Abstract
Modernization theory has been instrumental to our understanding of the conditions necessary for a democratic transition. Proponents suggest a link between economic development and political development where the former leads to a stronger middle class with a greater interest in politics, potentially resulting in demands on the regime for concessions. Recent findings, however, suggest modernization theory is incomplete. On the one hand, the working class may play a crucial role in the regime concession-demanding process. On the other hand, recent empirical evidence suggests that both classes are politically apathetic and simply do not engage the regime for change. This study investigates this relationship between economic development and political development by answering the question of how economic development has impacted interest in politics across the social classes in China. I use ordered logistical regression to test hypotheses derived from these propositions. The results have important implications for understanding the relationship between economic development and political development in China and the popular support for the CCP to turn the Chinese dream into a Chinese reality.
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Notes
Other studies provide indirect insight into the potential impact of economic development on political interest. For instance, Dickson [6] and Chen and Dickson [3] investigated the CCP’s efforts to coopt the middle class entrepreneurs, the beneficiaries of economic development, and found evidence that these efforts were successful. Perhaps it is reasonable to conclude that these coopted entrepreneurs are unlikely sources of democratic change in China. In another study, Schubert and Ahlers [19] investigated the participation of villagers in local Chinese elections in purposively selected provinces based on levels of economic development and found that these elections actually strengthen CCP legitimacy at the expense of democratic change.
The 1995 wave of the WVS did not have any observations on the dependent variable; this wave was therefore excluded from the analysis.
This survey does have a subjective measure for social class where respondents are asked to state the social class they belong. Such a question is not a reasonable measure for social class in the context of this study and the problems are further exacerbated by the role ideology likely plays in the perception of Chinese social class. It is therefore highly unlikely that the meanings assigned to social class by the Chinese respondents in this survey even come close to the meanings useful for this scholarly endeavor.
Given the statistically significant findings on age for 2000 and 2005, it is clear those from the Mao period are more politically interested than those from the wealth accumulation period. However, a question that may arise is whether those enculturated with the Maoist ideology have greater political interest than those simply born during the Mao period but enculturated later on, during the turbulent 1980s, a period defined by protests for democratic change. In other words, is the relationship between political interest and age linear as the findings in this study suggest or more curvilinear where those who were politically active during the 1980s actually hold political attitudes similar to, or perhaps greater than, those of the Mao period? Perhaps it is prudent to investigate this relationship so I conducted a subsequent regression analysis by employing discrete dummy variables to represent different age groups: those born before 1950 who were most likely to develop their political attitudes during the Mao period; those born between 1950 and 1960 who were likely to develop their political interest in the latter years of the Mao period, the Deng period and likely expressed their political interest in the 1980s; those born between 1961 and 1971 who were likely part of the1990s when political interest was discouraged and interest in wealth accumulation was encouraged; and those born after 1971 who were most likely more interested in wealth at the expense of political interest. The findings support the conclusions drawn in this study in that those enculturated during the Mao period maintained greater political interest than successive groups: In 2005, while both those born before 1950 and those born between 1950 and 1960 were statistically significant, the odds ratio for the former was much higher; in 2000, only those born before 1950 demonstrated statistically significant political interest.
