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Water Resources Allocation Using Solution Concepts of Fuzzy Cooperative Games: Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core

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Abstract

In this paper, two new solution concepts for fuzzy cooperative games, namely Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core are developed. They aim for optimal allocation of available water resources and associated benefits to water users in a river basin. The results of these solution concepts are compared with the results of some traditional fuzzy and crisp games, namely Fuzzy Shapley Value, Crisp Shapley Value, Least Core, Weak Least Core and Normalized Nucleolus. It is shown that the proposed solution concepts are more efficient than the crisp games. Moreover, they do not have the limitation of Fuzzy Shapley Value in satisfying the group rationality criterion. This paper consists of two steps. In the first step, an optimization model is used for initial water allocation to stakeholders. In the second step, fuzzy coalitions are defined and participation rates of water users (players) in the fuzzy coalitions are optimized in order to reach a maximum net benefit. Then, the total net benefit is allocated to the players in a rational and equitable way using Fuzzy Least Core, Fuzzy Weak Least Core and some traditional fuzzy and crisp games. The effectiveness and applicability of the proposed methodology is examined using a numerical example and also applying it to the Karoon river basin in southern Iran.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The Henry Samuely School of Engineering, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

    Mojtaba Sadegh

  2. School of Civil Engineering and Center of Excellence for Engineering and Management of Civil Infrastructures, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

    Reza Kerachian

Authors
  1. Mojtaba Sadegh
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  2. Reza Kerachian
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Correspondence to Reza Kerachian.

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Sadegh, M., Kerachian, R. Water Resources Allocation Using Solution Concepts of Fuzzy Cooperative Games: Fuzzy Least Core and Fuzzy Weak Least Core. Water Resour Manage 25, 2543–2573 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-011-9826-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-011-9826-x

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