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Propositional anaphors

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Abstract

Propositions are posited to perform a variety of explanatory roles. One important role is being what is designated by a dedicated linguistic expression like a that-clause. In this paper, the case that propositions are needed for such a role is bolstered by defending that there are other expressions dedicated to designating propositions. In particular, it is shown that natural language has anaphors for propositions. Complement so and the response markers yes and no are argued to be such expressions.

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Notes

  1. For varying views on the syntactic and semantic details, see Kratzer (2006), Moltmann (2013), and Moulton (2009, 2015).

  2. This assumption is not uncontroversial. For my current purpose, I will only defend that propositional anaphors are to be represented as variables. The leading alternative to identifying pronouns with variables identifies pronouns with definite descriptions. Part of the reason I adopt variabilism for propositional anaphors is that it is not clear what it would mean to analyze the anaphoric expressions I consider as definite descriptions.

  3. Modelling requires a decision on how to divide the explanatory labor between semantics and pragmatics, especially when it comes to anaphora resolution. These decisions I let the reader make for herself. For interested parties, Asher (1993) and Murray (2014) offer dynamic theories in which propositions participate in anaphora. But neither account captures the data that I present below. In particular, Asher does not consider dedicated anaphors or notice that they are licensed by tense phrases (Sect. 3). On the contrary, he maintains that propositional anaphors are not licensed in a principle way. Though Murray’s semantics is an improvement on Asher’s in that it can account for dedicated anaphors, she does not discuss how to explain Donkey sentences or strict/sloppy ambiguity (Sect. 2). Both accounts therefore require adjustments before they can fully model propositional anaphors.

  4. For example, see Asher (1993), Peterson (1997), Richard (2008), Stanley (2005), DeRose (2009), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009), Egan (2010), Schaffer (2012), Kaufmann (2012), MacFarlane (2014), and others.

  5. In an earlier draft of this paper quoted by Lebens (2017), I also argued that inference markers such as thus and therefore are relations in which the first relata is anaphoric on a proposition. That discussion is omitted in the present version. See Brasoveanu (2010) for a similar proposal.

  6. For example, pronouns get bound in a particular way and the conditions governing such binding do not obviously apply to tenses or modal auxiliaries. Still, these expressions are anaphoric. On temporal anaphora, see Partee (1973) and Webber (1988). Consult Roberts (1989), Stone (1997), and Stojnic (2017) for modal anaphora. Syntactic differences may also incline one to see similarity where there is not any. For example, both indefinite and definite descriptions can be antecedents for pronouns. Partee (1984) and others have argued for varieties of non-nominal anaphora on the grounds that the candidate expressions take antecedents akin to definites and indefinites. But definiteness is a special feature of determiner phrases that is realized through morphemes like the in English. It is not obvious that other varieties of anaphora do take definite antecedents when they lack the definiteness morphology. Though, see Schlenker (2006, 518) for an interesting exception.

  7. Of course, pronouns like she can be used without an antecedent when used deictically. In motivating there are propositional anaphors, our interest is only with anaphoric uses of pronouns. That is why I will not try to argue that propositional anaphors are exactly similar to pronouns.

  8. See Cushing (1972), Cornish (1992), and Needham (2012).

  9. Many of these considerations about complement so apply to do so constructions. For anaphoric accounts for this other use of so, I direct the reader to Ward and Kehler (2005) and Houser (2010).

  10. See Depiante (2000) and Reig Alamillio (2009).

  11. The simplified syntax I’m using omits projections not relevant to the paper’s purpose. For example, I am ignoring aspect and inflectional categories other than tense. Similarly, we will not need FinP (Rizzi 1997).

  12. See Chomsky (1995), Rizzi (1997), Cinque (1999), and Krifka (2001).

  13. I ignore imperatives deliberately. The received view is that imperatives lack tense (Zanuttini 1991). However, some languages appear to overtly mark imperatives for tense (van der Wurff 2007). The anaphors are similarly conflicted. So cannot be felicitously used after an imperative, but responses like Yes, I will or No, I won’t are felicitous. Perhaps their felicity is evidence for modal analyses of imperatives like Kaufmann (2012). Perhaps not. For reasons of space, I do not linger on how to explain such data.

  14. The meaning of a declarative is standardly assumed to be a proposition. That is similar to identifying the meaning of a tense phrase with a proposition. But there is increasing skepticism that declaratives have propositions for meanings. See King (2007), Yalcin (2007), Ninan (2010, 2012), Rabern (2012), and Yli-Vakkuri (2013) for discussion. I do not enter into those waters here. As consolation, I offer one observation for those who interested in how the present discussion bears on that debate. Some but not all of the reasons for such skepticism apply to tense phrases having propositions for meanings. In particular, reasons based on epistemic modals do not. Given the canonical syntax of Cinque (1999), epistemic modals always outscope the tense phrase by residing higher in the tree. As a result, the meaning of a declarative could fail to be a proposition even though a tense phrase has a proposition for its meaning because an epistemic modal does something to the proposition contributed by the tense phrase.

  15. After this paper was accepted, I encountered Roeper (2011). For further defense of the claim that a tense phrase projects a proposition, interested readers should consult his acquisition-based considerations.

  16. Hankamer and Sag (1976) and Kramer and Rawlins (2012) explain so this way. Kramer and Rawlins (2012), van Craenenbroeck (2010), Holmberg (2013), and Authier (2013) similarly propose that response markers carry elided material.

  17. Leading theories of ellipsis come in two assortments. Either ellipsis involves phonological deletion of syntax that is more or less the same as the antecedent material, or ellipsis involves a null proform of the same semantic type as the antecedent. I assume that ellipsis involves deletion. First, rival explanations involving ellipsis for the candidate expressions have only been proposed by those who see ellipsis as deletion. Second, hypothetical rivals where ellipsis consists in null proforms will not be interestingly different because the null proform will have to be a null proform for a proposition. For a recent survey of approaches to ellipsis, consult Merchant (forthcoming).

  18. See Aelbrecht (2010) and Merchant (2013).

  19. Sailor (2012, 4) offers a similar example of extraction failure out of so to which I am heavily indebted. His example differs in that it involves extraction from subject position. But that example might be independently ruled out by the that–trace effect. To dodge that complication, my examples involve extraction out of object position.

  20. See Lobeck (1995) and Depiante (2000).

  21. Here is the third problem I will hint at. Although non-elided counterparts can be found, it is not obvious that the silent–syntax theory can predict them. Response markers can be followed by a vast variety of sentences. The silent–syntax theory identifies each of these continuations as the non-elided counterpart of a bare response marker in that context. But the usual mechanisms for determining the content of the elided material is very conservative. Kramer and Rawlins (2012, 4) and Holmberg (2013, 37) follow Merchant (2001) and narrowly require that the elided material and its antecedent are mutually entailing.

  22. A referee notes that this variant of (42B) is felicitious: If yes, if Jim is invited to the party, we should not serve creme brûlée. But such a variant is not an instance of counterpart substitution because the non-elided counterpart is Yes, Jim is invited to the party. That lacks the extra if between yes and Jim that the variant adds.

  23. For comments or conversation related to this paper, I am indebted to Matthew Barros, Elizabeth Camp, Sam Carter, Simon Charlow, Veneeta Dayal, Andy Egan, Simon Goldstein, Jeffrey King, Nico Kirk-Giannini, Ernie Lepore, Martin Lin, Morgan Moyer, Jonathan Schaffer, Todd Snider, Una Stojnic, Matthew Stone, and an anonymous referee.

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    Peter van Elswyk

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van Elswyk, P. Propositional anaphors. Philos Stud 176, 1055–1075 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1042-6

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