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Acknowledgments
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2012 annual meeting of the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs. The author would like to express a sincere thanks to the following individuals for their helpful comments: Jing Chen, Apinya Owen, Frederick Solt, David Wilson and the anonymous reviewers. All errors remain the responsibility of the author.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 1
Descriptive Statistics
1990 WVS
Variable | Mean | Std. deviation | Minimum | Maximum | Observations |
Age | 37.78 | 12.97 | 18 | 74 | 847 |
Beijing | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Civil society | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Confidence in government | 0.73 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Democratic support | – | – | – | – | – |
Education | 6.98 | 2.62 | 0 | 10 | 847 |
Efficacy | 7.05 | 2.12 | 1 | 10 | 847 |
Female | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Income | 3.24 | 1.69 | 1 | 10 | 847 |
Income inequality | 7.94 | 2.29 | 1 | 10 | 847 |
Interest in politics | 2.94 | 0.82 | 1 | 4 | 847 |
Internet | – | – | – | – | – |
Life satisfaction | 7.27 | 2.08 | 1 | 10 | 847 |
Manager | 0.35 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Manual working class | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Media * education | – | – | – | – | – |
Nationalism | 0.95 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Newspaper * education | – | – | – | – | – |
Party membership | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Professional | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Radio and TV * education | – | – | – | – | – |
Routine non-manual labor | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Social capital | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Tradition | – | – | – | – | – |
Voluntary organize—environment | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Voluntary organize—labor | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Voluntary organize—profession | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
Voluntary organize—religious | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0 | 1 | 847 |
2000 WVS
Variable | Mean | Std. deviation | Minimum | Maximum | Observations |
Age | 39.60 | 10.91 | 19 | 65 | 684 |
Beijing | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Civil society | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Confidence in government | 2.36 | 0.54 | 1 | 3 | 684 |
Democratic support | – | – | – | – | – |
Education | 4.60 | 1.71 | 2 | 9 | 684 |
Efficacy | 7.31 | 2.49 | 1 | 10 | 684 |
Female | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Income | 5.90 | 1.99 | 1 | 11 | 684 |
Income inequality | 6.39 | 3.15 | 1 | 10 | 684 |
Interest in politics | 2.92 | 0.88 | 1 | 4 | 684 |
Internet | – | – | – | – | – |
Life satisfaction | 6.57 | 2.44 | 1 | 10 | 684 |
Manager | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Manual working class | 0.82 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Media * education | 18.54 | 9.83 | 2 | 45 | 684 |
Nationalism | 0.98 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Newspaper * education | – | – | – | – | – |
Party membership | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Professional | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Radio and TV * education | – | – | – | – | – |
Routine non-manual labor | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Social capital | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Tradition | – | – | – | – | – |
Voluntary organize—environment | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Voluntary organize—labor | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Voluntary organize—profession | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
Voluntary organize—religious | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 | 684 |
2005 WVS
Variable | Mean | Std. deviation | Minimum | Maximum | Observations |
Age | 45.25 | 12.99 | 18 | 70 | 1876 |
Beijing | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 | 1876 |
Civil society | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 | 1860 |
Confidence in government | 3.32 | 0.64 | 1 | 4 | 1757 |
Democratic support | 8.54 | 1.73 | 1 | 10 | 1458 |
Education | 4.16 | 2.59 | 1 | 9 | 1851 |
Efficacy | 7.23 | 2.35 | 1 | 10 | 1722 |
Female | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1876 |
Income | 3.93 | 1.87 | 1 | 10 | 1496 |
Income inequality | 5.77 | 3.12 | 1 | 10 | 1560 |
Interest in politics | 2.80 | 1.00 | 1 | 4 | 1654 |
Internet | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 | 1857 |
Life satisfaction | 6.76 | 2.41 | 1 | 10 | 1825 |
Manager | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 | 1817 |
Manual working class | 0.83 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 | 1817 |
Media * education | – | – | – | – | – |
Nationalism | 0.87 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 1632 |
Newspaper * education | 1.32 | 2.67 | 0 | 9 | 1835 |
Party membership | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 1862 |
Professional | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 | 1817 |
Radio and TV * education | 3.35 | 2.94 | 0 | 9 | 1845 |
Routine non-manual labor | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | 1817 |
Social capital | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1748 |
Tradition | 4.23 | 1.51 | 1 | 6 | 1792 |
Voluntary organize—environment | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 | 1854 |
Voluntary organize—labor | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 1854 |
Voluntary organize—profession | 0.06 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 | 1852 |
Voluntary organize—religious | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 | 1852 |
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Owen, D.A. The Impact of Economic Development on Political Interest Across Social Classes in China: Turning the Chinese Dream into a Chinese Reality?. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 20, 185–202 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-015-9345-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-015-9345-3