Abstract
A number of recent theories of quantum gravity lack a one-dimensional structure of ordered temporal instants. Instead, according to many of these views, our world is either best represented as a single three-dimensional object, or as a configuration space composed of such three-dimensional objects, none of which bear temporal relations to one another. Such theories will be empirically self-refuting unless they can accommodate the existence of conscious beings capable of representation. For if representation itself is impossible in a timeless world, then no being in such a world could entertain the thought that a timeless theory is true, let alone believe such a theory or rationally believe it. This paper investigates the options for understanding representation in a three-dimensional, timeless, world. Ultimately it concludes that the only viable option is one according to which representation is taken to be deeply non-naturalistic. Ironically then we are left with two seemingly very unattractive options. Either a very naturalistic motivation—taking seriously a live view in fundamental physics—leads us to a very non-naturalistic view of the mental, or else views in the philosophy of mind partly dictate what is an acceptable theory in physics.
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Notes
For a related discussion of self-falsifying propositions see Bardon (2005).
It suffices to either think of theories as models (which represent, or fail to represent, the way the world is) or as sets of propositions (which jointly represent, or fail to represent, the way the world is). Then the wordily state represented by an entertaining of, say, a timeless theory, is the worldly state that the theory qua model, models, or the worldly state that the set of propositions represent. Believing the theory to be true, then, is believing that the model holds of the world, or believing that the set of propositions are jointly true.
In particular, we do not mean by ‘representation’ the relatively specific doctrine called the ‘Representational Theory of the Mind’ by Fodor and others, which requires belief in very local and syntactically individuable representational states, and is more or less equivalent to the Language of Thought hypothesis.
Points, here, are points in configuration space; they are not point-sized objects: each is a three-dimensional object.
There is no reason to suppose that this phrase denotes the essentially modal notion that the phrase has in the lexicon of most philosophers.
Though we do not require that perdurantism is true: arguably one can make sense of there existing a lonely intrinsic duplicate of an enduring object at-a-time.
See for instance Dowe (1992).
Such as, for instance Lewis (1973).
It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
It is of the second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law.
It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly (Lewis 1979, p. 472).
This may not pick out a single unique path. Baron and Miller suggest that this will make little difference to the evaluation of counterfactuals.
For a useful survey of such views see Cummins (1989).
Exactly what naturalism is, and how to characterize it, is a vexed issue. If naturalism is nothing more than following science where it takes us, then perhaps almost all defenders of timeless theories are motivated by naturalism. Equally, there are other characterizations of naturalism that build more into a conception of naturalism, and which might be such that at least some defenders of timeless theories are not motivated by naturalism thus understood.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Jonathan Tallant, Oliver Pooley, Carlo Rovelli, Jeremy Butterfield, Sam Baron and Adrian Bardon, and participants at the International Association or the philosophy of Time Association (2016) for helpful criticisms and encouragement. The study was funded by Australian Research Council with Grant Nos. DP110100486, FT170100262, DP11010048.
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Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the contents of thought. Philos Stud 176, 1807–1829 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1097-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1097-4