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Knowledge claims and context: loose use

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Abstract

There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable strictness. “S knows p” is commonly used loosely to implicate “S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes.” A pragmatic account may use a range of semantics, even contextualist. I use an invariant semantics on which knowledge requires complete justification. This combination meets the Moorean constraint as well as any linguistic theory should, and meets the intuition constraint much better than contextualism. There is no need for ad hoc error theories. The variation in conditions of assertability and practical rationality is better explained by variably strict constraints. It will follow that “S knows p” is used loosely to implicate that the condition for asserting “p” and using it in practical reasoning are satisfied.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the members of my Fall 2005 seminar, Emily Evans, Paul␣Naquin, Nate Olson, David Pierce, Mark Pitlyk, Diana Puglisi, and Dan Quattrone, for many hours of fruitful discussion in which many of the ideas of this paper were tried out or tested. Jason␣Stanley graciously providing the proofs of Knowledge and Practical Interest for us to work through. I am also grateful to Paul Portner and Elena Herburger for the opportunity to present part of this paper in their Spring 2006 seminar on implicature. Steven Gross also provided helpful comments. My greatest debt is to Stewart Cohen, who provided pages of extremely helpful and thought-provoking objections and replies. Attributions to Cohen without references were personal communications.

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  1. Department Of Philosophy, Georgetown University, New North Bldg, Room 215, 37th And O Streets, NW, Washington, DC, 20057-1076, USA

    Wayne A. Davis

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Davis, W.A. Knowledge claims and context: loose use. Philos Stud 132, 395–438 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9035-2

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