Abstract
This paper analyses the mechanisms of stratification and inequalities in educational achievements. The main objective is to determine how stratification leads to unequal educational outcomes and how inequalities are channelled through student characteristics, school characteristics and peer effects. This analysis is undertaken in five countries differentiated by their schooling systems. The countries are Japan, Finland, Germany, Italy and the UK, and the dataset used is PISA 2003. The analysis consists of a multilevel econometric model used to explain variations in performance scores. The explanatory variables are student, school and peer characteristics. The institutional context of each education system is used to interpret the results and to describe how inequalities arise. In the last section, policy implications, based on the regression results, are derived.
Résumé
Anatomie des inégalités dans les performances scolaires : le rôle des origines des élèves, l’influence des pairs et les caractéristiques scolaires – L’auteur analyse les mécanismes de stratification et d’inégalité dans les performances scolaires. L’objectif principal consiste à établir dans quelle mesure cette stratification engendre l’inégalité dans les résultats éducatifs, et dans quelle mesure les inégalités sont canalisées par les caractéristiques des élèves, celles des établissements et par l’influence réciproque entre les élèves. Cette analyse a été effectuée dans cinq pays dotés de systèmes scolaires différents : le Japon, la Finlande, l’Allemagne, l’Italie et le Royaume-Uni, le fichier de données utilisé est celui de PISA 2003. L’analyse consiste en un modèle économétrique à plusieurs niveaux qui permet d’expliquer les différences dans les performances scolaires. Les variables explicatives sont l’élève, l’établissement scolaire et les caractéristiques des pairs. Le contexte institutionnel de chaque système éducatif a été exploité pour interpréter les résultats et décrire la manière dont les inégalités se mettent en place. Les déductions en termes d’implications stratégiques, s’appuyant sur les taux de régression, en sont tirées dans la dernière section.
Zusammenfassung
Auflösung von Ungleichheit in Leistungsmessungen: Der Einfluss von Familienhintergrund, „peer effects" und Schulmerkmalen – In diesem Aufsatz werden die Mechanismen von Schichtung und ungleichem Bildungserfolg analysiert. In erster Linie gilt es festzustellen, wie Schichtung zu ungleichen Bildungsergebnissen führt und wie Benachteiligung durch Prägungen der Lernenden, durch bestimmte Merkmale der Schulen und durch den Einfluss Gleichaltriger im sozialen Umfeld (sogenannte „peer effects“) vermittelt werden. Diese Analyse wird in fünf Ländern mit verschiedenartigen Schulsystemen durchgeführt. Die Länder sind Japan, Finnland, Deutschland, Italien und das Vereinigte Königreich, die Datengrundlage ist PISA 2003. Die Analyse besteht aus einem mehrschichtigen ökonometrischen Modell zur Erklärung von Leistungsunterschieden. Die erklärenden Variablen sind Merkmale der Lernenden, der Schulen und der Peers. Anhand des institutionellen Kontextes des jeweiligen Bildungssystems werden die Ergebnisse interpretiert und es wird beschrieben, wie es zu Benachteiligungen kommt. Auf der Grundlage der Regressionsergebnisse werden im letzten Abschnitt Konsequenzen für politische Strategien abgeleitet.
Resumen
Desglose de desigualdades en puntajes de rendimiento: el papel del trasfondo social del estudiante, de los efectos grupales y de las características de la escuela – El autor analiza en este trabajo los mecanismos de estratificación y desigualdades en los logros educativos. El principal objetivo es determinar cómo la estratificación da lugar a resultados educativos desiguales y cómo las desigualdades son canalizadas mediante características del estudiante, características de la escuela y efectos grupales (peer effects). Este análisis se efectúa en cinco países diferenciados por sus sistemas escolares. Los países son Japón, Finlandia, Alemania, Italia y el Reino Unido, y el conjunto de datos utilizado es el de PISA 2003. El análisis consiste en un modelo econométrico multinivel, usado para explicar variaciones en los puntajes de rendimiento. Las variables que lo explican son las características del estudiante, de la escuela y del grupo que influye en el estudiante. El contexto institucional de cada uno de los sistemas educativos es utilizado para interpretar los resultados y describir cómo se producen las desigualdades. En la última parte del trabajo se deducen las consecuencias políticas, a partir de los resultados de regresión.
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Notes
Plausible values provide better estimates of standard errors than the Warm likelihood estimates (see p. 76 in the PISA data analysis manual). For more details on computation techniques refer to chapters 2 to 7 in the same manual.
For a full review of multilevel modelling techniques, see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002).
See Mostafa (2009, Chapter 4) for more details on endogeneity problems, for the estimation results of the different variants of the model and for the results on the Hausman test.
It should be noted here that the generalisations apply mostly to England since the English students dominate the sample. In fact, variation in student achievement (total dispersal of scores) is much higher in England and Northern Ireland than in Scotland and Wales when you break down the figures by country (see Green 2008).
In the case of Italy we can speak about social peer effects in the upper secondary phase because students have been together for more than one year.
Finland is the top-ranking OECD country in terms of average performance scores on mathematics in 2003.
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Acknowledgment
The author is grateful to Said Hanchane, Martin Weale, Andy Green and the participants at the PISA Research Conference in Kiel for their comments.
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Mostafa, T. Decomposing inequalities in performance scores: the role of student background, peer effects and school characteristics. Int Rev Educ 56, 567–589 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-010-9184-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-010-9184-6