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The Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Relation Between Religion and Science Education: The Case of Evolutionary Theory

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Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between religion and science education in the light of the cognitive sciences. We challenge the popular view that science and religion are compatible, a view that suggests that learning and understanding evolutionary theory has no effect on students’ religious beliefs and vice versa. We develop a cognitive perspective on how students manage to reconcile evolutionary theory with their religious beliefs. We underwrite the claim developed by cognitive scientists and anthropologists that religion is natural because it taps into people’s intuitive understanding of the natural world which is constrained by essentialist, teleological and intentional biases. After contrasting the naturalness of religion with the unnaturalness of science, we discuss the difficulties cognitive and developmental scientists have identified in learning and accepting evolutionary theory. We indicate how religious beliefs impede students’ understanding and acceptance of evolutionary theory. We explore a number of options available to students for reconciling an informed understanding of evolutionary theory with their religious beliefs. To conclude, we discuss the implications of our account for science and biology teachers.

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Notes

  1. Because we will deal here with universal aspects of the human mind, we do not have a particular religion in mind. Nevertheless, the following discussion will be particularly relevant for, and is therefore primarily intended at, learning and understanding evolutionary theory in relation to Christian beliefs.

  2. The distinction between creationist and other Christian belief systems might appear somewhat artificial in the sense that any form of Christianity introduces the belief that God somehow created this world. We will use the word creationism here to indicate the belief that God has actively and directly intervened in this world, whether in the construction of the universe, in the creation of species or the design of biological functional complexity (adaptations). Such creationist beliefs often come with a resentment against evolution. Non-creationist religious beliefs hold that God created through secondary laws, that is, indirectly and thus tend to be more science-friendly.

  3. Here, we will apply the term ‘supernatural’ as some of the authors have defined it elsewhere (Boudry et al. 2010), namely as “referring to any phenomenon which has its basis in entities and processes that transcend the spatiotemporal realm of impersonal matter and energy described by modern science.”

  4. Evans (2008), Evans et al. (2011), González Galli and Meinardi (2011), Sinatra et al. (2008).

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Acknowledgments

Parts of this paper have been presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, October 29-31, 2010, Baltimore, Maryland. This research was supported by grants BOF08/24J/041 and COM07/PWM/001 from Ghent University and by the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders (FWO). We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful remarks.

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  1. Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium

    Stefaan Blancke, Johan De Smedt, Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman

  2. Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, University of Leuven, Dekenstraat 2, 3000, Leuven, Belgium

    Helen De Cruz

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  1. Stefaan Blancke
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Blancke, S., De Smedt, J., De Cruz, H. et al. The Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Relation Between Religion and Science Education: The Case of Evolutionary Theory. Sci & Educ 21, 1167–1184 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-011-9402-z

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