Abstract
Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116, 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘\({\phi}\) & Might \({\neg\phi}\) ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data.
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Yalcin S. (2007) Epistemic modals. Mind 116: 983–1026
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Schulz, M. Epistemic modals and informational consequence. Synthese 174, 385–395 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9461-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9461-8