of Political Science) 5: 88–103.

    Google Scholar 

  88. Yu, Jianxing, Jun Zhou, and Hua Jiang. 2012. A path for Chinese civil society: A case study on industrial associations in Wenzhou, China. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  89. Yu, Keping 俞可平. 2014. 论国家治理现代化 (Essay on the modernization of state governance). Beijing: Social Science Academic Press.

  90. Zhang, Kangzhi. 2018. Xin shidai jigou gaige de xin tansuo (New exploration of contemporary institutional reform), Gonggong guanli yu zhengzhi pinglun (Public Administration and Policy Review) (7)5, 33–42.

  91. Zeng, Jingzhan. 2015. Did policy experimentation in China always seek efficiency? A case study of Wenzhou financial reform in 2012. Journal of Contemporary China 24 (92): 338–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  92. Zheng, Yongnian. 2007. De facto federalism in China: Reforms and dynamics of central-local relations. New Jersey: World Scientific.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  93. Zhou, Xuegang. 2010. The institutional logic of collusion among local governance in China. Modern China 36 (1): 47–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  94. Zhou, Xuegang, Lian Hong, Leonhard Ortolano, et al. 2013. A behavioral model of 'muddling through' in the Chinese bureaucracy: The case of environmental protection. China Journal 70: 120–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  95. Zhu, Ganwei. 2018. Jigou gaige de yanjin: Huigu yu qianjing (The evolution of institutional reform: Review and future prospects). Gonggong guanli yu zhengzhi pinglun (Public Administration and Policy Review) (7)5, 7–13.

  96. Zhu, Yapeng. 2013. Policy entrepreneurship, institutional constraints, and local policy innovation in China. The China Review 13 (2): 97–122.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Chinese Studies, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Wilhelmstr. 133, 72040, Tübingen, Germany

    Gunter Schubert

  2. Institute of East and South Asian Cultural Studies – Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Würzburg, Am Hubland, 97074, Würzburg, Germany

    Björn Alpermann

Authors
  1. Gunter Schubert
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Björn Alpermann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gunter Schubert.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Schubert, G., Alpermann, B. Studying the Chinese Policy Process in the Era of ‘Top-Level Design’: the Contribution of ‘Political Steering’ Theory. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 24, 199–224 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09594-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09594-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation