Abstract
In this essay I defend a kind of nonnaturalist normative supervenience, grounded in the essences of things. Essentialist theories, in fact, give us the tools to treat the nexus of normative supervenience as a nexus of metaphysical necessity, holding between the normative and the natural. In this context, essentialist grounding provides an explanation of normative supervenience that allows us to keep together both supervenience and nonnaturalism. Moreover, to achieve this significant result, I do not make use of hybrid properties, which are both normative and natural. Rather, I endeavour to show that the notion of hybrid property is based on an erroneous notion of grounding.
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Notes
In recent years, the notion of grounding has become especially important for dealing with many issues relating to traditional foundational metaphysical problems. For a general introduction to the topics of grounding and to its formal techniques see Correia and Schnieder (2012).
Recently, it has been proposed that we should consider normative properties as primitive, and define the nonnormative as the complement of the former. On this, see, for example, Hamilton (2016), p. 2, who defines a normative property as “… the feature of something … that has to do with its being favored or disfavored”. Now, this idea could be useful, but—if applied—it would not have any consequence for our perspective.
On this, see Hamilton (2016), pp. 11–12, and Leary (forthcoming), p. 4.
It might be observed that hitting the target depends not only on the arrow structure, but also on the archer’s skill. But this is irrelevant with respect to the fact that hitting the target is the end of the arrow. It is, in fact, quite obvious that hitting the target also depends on an archer’s ability. What is important is that—provided the ceteris paribus clause determining that the archer is of an expected standard—the arrow hits the target.
An object’s property of positivity is defined here in a purely formal way. An object that has the end to realise something is a “good object” if it realises it.
“|–” is the sign of logical derivability. Below, the sign “\({\square}_{l}\)” denotes logical necessity.
In Hamilton’s presentation of thesis EGN (Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism), he lays down three basic conditions. (GN): Particular normative facts are fully grounded in non-normative facts; (E): Facts about grounding are explained by the essences of the properties involved; (N) the essences of some normative properties cannot be specified in entirely non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation. Clearly, the first two conditions are coherent with my nonnaturalist conception grounded in essentialism, while the part in italics of the third condition is not. In a footnote at p. 39 he then explains—by putting forward two reasons—why according to him the two parts of the sentence cannot be separated. The first reason coincides with Rosen’s claim: “If a property’s essence really does specify non-normative sufficient conditions for its instantiation, then one may give a real definition of this property’s essence in purely non-normative terms—namely, by listing its essential sufficient conditions”. However, the second reason seems to be question begging. Actually, it criticises nonnaturalism because it attributes to the essences of normative properties a function that goes beyond that of establishing nonnormative sufficient conditions: “What work do these extraneous normative features do besides ensuring that the property is co-instantiated with certain non-normative facts?” (2016, p. 37).
This means: a’s volition of p—W(a, p)—gives rise to the obligation, originated from a, that p is realised—(Oap). But this does not preclude that the obligation to realise p is addressed to other subjects. It can happen, for example, that a wants b to open the door. In that case, it is an obligation imposed to b on the part of a—(Oa(b, p)). In order for the will to establish such a kind of obligation—(Oap)—no particular conditions are needed. It lies in the nature of the will in general to give rise to the obligatoriness of what one wants to realise. For example, legitimacy of the willing act is not required. Of course, the will of the legislator—this being a legitimate authority, if exterted within certain restraints—gives rise to an obligation addressed to all citizens, and legitimated by the right on the part of the legislative authority to enact legal obligations for all. However, even behind this requirement, it is the general form of obligation analytically required by the general nature of the will.
The comparative analysis of the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic end that I have performed has a general meaning, and, therefore, concerns different domains. Morality is a central area of application. There are different suggestions regarding its nonnaturalist foundations. Among them is the teleological foundation of Aristotelian tradition. According to that, the end of a human being is the rule on which to judge the goodness of her actions. Within this conception, the idea that the human being has an intrinsic end clearly plays an essential role. Second, there is the question of whether it is individual actions, or types of actions that are endowed with intrinsic ends. This essay is not the place to address that problem. However, the idea that the goodness of actions is derived from the end of human beings, and thus is not intrinsic to actions themselves, is likely to be more plausible. The moral quality of the action is in any case a real quality that supervenes on its nonnormative basis.
Shafer-Landau (2003) is classified by Leary as a Grounded Nonnaturalist, although his view is influenced by the idea of constitution, and not by that of grounding. For a treatment and a criticism of Shafer-Landau’s conception, see Corradini (forthcoming).
Let us note that the Stoic ethics is essentially based on the dichotomy between evil and suffering. One of Stoic virtues lies in apatheia: do not worry about suffering, because it is not a bad thing. “Pain is slight if opinion has added nothing to it; but if, on the other hand, you begin to encourage yourself and say, ‘It is nothing—a trifling matter at most; keep a stout heart and it will soon cease’; then in thinking it slight, you will make it slight.” (Seneca, Epistle 78, 13).
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Acknowledgements
I thank my co-editors Giuliana Mancuso and Bruno Niederbacher and two anonymous referees for useful comments on a earlier draft of this paper.
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Corradini, A. Essentialism and Nonnaturalist Normative Supervenience. Topoi 37, 631–643 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9458-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9458-8