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The Failed Feminist Challenge to ‘Fundamental Epistemology’

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Abstract

Despite volumes written in the name of the new and fundamental feminist project in philosophy of science, and conclusions drawn on the strength of the hypothesis that the feminist project will boost progress toward cognitive aims associated with science and rationality (and, one might add, policy decisions enacted in the name of these aims), the whole rationale for the project remains (after 20 years, plus) wholly unsubstantiated. We must remain agnostic about its evidentiary merits or demerits. This is because we are without evidence to test the hypothesis: certainly, we have no data that would test the strength of the hypothesis as asserting a causal relationship between women and cognitive ends. Thus, any self-respecting epistemologist who places a premium on evidence-driven belief and justification ought not to accept the hypothesis. By extension, there is no reasoned basis to draw any definitive conclusion about the project itself. No matter how self-evidently correct.

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Correspondence to Cassandra L. Pinnick.

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This article originated as a lecture for the Fifth International Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy and is published by MENTIS in the GAP.5 Volume (2004).

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Pinnick, C.L. The Failed Feminist Challenge to ‘Fundamental Epistemology’. Sci Educ 14, 103–116 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-004-9515-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-004-9515-8

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