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Minimizing indexicality

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Abstract

I critically examine Cappelen and Lepore’s definition of and tests for indexicality, and refine them to improve their adequacy. Indexicals cannot be defined as expressions with different referents in different contexts unless linguistic meaning and circumstances of evaluation are held constant. I show that despite Cappelen and Lepore’s claim that there are only a handful of indexical expressions, their “basic set” includes a number of large and open classes, and generates an infinity of indexical phrases. And while the tests can be used effectively to combat contextualism concerning ‘knows’ and ‘actual,’ many expressions not in their basic set test positive for indexicality, including quantifier nouns, weather reports, and comparative adjectives. I rebut their claim that context-shifting arguments inevitably lead to radical contextualism, and that if there were any indexicals beyond their basic set, communication would be impossible.

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Notes

  1. See for example Travis (1996, p. 454; 1997, p. 87), Recanati (2004, pp. 4, 56–58, 96–97, 136, 153, 154; 2005, pp. 174, 188). Searle (1980) was a forerunner.

  2. I presented prior drafts of this paper to the Arché Group at the University of St. Andrews in April 2008 and in the July 2011 “Content, Context and Conversation” workshop hosted by the Lichtenberg-Kolleg in Göttingen. I’m especially grateful to Herman Cappelen, Jonathan Schaffer, Jeff King, Nick Asher, Christian Beyer and anonymous referees for their comments.

  3. See e.g., Bar-Hillel (1954, p. 359), Montague (1968, p. 103), Lewis (1970, p. 184ff), Stalnaker (1976, p. 229), Lyons (1977, pp. 106, 637, 646), Leezenberg (1994, p. 1648), Perry (1997, p. 586), Levinson (2003), and Braun (2007).

  4. MacFarlane (2009) argues that the standard definition is too broad for different reasons, maintaining that extension can vary with context of use without content varying. I dispute this in Davis (2012, 2013b).

  5. Cf. Husserl (1900, 1.1.26, 6.1.5), Gale (1967, p. 151), Smith (1989), Plumer (1993).

  6. See Davis (2003, pp. 250–254).

  7. For non-deictic uses of ‘I’ and ‘now,’ see Davis (2011, 2013a, forthcoming: §v) and below. In Davis (2013a) I sketch a positive characterization of the deictic use as that in which the speaker’s perceptual or introspective focus determines the referent in a particular way, a theory I develop at length in Indexical Meaning and Concepts.

  8. I develop such a theory in Indexical Meaning and Concepts.

  9. Cappelen and Lepore call this the “collective description” test. I presume the test is whether it follows that ‘A and B both v’ is true not that is ever uttered.

  10. This is the basis of the identity test for ambiguity. See Zwicky and Sadock (1975).

  11. See also Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, p. 34).

  12. Cappelen and Lepore (2005a, pp. 1–2) use ‘disquotational’ for such reports.

  13. When a pronoun is used anaphorically, its referent is (or is related to) that of its antecedent. In the most natural interpretation of (5), the antecedent of ‘he’ in both uses is ‘the composer of Fidelio.’ But in other contexts of use, ‘he’ can be used demonstratively in (5) (imagine Ann and Bob pointing at a picture of Mozart), or deictically (imagine a context in which Ann and Bob are focused on the most perceptually salient male). In non-anaphoric uses, ‘he’ would naturally be emphasized. So indexicals not only have different referents in different contexts, the determinants of their referents vary depending on whether they are used anaphorically, demonstratively, or deictically.

  14. Cf. Humberstone (2006, pp. 312–315), Hawthorne (2006, p. 445), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, pp. 40–42).

  15. Cf. Williamson (2005, pp. 215–217). Cappelen and Lepore (2005a, p. 105) look at whether there are or can be false utterances of ‘p’ even though p.

  16. See Davis (forthcoming).

  17. Cf. Williamson (2005, p. 224). Compare and contrast Hawthorne (2004, pp. 100–101) and DeRose (2009, pp. 172–173).

  18. Cf. Borg (2007, §iii), Pagin and Pelletier (2007, p. 53).

  19. Cappelen and Lepore (2005a, p. 39; 2006, pp. 430, 470–471).

  20. See Doerge (2010) for a discussion of incompleteness arguments.

  21. It is also necessary to know in both cases how specific a location the speaker has in mind. Ann could in both cases be describing the weather in Brittany, or more specifically in Brest, or more specifically still in her neighborhood in Brest.

  22. Cf. Hawthorne (2006, p. 448), Borg (2007, §iii), Pagin and Pelletier (2007, p. 53).

  23. This is MacFarlane’s (2005a, b) tack. Bach (2006) proposes instead that ‘It is cloudy’ expresses a propositional radical, and that only its completions have truth values.

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    Wayne A. Davis

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Davis, W.A. Minimizing indexicality. Philos Stud 168, 1–20 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0191-x

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