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There cannot be two omnipotent beings

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Abstract

We argue that there is no metaphysically possible world with two or more omnipotent beings, due to the potential for conflicts of will between them. We reject the objection that omnipotent beings could exist in the same world when their wills could not conflict. We then turn to Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith’s argument that two coexisting beings could remain omnipotent even if, on some occasions, their wills cancel each other out so that neither can bring about what they intend. We argue that this argument has an absurd consequence, namely having to regard an utterly powerless being as omnipotent.

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Correspondence to James Baillie.

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Baillie, J., Hagen, J. There cannot be two omnipotent beings. Int J Philos Relig 64, 21–33 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-007-9152-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-007-9152-7

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